specially concurring:
In ruling that a post-trial motion is not necessary following the direction of an adverse verdict and entry of judgment thereon, the majority finds that such a result was intended by the legislature. Quite the contrary seems to me to be true. Section 68.1(2) of the Civil Practice Act provides in part: “A party may not urge as error on review of the ruling on his post-trial motion any point, ground or relief not particularly specified in the motion.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap, no, par. 68.1.) It follows from a literal reading of this provision that the absence of a post-trial motion prevents appellate review of any alleged errors made during the course of a civil jury trial. Section 68.1(5) provides: “Any party who fails to seek a new trial in his post-trial motion, either conditionally or unconditionally, as herein provided, waives the right to apply for a new trial, except in cases in which the jury has failed to reach a verdict.” Literally read, these two provisions plainly apply to all civil jury trials, except those in which the jury failed to agree; their inclusiveness indicates to me a legislative intent to require a post-trial motion in all civil jury trials except those.specifically excluded. See American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Ill. 174, 180-1.
The majority evidently agrees with the argument employed by the Second District Appellate Court in Larson v. Harris, 77 Ill. App. 2d 430, to the effect that the rules applicable to a bench trial should be applied to allow appeal of directed verdict cases without a post-trial motion rather than requiring the presentation of the same argument on the same issue to the same judge. I do not find this argument persuasive for it is frequently necessary in connection with post-trial motions to do precisely this. The purpose of a post-trial motion is to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any errors in the trial and eliminate the necessity of appeal. These errors are not infrequently made by the judge himself, and argument on the post-trial motion in such cases ordinarily requires presentation of essentially the same argument to the same judge. I do not regard this as a completely meaningless exercise, however, since it does afford the judge an opportunity for a more deliberate consideration of the propriety of the action which he took originally amid the pressures of a jury trial.
I see little logic in eliminating post-trial motions as unnecessary to preserve for review a trial court’s action in directing a verdict and requiring such motions to preserve all other judicial errors. As I read the opinion of the court, it is impliedly assumed that a trial judge who directed a verdict will never, after argument on a post-trial motion, change his mind, and that to require such motion in those cases is an “archaic and futile ceremony.” Concededly, a post-trial motion following a directed verdict may not often succeed, but I would not attribute to our trial judges such an absence of objectivity as to say they will never recognize their error, if error it was.
While, if I thought it an open question, I would not necessarily disagree with the majority conclusion that a post-trial motion should not be required in directed verdict cases, I believe the legislature has determined that it should be. Sufficiently substantial reasons do exist to make the desirability of such a requirement a debatable question and it seems to me inappropriate for this court to infer from the statutory language a contrary intent for which I find no support therein.
Accordingly, I agree that we should reinstate the judgment of the circuit court of Wayne County, but I would do so on the ground that claimed errors therein are not subject to review.
Mr. Justice Kluczynski took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.