(dissenting) — Chapter 253, Laws of 1955, p. 1035, commonly known as the Ryder act, reads as follows:
“Section 1. The public school system of this state is in critical need of equalized opportunity for local school districts to provide adequately for proper education of the greatly increasing number of children now enrolled and soon to enroll in the public schools of the state. Studies by the legislative counsel have revealed this situation to be largely the result of nonuniform valuations placed upon taxable property contrary to constitutional requirements. This present condition makes it imperative that the state enforce constitutional standards of valuation to effect uniform levels of support of the state’s public schools.
“Recognizing its constitutional and paramount duty to make ample provision for the education of children within the state, the state hereby declares its purpose to fulfill that duty enjoined upon it by the Constitution by requiring that the valuation of taxable property within school districts, for purposes of school district taxes, be made to conform to standards required by the Constitution.
“Sec. 2. The education, through the establishment and maintenance of public schools, of all children residing within the state is hereby declared to be a state function, and each school district in the exercise of every activity required by or done pursuant to law in the establishment and maintenance of public schools is hereby declared to be carrying but a state function for state purposes.
“Sec. 3. All tax levies made by or for any school district shall be based on the assessed valuation of the taxable property within each respective school district, which assessed valuation shall be the value (1) placed upon said property by the county assessor as equalized by the county board of equalization, and by the tax- commission in respect to property assessed by it pursuant to chapters 84.12 and 84.16 RCW, (2) and equalized at fifty percent of true and fair value in money by the state board of equalization.
“Sec. 4. Each county assessor shall transmit to the state board of equalization before the first day of August next succeeding the adjournment of the county board of equalization, an abstract of the equalized aggregate value of all taxable property within each school district, or part of a school dis- • trict, situated within his county.
“Sec. 5. Within three days following final adjournment of the state board of equalization, the secretary thereto shall certify to each ■ county assessor the aggregate value, as *795equalized by said board, of all taxable property within each school district, or part of a school district, situated within each respective assessor’s county.
“Sec. 6. No county shall be required to transfer to school district funds, on account of school district levies on property assessed pursuant to the provisions of this act, amounts in excess of taxes actually collected by the county treasurer.
“Sec. 7. None of the provisions of this act shall be construed to derogate from the exemptions provided for in RCW 84.36.080 and 84.36.090.”
As I understand the reasoning of the majority, it can be expressed in the following syllogism. Major premise: Levies for local taxes for local purposes cannot be based upon the valuation as equalized by the state board of equalization. State ex rel. State Tax. Comm. v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P. (2d) 619 (1932). Minor premise: If the amount of tax to be levied by a local authority for school district purposes is not fixed by the legislature, the holding of Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 50 P. (2d) 36 (1935), does not apply, and any tax levied by such an authority is levied for local purposes. Conclusion: Property valuations as equalized by the state board of equalization may not be used for the levying of taxes by or for school districts.
In the first place, the Redd case was not concerned with a question of equalization, but was confined to a consideration of the power of the state board to reassess property within a county for local taxation purposes.
“The cases at bar,” we said, “do not involve the question of the power under the constitution of the legislature to classify the subjects of taxation to the end that taxation be equal and uniform throughout the state, and that all property be taxed in proportion to its value.
“To secüre uniformity in taxation, as our constitution requires, it is essential that the valuation of the subjects upon which the tax is levied be uniform. To accomplish this purpose, boards of equalization have been provided, one object of which is to so equalize assessments that no one part of a taxing district will be required to pay more than its proportionate share of a tax.
“ ‘Equalization of assessments has, for its general purpose, to bring the assessments of different parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one of the *796parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax. To accomplish this purpose assessment rolls are equalized by county courts, boards of supervisors or commissioners, and the aggregate of the county assessments by a state board established for the purpose. This is not done by changing individual assessments, but by fixing the aggregate sums for the several districts at what, in the opinion of the board, they should be, so that general taxes may be levied according to this determination instead of on the assessor’s footings.’ 1 Cooley on Taxation (3d ed.), p. 784. (Italics mine.)”
But assuming that the legislature may not require a local authority to use the values fixed by the state board of equalization for local purposes, I cannot accept the proposition that the financing of public education is a state purpose if the legislature chooses to fix the amount of taxes to be levied, but is a local purpose if the legislature chooses not to fix the amount but only to provide a method of equalizing the valuation on which school taxes shall be based. No such distinction was drawn in Newman v. Schlarb, supra, a case which recognized that school taxes serve both a state and local purpose. Regardless of that fact, this court held, if a state purpose is served, the legislature may impose a tax or direct its imposition by the local authority. And in State ex rel. State Tax Comm. v. Redd, supra, we held that valuation of property is a part of the process of imposing taxes within the meaning of the constitutional provision relied upon by the opponents of the legislation involved in that case, in Newman v. Schlarb, and in the case at bar. This constitutional provision is Art. XI, § 12, which reads:
“The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes.”
Newman v. Schlarb, supra, involved an attack upon the constitutionality of § 12, chapter 28, Laws of 1933, p. 171, which provided, in part, as follows:
“The county commissioners of the several counties of the *797State of Washington shall annually at the time of making the tax levy for county purposes, levy a tax on all property subject to taxation in their county, sufficient to produce five cents per day for each pupil in attendance in the common schools of the county during the preceding school year.”
It was contended by the plaintiffs in that action that the said statute violated Art. XI, § 12, of the state constitution, which provides that the legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties or other municipal corporations; or, in the alternative, that it violated the uniformity clause of Art. VII, § 1 (amendment 14), and also the provision of intiative measure No. 94, which limited the state levy to two mills.
The court quoted §§ 1 and 2, Art. IX, of the constitution, which provide:
“Sec. 1. It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.
“Sec. 2. The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools. The public school system shall include common schools, and such high schools, normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be established. But the entire revenue derived from the common school fund and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools.”
After quoting these constitutional provisions, this court said:
“Thus, at the very inception of our state government, the framers of the constitution recognized what all of the states of the Union have recognized, namely, that the promotion of the general intelligence of the people constituting the body politic is the most effective way of increasing the usefulness and efficiency of its citizens, upon which the safety and welfare of the government depends. 24 R. C. L. 588.
“Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, the state legislature at its first session established a general uniform system of common schools to be administered by state, county, and school district officers. Laws of 1889-90, chapter 12, p. 348, § § 1 and 2. The same provisions appear in the present *798school code adopted in 1909. Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 4518, 4519 [P.C. §§4720, 4721],
“Our decisions have uniformly recognized that, by the declared policy of the state, the duty of educating the children within its borders is fundamental. . . .
“It is apparent that the.legislature, acting in pursuance of the-constitutional mandate, saw fit to establish a system which, because of its ramifications, was to be administered through the cooperation of state, county, and school district officers. It needs no argument to prove that the system must of necessity be operated and conducted in that way. The state, being engaged in the exercise of a paramount duty could, of course, select any method that it saw fit in order to discharge that duty. Consequently, it reserved to the proper state officers the general supervision of the system and. entrusted to its various political subdivisions certain functions and details in which they were particularly interested and concerned.
“The establishment and maintenance of public schools throughout the state is primarily and essentially a state purpose, from which local and special benefits are expected to, and do, flow to the counties and the various municipalities of the state. In the performance of such general duties and purposes, the state calls upon and utilizes its-constituent political agencies and for such purposes confers such powers and imposes such duties upon them as it deems necessary. These local subdivisions are created by the sovereign power, of the state and under its paramount authority, with the view, not only of having them administer their own local and internal affairs, but also of having them carry out the policies of the state at large and assist in the accomplishment of the general purposes of the state.
“Consequently, the state, through the legislature, may not only require such subdivisions to levy taxes for public purposes, but may also fix the amount to be levied by them provided that such purposes, though of a general nature and for the benefit of the whole people, result in special benefits to the particular subdivision. [Citing cases.]
“We hold, therefore, that the purpose of education is not merely a county purpose,- but rather a state purpose, with local benefits to the county, meeting both state and local needs. The statute, Rem. 1935 Sup., § 4936, does not impose a tax upon the county for county purposes, but for state purposes. Hence the statute does not violate Art. XI, § 12, of the state constitution.” (Italics mine.)
*799See, also, Rauch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568, 576, 48 Pac. 253; School Dist. No. 20, Spokane County, v. Bryan, 51 Wash. 498, 502, 99 Pac. 28, and State ex rel. School Dist. No. 37, Clark County, v. Clark County, 177 Wash. 314, 31 P. (2d) 897. A reading of the Clark County case does not disclose whether the contention was made that the valuation for school tax purposes should be that fixed by the state board of equalization, and the question is not discussed. It was assumed in State ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10 v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P. (2d) 638, that school district taxes are levied for a local purpose. Both of these cases, cited by the majority as supporting its conclusion that the legislature may not require state equalization of property valuations for school district purposes, were decided prior to our decision in Newman v. Schlarb, supra, and consequently, in so far as they are contrary to that decision, they have been overruled sub silentio.
The majority assume that the taxes levied by the school districts under the present system are disbursed and spent for purposes different from those for which the taxes levied under the 1933 act (held constitutional in Newman v. Schlarb), were spent. There is nothing in the record to indicate that there has been a change in the uses made of school funds, nor is such a contention made by any of the parties to this suit. If the education of the children of this state was a state purpose in 1933, it is still a state purpose.
The only difference between the situation under the 1933 act and the situation at the present time is that under the 1933 act the county was required to levy a tax sufficient to produce five cents per day per pupil, whereas, since the repeal of that act, the amount of tax to be levied is discretionary within the 12-mill limit.
However, the amount of state funds which is made available to a school district under RCW 28.41.060 is reduced if the district has failed to levy the maximum tax allowed by law, based on a valuation of fifty per cent of the true and fair value of the property located within the district. In other words, the amount of state funds made available to *800the district depends on the amount of taxes raised within the district. Thus, the legislation indirectly regulates the amount of taxes to be levied, and it was in aid of this regulation that the Ryder act was passed. If the constitution permits a direct regulation of the taxes to be levied by a county or school district for school purposes, I see no reason why an indirect regulation should be held unconstitutional.
The state legislature may impose a tax on or direct the imposition of a tax by a county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for purposes of education. Newman v. Schlarb, supra. The raising or lowering of assessed valuations is a step in the imposition of a tax. State ex rel. State Tax Comm. v. Redd, supra. In my opinion, whether we extend the holding of that case to include the equalization process, or whether we conclude that equalization of assessed valuations is not the imposition of a tax, the state legislature may, through its agency, the state board of equalization, equalize the assessed valuation of property for school tax purposes.
Judge Schwellenbach, in his concurring opinion, states that the act is unconstitutional because it does not provide that the taxes collected shall be remitted to the state treasurer. I do not see the necessity of such a provision in a statute which does not purport to provide for the collection of taxes and the payment over to the proper agency of the funds collected. If the act provided that taxes collected for school purposes should not be remitted to the state treasurer, or if it provided that they should be collected and remitted to some other agency, I would see the merit in this contention. As the act stands, however, it makes no provision for the collection and handling of taxes, except that in § 6 there is an implied reference to the taxing procedures provided for in RCW 28.44, 84.52 and 84.56. Assuming that this provision, by reason of this implied reference, is contrary to Art. VII, § 6, of the constitution, it appears to be surplusage. It is only remotely related to the equalization process, if it is related to it at all. An act cannot be declared unconstitutional in its entirety by reason of the fact that some one or more of its provisions is uncon*801stitutional, unless the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions are unseverable and are so intimately connected and interdependent in their meaning and purpose that it could not be believed that the legislature would have passed the one without the other, or unless the part eliminated is so intimately connected with the remainder of the act that the elimination would render the remainder incapable of accomplishing the purposes of the legislature. Unemployment Compensation Department v. Hunt, 17 Wn. (2d) 228, 135 P. (2d) 89, and cases cited therein.
If there exists a valid objection to the manner in which school funds are held and disbursed, it should be directed to the statutory provisions pertaining to these matters, and of these the appellants do not complain. Since 1889, school taxes have been paid to the county treasurer, who retains them as custodian after crediting them to the proper school funds. If the appellants’ argument here has any validity, the handling of all school taxes collected by the counties is contrary to the provisions of the state constitution and has been since the date that instrument was adopted.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Hamley, C. J., Mallery, and Finley, JJ., concur with Rosellini, J.June 7, 1956. Petition for rehearing denied.