Defendant Nancy Duncan appeals as of right from circuit court orders denying her motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition for Betty Duncan. We reverse.
Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the beneficiary of Norman Duncan’s pension benefits. Norman and Betty Duncan were divorced on February 27,. 1979. At the time of the divorce, Norman was a City of Berkley police officer and an active member of the department’s pension plan. Pursuant to the property settlement portion of the judgment of divorce, *404each party was awarded respective pensions free and clear of any interest of the other party. The following proviso' was added:
Provided, however, that the plaintiff, Betty Duncan, be and she is hereby awarded full rights to remain as beneficiary on the pension plan or retirement plan of the defendant, Norman Duncan.
No steps were taken to implement this ambiguous proviso.1 Norman took no steps to designate Betty as his beneficiary and Betty did not serve a copy of the judgment on the pension trustee. The intent of the parties is not discernible from this record, but we find it to be unnecessary to disposition because interpretation of a statute mandates reversal.
On May 20, 1982, Norman and Nancy Duncan were married and remained married until Norman’s death on December 20, 1987. On February 19, 1985, Norman designated Nancy as the beneficiary of his pension plan. He retired on September 4, 1985. After Norman’s death, Nancy received benefits as the beneficiary of Norman’s pension. Nancy received $1,282.57 per month (sixty percent) of the deceased retiree’s benefits. On March 8, 1988, Betty requested benefits in accordance with the February 27, 1979, judgment of divorce. Because Betty could have qualified as a survivor beneficiary only under the pension’s fifty percent formula, her dollar entitlement would have been less. No determination of that amount was made at the trial level. Facing competing claims for benefits, plaintiff initiated the instant action for declaratory relief._
*405The issue presented is whether the naming of Betty as the pension beneficiary under the judgment of divorce supersedes Norman’s subsequent designation of Nancy as the pension beneficiary. At the time of the divorce, city police pensions were exempt from any legal process. MCL 38.559(6); MSA 5.3375(9X6). This insulated such a pension from process in a divorce proceeding. See Public School Employees’ Retirement Bd v Wexford Circuit Judge, 39 Mich App 568; 197 NW2d 854 (1972). Although MCL 38.559; MSA 5.3375(9) was subsequently amended to allow pensions to be distributed as marital assets, the amendment only applies to judgments of divorce awarded on or after June 13, 1985. Sommerville v Sommerville, 164 Mich App 681, 688; 417 NW2d 574 (1987). It is correct, as Betty urges, that in 1979 courts could take pension benefits into account when disposing of marital assets. See Lindner v Lindner, 137 Mich App 569; 358 NW2d 376 (1984). However, the pension funds themselves were not subject to the court’s process. Id., p 572.
On these facts, we hold that the divorce court’s declaration in the February 27, 1979, judgment that Betty "remain” as the pension beneficiary was either precatory or fails as an attempted exercise of the court’s process on the funds themselves. For purposes of this decision we must assume that the divorce court’s intent was more than just to designate Betty as an interim beneficiary until Norman’s marital status changed or until an effective written designation was implemented. We decide the issue construing the facts most favorably to Betty. We hold that the declaration in the February 27, 1979, judgment that Betty "remain” as the pension beneficiary was an attempted exercise of the court’s process on the *406funds themselves, an exercise in excess of its jurisdiction.2
MCL 38.559(6); MSA 5.3375(9)(6) specifically provided that a beneficiary’s rights under the act would not be subject to process of law. Therefore, the court granting the divorce judgment was without authority to order the appointment of Betty as beneficiary or to later have it enforced against Norman’s designated beneficiary. Although the law has changed, as mentioned above, it is of no consequence to judgments of divorce awarded before June 13, 1985. Accordingly, the divorce decree’s naming of Betty as the pension beneficiary cannot be given legal effect.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant Nancy Duncan. Plaintiff’s payment obligation is to be determined on remand.
Holbrook, Jr., J., concurred.Whether Betty was to "remain” beneficiary until changed by Norman or by operation of law or by order of the court is not specified.
To the extent that Judge Shepherd sees a mutual agreement by the parties, a "bargain,” we think the conduct of the parties belies such a construction. A more plausible assumption would be that the divorcing husband had no existing compunction to designate a beneficiary. Betty, his first wife, was the plaintiff in the divorce action. She was not at any time a designated beneficiary, either before or after the divorce, according to plaintiff’s records.