This is an appeal by the State of Montana and the state board of equalization of the State of Montana from the judgment made and entered October 23, 1952, in the district court of Flathead County.
This controversy arose over the taxable value fixed by the state board of equalization on the real estate, improvements thereon and the personal property of the Alex Shulman Company located in Flathead County, Montana, for the year 1950, the Alex Shulman Company contending the assessed valuation was excessive.
From the record it appears that the Alex Shulman Company was a foreign corporation, incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington; that in December 1950 said corporation was dissolved and that Laurence S. Carlson was designated as trustee in liquidation thereof.
The record further shows that on or before November 30, 1950, Alex Shulman Company elected to and did pay one-half of its said taxes so determined by the state board of equalization for the year 1950 and elected not to pay the other one-half until on or before May 21, 1951, and that it did pay to the county treasurer of Flathead County, Montana, the said first half of said taxes in the sum of $4,926.41.
Thereafter and on January 26, 1951, plaintiff Carlson, as trustee for Alex Shulman Company, proceeding under the provisions of R.C.M. 1947, section 84-4502, commenced this action in the district court of Flathead County, praying for judgment against Flathead County and its county treasurer for the aforesaid sum of $4,926.41, or such portion thereof as has been illegally levied and collected.
It appears that the county assessor of Flathead County had assessed the property of Alex Shulman Company for the year 1950; that thereafter Alex Shulman Company applied to the *26board of county commissioners of Flathead County, while it was sitting as a board of equalization, for a hearing; that after hearing before said county board of equalization the board denied the application in toto; that the Alex Shulman Company then appealed to the state board of equalization of the State of' Montana; that on September 20, 1950, the state board of equalization heard the appeal at Kalispell, and after a full hearing the said board made its order reducing the original assessed valuation of the lands in the sum of $31,709' and reducing the assessed valuation on the improvements thereon in the sum of $25,000; upon this reduced assessed valuation the tax was computed.
The tax for state purposes computed thereon amounted tO' approximately $641.96, the county and local tax amounted to approximately $9,210.85 or a total tax for the year 1950 of $9,-852.81.
Following the filing of the complaint on January 26, 1951, no move or appearance was made by or on behalf of the County of Flathead to defend against or resist the said action. Therefore on December 10, 1951, the State of Montana and the state board of equalization filed a petition for leave to intervene in the action and tendered complaint in intervention.
On January 7th the judge made, and on January 8, 1951, filed his order granting the State of Montana and the state board of equalization permission to intervene and to file said complaint resisting, opposing and defending against plaintiff’s claims, demands and action.
Thereupon plaintiff filed a motion to strike the complaint in intervention and on August 13, 1952, the judge by order granted the motion of plaintiff to strike such complaint, whereupon the State of Montana and the state board of equalization filed their election to stand upon their said complaint in intervention.
Thereafter on motion of Edward Schroeter, county attorney of Flathead County, and E. B. Foot, deputy county attorney, the judge entered and filed the judgment of dismissal of said *27complaint in intervention on October 23, 1952. This appeal followed.
The only question pertinent to this appeal is: Was the judge correct in entering judgment dismissing the complaint in intervention.
Clearly the judge was in error.
The controlling statute is R.C.M. 1947, section 93-2826, which reads: “Any person may, before the trial, intervene in an action or proceeding who has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both. An intervention takes place when a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceeding between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and the defendant, and is made by complaint, setting forth the grounds upon which the intervention rests, filed by leave of the court and served upon the parties to the action or proceeding who have not appeared, and upon the attorneys of the parties who have appeared, who may answer or demur to it as if it were an original complaint. ’ ’ Emphasis supplied.
This section of our Code, like all others, is to be liberally construed to effect the legislative intent and purpose. R.C.M. 1947, sections 93-401-15, 93-401-16. “The codes establish the law of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.” R.C.M. 1947, section 12-202.
The determinative questions here raised are of vital interest and concern to the State of Montana and to the state board of equalization as they pertain to our tax laws, the procedure relative thereto and the public fiscal policy of the sovereign State of Montana.
The complaint in intervention sets forth inter alia that the State of Montana and the state board of equalization, and each *28thereof, have an interest in the litigation, that in addition to the levy of taxes upon said reduced valuation for Flathead County for the year 1950, the State of Montana by the order of the state board of equalization required taxes thereon also to be levied for state purposes, which state levies were made under and as required by section 2, Chapter 25, Laws of Montana 1949, as follows: 6 mills for the university millage fund; % mill for the state insane hospital bond interest and sinking-fund; 1 mill for the university building bond interest and redemption fund.
The complaint further sets forth that the taxes levied against said property as aforesaid for the said year of 1950 approximate $9,852, and the state ’s proportion is an integral part thereof; that the State of Montana and the state board of equalization would be adversely affected in the event the court might overlook the facts to be brought out and the state have no opportunity to be heard.
The district court was correct in granting the State of Montana and the state board of equalization leave to intervene. The State and the state board of equalization were interested parties. In Stack v. Coyle, 59 Mont. 444, 197 Pac. 747, 749, Chief Justice Brantly, speaking for this court, said of section 6496, now section 93-2826, supra, that “The statute is broad enough in terms to permit intervention in any case, provided only the person seeking to intervene can show either an interest in the subject-matter of the action, or an interest in the success of either of the parties, or an interest in the subject matter against both.” Emphasis supplied. Compare Moreland v. Monarch Min. & Mill Co., 55 Mont. 419, 178 Pac. 175; Burgess v. Hooks, 103 Mont. 245, 62 Pac. (2d) 228.
In State ex rel. Thelen v. District Court, 93 Mont. 149, 157, 158, 17 Pac. (2d) 57, 58, Justice Angstman speaking for the court said of section 9088, Rev. Codes 1921, now section 93-2826:
“Under our statute, any person may before trial intervene in an action or proceeding, who has an interest in the matter in *29litigation, in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both. * * *
“ * * * Prompted by a desire to do no injustice, and to render complete justice, courts allow the right of intervention in an equity case with liberality, when the petitioner’s rights will be directly affected by the decree.”
In Equity Co-operative Ass’n v. Equity Co-operative Milling Co., 63 Mont. 26, 37, 206 Pac. 349, 352, this court said in considering this section: “ * * * it appears to us that the trial court was in error in not allowing the filing of the complaint in intervention. The statute is plain * * * and, as the interveners made prima facie showing of interest in the subject of the litigation, they should have been allowed to intervene.” Compare State ex rel. Westlake v. District Court, 118 Mont. 414, 167 Pac. (2d) 588, 590, 163 A.L.R. 911, wherein this court said: “It is also made clear by the holding in the same case [Burgess v. Hooks, 103 Mont. 245, 62 Pac. (2d) 228, 229] that ‘after intervention, the intervener’s rights are as broad as those of the other parties to the action’ and the holding in State Bank of New Salem v. Schultze, 63 Mont. 410, 209 Pac. 599, 603, that ‘from a reading of the statute, it was clearly the legislative intent that the ordinary rules of pleading shall apply to a complaint in intervention * *
The sovereign State of Montana, acting for all of the people, delegates the right to intervene whenever a person, a corporation or other entity brings itself within the terms of section 93-2826, supra. The sovereign people are the ones who thus have delegated such power, right or authority as is deemed proper but also retaining for their sovereign use the right to intervene on behalf of themselves through their designated state officers, when that right has been prima facie shown.
The complaint in intervention here filed under leave of the court had and obtained, states facts which, if true, show plainly and unequivocally that inteveners, the State of Montana and the state board of equalization, have a vital public interest in the subject matter of the action, that is, in the taxes due the State *30of Montana as directed by the state board of equalization, and as enforced by said board under its constitutional powers, and expressly subsection (6) of section 84-708, R.C.M. 1947, which specifically requires said board to supervise the administration of all revenue laws of the State of Montana and assist in their enforcement.
The district court erred in granting the motion of plaintiff to strike the interveners’ complaint in intervention and in entering the judgment herein. Such judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint in intervention is reversed and the cause is hereby remanded with directions to reinstate the complaint in intervention and to then proceed in conformity with the views expressed herein.
ME. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIE, and ME. JUSTICE ANDEESON, concur.