concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s disposition except for its conclusion that plaintiffs breach of contract claim is not subject to arbitration.
Regarding the breach of contract claim, the majority uses first-amendment law to decide a non-first-amendment issue. The pivotal question does not involve ascertaining the line between church and state; rather, it involves the meaning of the word “ecclesiastical” as that word is used in the Synod’s bylaws. Focusing solely on the presence or absence of “neutral principles” is thus misleading because such an approach defines the word “ecclesiastical” according to unrelated cases rather than the document in which it appears.
The bylaws provide an exception to arbitration for contractual arrangements involving employment benefits. However, the bylaws also state that the exception does not apply in cases involving ecclesiastical issues. In determining the scope of the word “ecclesiastical” in this context, we should be guided by the plain language of the bylaws. According to that language, all internal disputes and disagreements constitute “a matter of grave concern for the whole church.” Moreover, the bylaws explicitly advocate rejection of the “win lose” attitude that prevails in secular conflict. Instead of engaging in such conflict, parties should “proceed with one another with ‘the same attitude that was in Christ Jesus’ (Phil. 2:5).” Indeed the bylaws call upon “all parties to a disagreement” to utilize the Synod’s internal system for dispute resolution.
Such language reflects meaning that gets lost in a mere “neutral principles” analysis. I acknowledge that a standard employment contract would qualify under the exception to arbitration set forth in the bylaws. However, the instant alleged contract is not standard; it is an inducement to resignation in connection with allegations that a pastor made inappropriate sexual contact with a parishioner. I do not believe we can cleanly excise the alleged agreement from its context; the agreement is inevitably bound up with the circumstances in which it arose. Accordingly, I believe this scenario falls under the class of conflicts identified in the bylaws as “a matter of grave concern” and detrimental to the “body of Christ” (i.e., the whole church).
At a minimum, there is a legitimate question about whether the bylaws require arbitration. Accordingly, we should affirm the judge’s order. See Heiden v. Galva Foundry Co., 223 Ill. App. 3d 163 (1991) (noting that doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration). The majority’s analysis would be apt in determining whether plaintiff’s breach of contract claim should be dismissed outright or merely stayed pending arbitration. However, that analysis should not govern the determination of whether an arbitration agreement exists in the first place.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s disposition dealing with plaintiffs breach of contract claim. I concur in the remainder of the disposition.