This is an action by certain property owners of Yakima county challenging the constitutionality of chapter 253, Laws of 1955, p. 1035, generally referred to as the Ryder act, and seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes raised by levies based upon assessed valuations provided by that act to be the basis for school district taxes.
Two different assessed valuations have heretofore been recognized in this state as the basis for the imposition of ad valorem taxes, one for the levy of state taxes and the other for local taxes. The assessed valuation which must be used for local taxes, i.e., for levies made by local authorities for local purposes, is fixed by the county assessor and county board of equalization. State ex rel. State Tax Comm. v. Redd (1932), 166 Wash. 132, 6 P. (2d) 619. The other is that used for state tax levies and is arrived at by the state board of equalization, which equalizes the figures certified to it by the assessors of the various counties to the end that the valuation in each county will conform to the determination of the constitution that it be “fifty per centum of the true and fair value of such property in money: ...” Constitution, amendment 17. (This same standard, of course, guides the county assessors in their work.) That *785this equalized valuation might be used as the basis for the levy of state taxes was determined by State ex rel. Showalter v. Cook (1933), 175 Wash. 364, 27 P. (2d) 1075.
The assessed valuation of the taxable property in Yakima county (other than public utilities, etc.) on January 1,1955, as certified by the county assessor, was $92,508,500. As determined by the state board of equalization, it was $125,-011,486, over thirty-five per cent more than that established by the local authorities.
Chapter 253, Laws of 1955, authorizes all tax levies made by or for any school district to be based upon the equalized valuation of the taxable property within the district as determined by the state board of equalization, on the theory that such levies are for a state purpose.
Plaintiffs contend that chapter 253, Laws of 1955, is unconstitutional for various reasons; and they allege that the use of the equalized valuation as determined by the state board of equalization has resulted in an increase of $336.86 in taxes on their property in Yakima county over what the tax would be had it been levied on the basis of the assessed valuation as certified by the county assessor. The trial court sustained a demurrer to their complaint and dismissed their action. The plaintiffs appeal.
We shall consider first the appellants’ contention that a school district tax is a local tax for a local purpose, and that, as heretofore determined by this court in State ex rel. State Tax Comm. v. Redd, supra, the tax must, under the provisions of Art. XI, § 12, of the state constitution, be levied on the assessed valuation as certified by the county assessor.
The respondents seek to avoid the holding of the Redd case that levies for local taxes for local purposes cannot be based upon the valuation as equalized by the state board of equalization by reasoning which can be expressed in the following syllogism based upon the holdings of this court. Major premise: Property valuations as equalized by the state board of equalization may be used as the basis for state tax levies. State ex rel. Showalter v. Cook, supra. Minor premise: All taxes levied by or for school districts, although local taxes, are for state purposes. Newman v. *786Schlarb (1935), 184 Wash. 147, 50 P. (2d) 36. Conclusion: Property valuations as equalized by. the state board of equalization may be used for the levying of taxes by or for school districts.
The conclusion is patently a non sequitur. From the fact that a state tax can be levied upon property valuations as equalized by the state board of equalization, it does not follow that a local tax for a state purpose may be so levied.
However, we do not base our conclusion that chapter 253, Laws of 1955, is unconstitutional on any syllogistic weakness. To put the respondents on the strongest possible ground, we will assume, but not concede, that a local tax levy for a state purpose may be based on the assessed valuation of the property within the district as equalized by our state board of equalization. Having made that assumption, our position is that there is no support, in fact or in any opinion of this court, for the proposition stated in the minor premise, that all taxes levied by or for school districts are for state purposes.
Newman v. Schlarb, supra, strongly relied upon by the respondents, is not authority for any such proposition. We there held that, when the state directed the counties to levy a tax sufficient to produce five cents per day for each pupil in attendance in the common schools during the preceding year, the tax levied in conformity therewith was for a state purpose. It is to be noted that no question of assessed valuation was before the court; we were concerned only with a mandate to raise a specific amount of money. Whether the revenue was to be raised by a low millage on a high valuation or by a high millage on a low valuation was immaterial — the amount to be raised was definite and certain, or could be made so, and was determined by the state.
We attempt no distinction between the county involved in Newman v. Schlarb, supra, and the school district involved in the present case. We agree (assuming always, as pointed out in Newman v. Schlarb, that there is a local benefit to justify a tax on a local district or subdivision for a state purpose) that, if the state can require a county to raise a certain amount for a state purpose, it can require a *787school district to raise a certain amount for a state purpose. That is not the situation in the present case.
The legislature, in chapter 253 of the Laws of 1955, has for the first time said (a) that, regardless of who determines the amount, all taxes levied by a school district are for a state purpose, and (b) that a local tax (it being for a state purpose) can be raised by a levy based on the assessed valuation of property within the district as equalized by the state board of equalization. (We have heretofore indicated that we will assume but not concede (b).)
We direct our consideration to proposition (a).
Heretofore, any local tax that the court has declared to be for a state purpose has been in an amount fixed by the state through its legislature as (1) requiring a county to levy a sufficient tax to raise an amount equivalent to ten dollars for each child of school age in the county (Laws of 1909, chapter 97, title 3, subchapter 9, § 5, p. 322; Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4936) (This tax was never declared to be for a state purpose but we assume it so to be on authority of Newman v. Schlarb, supra); (2) requiring a county to levy a tax sufficient to raise an amount equivalent to five cents per day for each pupil in attendance in the common schools of the county (Laws of 1933, chapter 28, § 12, p. 171; Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §4936).
The amount of the tax to be levied by or for the school districts within the contemplation of chapter 253, Laws of 1955, will be fixed not by the state but by the directors of the various school districts, and frequently oh the basis of millages specifically approved by the voters of the district. The amounts raised will vary from district to district, as will the millages required to raise those amounts. In the absence of any mandate by the state as to the amount to be raised (which was the basis for the decision in Newman v. Schlarb, supra), a requisite for a tax for a state purpose is missing and we are dealing only with a local tax for a local purpose.
Further analysis discloses that, apart from the fact that the state has not fixed the amount of the tax to be levied on behalf of the school districts, substantial portions of the *788taxes levied by or for school districts are local taxes for predominantly local purposes. To the extent that any discretion is vested in school districts as to what taxes shall be levied and where and how expenditures are to be made,' there is local control and autonomy. The taxes that will be raised by levies based on the assessed valuation as provided for in chapter 253 are definitely local in the sense that they cannot be expended outside of the district in which they are raised, either for the benefit of the state or for the benefit of some other district. The state cannot control the amount of a school district budget or, except by certain millage limits, the millage levied to raise the amount of that budget. Nor will the state control the way in which the tax money will be spent, within certain limitations. The state exercises certain controls, such as minimum salary provisions and the requirement that the schools within the district must meet certain minimal educational standards. A very effective but indirect control is made possible by insistence that certain specific requirements must be met before state funds will be available for building and perhaps for other purposes.
Enough has been and will be said to make clear that some matters involved in the construction and operation of the public schools which are reflected in the amount of district taxes could be considered as state purposes only by stretching the imagination to the breaking point. To state an extreme position, whether a school shall have expensive drinking fountains or paper cups beside a faucet is a matter of local and not state concern, at least if the district is paying the bill. There might even be districts that would prefer two or three-storied buildings to the modern trend of having everything on one floor, or that would put major emphasis upon old-fashioned subjects, such as spelling. Such things and the amounts expended therefor seem to us predominantly matters of local concern.
This is neither the time nor the place for a detailed consideration of the somewhat complex relationship between the state, the county, and the school districts so far as schools *789are concerned, and our purpose is only to demonstrate that part, at least, of the taxes raised by local school districts are for such predominantly local purposes that by no process of reasoning can they be considered to be for state purposes.
This becomes even more apparent when it is realized that in many instances the millages which districts vote upon themselves beyond the normal constitutional and statutory limits are for construction purposes. In some instances, at least, these represent the triumph of local pride and determination to build and control their own schools despite state recommendations for consolidation which might represent financial savings and lower taxes.
The constitution itself, in amendment 27, which deals with the limitation upon municipal indebtedness, states that no part of the indebtedness allowed by the section shall be incurred “for any purpose other than strictly county, city, town, school district or other municipal purposes . . . ” (italics ours), and then gives school districts some additional leeway on indebtedness for capital outlays under certain circumstances. Since school district taxes are, in part at least, to pay indebtedness incurred for “strictly . . . school district or other municipal purposes,” the levies must, on the reasoning of the Redd case, supra, be based upon the valuations fixed by the local authorities and not on those valuations as equalized by the state board of equalization, in the absence of any attempt to segregate between state and local purposes.
The contention that school district levies should be based on the valuation as equalized by the state board of equalization has heretofore been made on behalf of a school district and rejected by this court. In State ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10 v. Kelly (1934), 176 Wash. 689, 30 P. (2d) 638, the Pierce county assessor had fixed the assessed valuation of property in the county at $55,780,370 and the valuation as equalized by the state board of equalization was $64,-860,895. The school district sought to compel the ten-mill levy for schools on the valuation fixed by the state board of equalization. If such millage is for a state purpose now, *790it was for a state purpose then; nevertheless, we held that the Redd case and the reasons therein stated governed the situation, and that the levy must be based upon the valuation fixed by the county assessor. We approved that holding and quoted at some length from that opinion in State ex rel. School District No. 37 v. Clark County (1934), 177 Wash. 314, 31 P. (2d) 897.
Upon both reason and precedent, an act which provides that school district levies which must, in part at least, be for strictly or predominantly local purposes, shall be based upon assessed valuations other than those fixed by the proper local authorities, is a violation of Art. XI, § 12, of the constitution for the reasons more fully set forth in State ex rel. State Tax Comm. v. Redd, supra. The declaration by the legislature in § 2 of chapter 253, Laws of 1955, p. 1036, that everything done by a school district is “carrying out a state function for state purposes,” must yield not only to the constitutional recognition that there are strictly school district purposes (constitution, amendment 27) but to the facts to which we have already directed attention. Jensen v. Henneford (1936), 185 Wash. 209, 217, 53 P. (2d) 607; Aberdeen Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Chase (1930), 157 Wash. 351, 366, 289 Pac. 536, 290 Pac. 697, 71 A. L. R. 232. As said in Jensen v. Henneford, supra, an actual purpose cannot be changed into something else by a legislative declaration, “any more than a man can transform his character by changing his attire or assuming a different name.”
We recognize that the state has the power, if the legislature should see fit to exercise it, to abolish school districts and operate the schools of the state as a state function divorced from all local control. But as long as the state chooses to permit schools to be operated on a district basis as are “other municipal corporations,” the provisions of Art. XI, § 12, of the constitution apply thereto.
We expressly reserve, as being unnecessary to a decision in the present case, the following questions:
1. Whether the assessed valuation as equalized by the state board of equalization can be made the basis for a levy *791for so much of a school district tax as the state, by legislative mandate, directs the district to raise.
2. Whether the assessed valuation as equalized by the state board of equalization can be made the basis for a levy by or for a school district if it can be established that the resultant tax is for a state purpose. This is the question to which we have assumed an affirmative answer for the purposes of this opinion.
3. Whether a local tax for a state purpose must be paid into the state treasury to comply with Art. VII, § 6, of the state constitution, which provides: “All taxes levied and collected for state purposes shall be paid in money only into the state treasury.”
The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs’ cause of action is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrers interposed to the complaint of the plaintiffs.
Weaver and Ott, JJ., concur.