dissenting.
The majority holds that Officer Kelly violated ORS 810.410(3) when, during a lawful traffic stop, he asked defendant whether defendant had any drugs on his person or in his vehicle and whether he could search defendant and his vehicle. Thus, according to the majority, the officer’s mere words constituted a violation of the statute. Because I disagree that ORS 810.410(3) applies to the questions asked by Kelly, I dissent.
It is important to keep in mind that the issue before us requires us to discern the intent of the legislature and not to promulgate law that reflects our policy choices. ORS 174.020. That legal axiom is important to this case because it appears from the majority opinion that its ruling is prompted by a belief that it is bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 895 P2d 306 (1995). The correctness of that rationale depends on how broadly one interprets the holding in Dominguez-Martinez. It is the purpose of this opinion to demonstrate that the majority’s rationale does not withstand scrutiny when the issue is analyzed properly.
*186When interpreting a statute, the initial inquiry regarding the intent of the legislature begins with the text and context of the statute. ORS 810.410(3)(b) provides that a police officer “[m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic infraction for the purpose of investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of citation.” On its face, the statute says nothing about a limitation on the contents of conversation between an officer and a motorist. Moreover, in construing the same language, the Supreme Court has held that it is not self-explanatory and accordingly, it is necessary to resort to the legislative history of the statute to interpret the legislature’s intent in a given context. State v. Porter, 312 Or 112, 116-17, 817 P2d 1306 (1991). In accordance with the proper application of the rules of statutory construction, we must follow the Supreme Court’s lead.
The legislature enacted the statute in 1981 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 280 Or 95, 570 P2d 52 (1977). In Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that the criminal law enforcement procedures retained by the legislature for driving while under the influence of intoxicants, a Class A traffic infraction, contained too many penal characteristics not to be considered as a criminal prosecution under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. Brown was charged with his first offense for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). He moved in the trial court for an order for state-provided legal counsel as an indigent, for a trial by jury and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Those rights were expressly excluded by statute when the charged offense was a traffic infraction. The trial court allowed the defendant’s motion, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in the light of the entire statutory scheme involving the treatment of DUIIs. The court held that such prosecutions implicated guarantees applicable to criminal cases, and that those guarantees could not be circumvented by labeling the offenses as infractions.
As a result of the holding in Brown, the legislature was faced with the prospect that the same analysis would be *187applied to enforcement procedures for all traffic infractions. That prospect was reinforced by the holding in Easton v. Hurita, 290 Or 689, 625 P2d 1290 (1981), in which the court held that under a statute restricting searches and seizures for traffic infractions, a police officer could not make a full custody arrest and lodge the motorist in jail for a minor traffic offense.
Consequently, Senate Bill 55 (later to become ORS 810.410) was introduced in the 1981 Legislative Assembly at the request of the Special Courts’ Committee of the Oregon Judicial Conference. A member of the Special Courts Committee explained to the House Judiciary Committee considering the bill:
“The purpose of Senate Bill 55 is to establish effective law enforcement procedures for traffic infractions that can be distinguished from criminal law enforcement procedures and at the samé time retain authority for police officers to stop, investigate, identify and cite motorists for traffic infractions.” Testimony, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 2, SB 55, July 2, 1981, Ex. A.
The purpose of SB 55 was explained in a similar fashion in the floor debates of both the Senate and the House. Tape recording, Third reading to the Senate, June 1, 1981, Tape 97B; see also Tape recording, Third reading to the House, July 29, 1981, Tape 35, Track II. As is apparent from the testimony before the legislature, there is no suggestion that the legislature was concerned about what an officer says to a motorist during a traffic stop. Rather, its focus was on an effort to segregate traffic enforcement procedures from ordinary criminal procedures so as to avoid the attachment of constitutional guarantees associated with criminal offenses. Because neither the text nor the context of the statute, nor its underlying legislative history, clearly answers whether the legislature intended that the statute apply to questions asked by an officer during a traffic stop, we must look elsewhere.
After the adoption of the statute by the legislature, the law became subject to judicial interpretation. When a statute is interpreted by an appellate court, the interpretation becomes part of the meaning of the statute as if it had been written into the text at the time of its enactment, and *188the principle of stare decisis is implicated. Walther v. SAIF, 312 Or 147, 149, 817 P2d 292 (1991). Based on this principle, the majority holds that the court’s decision in Dominguez-Martinez is controlling. However, the principle of stare decisis does not apply when the facts of the case relied on and the facts of the cases at issue are materially different. I-L Logging v. Mfgrs. & Wilse. Ind. Exc., 202 Or 277, 333, 273 P2d 212, 275 P2d 226 (1954). Because the facts in Dominguez-Martinez are materially different from the facts in this case, the majority errs in applying the holding inDominguez-Martinez here.
To properly interpret the holding in Dominguez-Martinez, it is necessary to read it in the light of the language of the statute, the legislative history underlying the statute and two previous cases decided by the Supreme Court interpreting the statute. In the first, State v. Farley, 308 Or 91, 775 P2d 835 (1989), a police officer stopped the defendant (presumably with flashing red lights), because his vehicle had no visible license plates, an apparent traffic infraction. As the officer approached the defendant’s vehicle, the officer noticed a valid temporary vehicle permit posted on the windshield. The permit allowed the vehicle to be operated without license plates and therefore satisfied the reason for the initial stop. Nonetheless, the officer continued the stop by approaching the vehicle and asking the defendant for his driver’s license. The defendant presented his license and told the officer that he had no insurance. The officer detained the defendant and his vehicle while he checked on the status of the license. On the basis of the information subsequently obtained, the officer cited the defendant for driving while suspended and for driving without insurance. The court affirmed the trial court’s suppression of the evidence obtained after the stop of the defendant’s vehicle. It ruled that under the provisions of ORS 810.410(3), the officer’s authority to stop the defendant was limited to the purposes of the investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction of operating a vehicle without license plates. The court concluded,
“We have reviewed the substantial legislative history submitted post-argument, and we are satisfied that the legislature, in setting the limits for detention and citation of traffic offenders, did not intend to force operators of vehicles *189in this state to be detained by police for the minutes (be it 5 or 30) it takes to make a radio call to determine if there are any outstanding warrants for the operator. If a driver has committed no observed wrong, the legislature has directed that the driver be allowed to proceed.” 308 Or at 95 (emphasis supplied).
The next significant Supreme Court case to interpret ORS 810.410(3)(b) was State v. Porter. In Porter, the defendant was stopped after the officer discovered that there was an arrest warrant outstanding for the car’s registered owner and after observing that the defendant matched the description of the registered owner. After confirming that the defendant was the subject of the warrant, the officer arrested the defendant and placed him in the back seat of the patrol car. While making the arrest, the officer had noticed an open beer can behind the driver’s seat. He returned to the defendant’s car and picked up the beer can, observing that it contained some beer. He then conducted a search for more open beer cans pursuant to an investigation under the Open Container Law. While conducting that search, the officer discovered controlled substances leading to the subsequent indictment and conviction of the defendant.
The defendant argued that under ORS 810.410(3), the officer could not lawfully have searched for additional open containers because his investigation for the traffic violation for keeping an open container of an alcoholic beverage was complete when the officer found the first beer can. The Supreme Court agreed. In the light of the legislative history of the statute, the court held that the search during the traffic stop exceeded the scope of investigation permitted by the statute and that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of the subsequent search. The court said, “[a] search that explores for evidence of other crimes or infractions is not ‘reasonably related to the traffic infraction, identification and issuance of a citation.’ ” Porter, 312 Or at 120 (emphasis in original).
The holding in Porter was followed by State v. Dominguez-Martinez. There, the officer made a lawful traffic stop because the vehicle he was following had changed lanes *190twice without signaling. Dominguez-Martinez was driving the vehicle. The officer took defendant’s driver’s license back to his patrol car where he learned by radio that the license and registration for the vehicle were in order. Then, the officer returned to the vehicle and tested the turn signals on the automobile, finding that one was defective. He told the defendant that he would not issue a citation for a defective turn signal, but that he should have the signal repaired. He then leaned forward into the automobile resting his elbow on the automobile door, returned the license and registration to the defendant, and said, ‘You guys are free to go, adiós.” The defendant started the automobile’s engine. However, the officer continued to lean on the door and asked within one or two seconds, “Do you mind if I ask you a few more questions?” The subsequent questioning led to a consent to search and the discovery of controlled substances.
The Dominguez-Martinez court relied on its holdings in Porter and in Farley in its analysis. The court stated:
“From those cases, it is clear that, under ORS 810.410, a police officer has authority to stop a vehicle and detain the occupants in order to investigate a traffic infraction that he or she has witnessed. It also is clear, however, that an officer who stops a person for a traffic infraction may investigate only that infraction, unless the state can point to some basis other than the traffic infraction to broaden the scope of the investigation. Moreover, it is clear that, after the investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction is complete, an officer does not have authority under ORS 810.410 to continue to detain the person stopped for the traffic infraction.
“In this case the officer stopped defendant for making unsignaled lane changes. * * *
“But, the trooper did not stop with that limited detention and focused investigation [in regard to the reason for the traffic stop]. * * *
“In this case, at the same time that the trooper was telling defendant and [his passenger] that they were free to go, he stood in the open doorway, and defendant could not have driven away. * * *
“The trooper’s authority to detain the two men dissipated when he completed the investigation ‘reasonably related to *191the traffic infraction * * * and issuance of citation.’ ORS 810.410(3)(b). Thus, as in Farley, the officer’s authority to detain defendant under the statute had dissipated, and the men should have ‘been allowed to proceed’ without further detention. Accordingly, the trooper exceeded his authority to stop and detain a motorist in order to conduct a traffic investigation under ORS 810.410(3).
******
“As this court held in Porter, ‘because the object of [ORS 810.410(3)] is to define the authority of officers to respond to a traffic infraction,’ the evidence should be suppressed when police officers exceed that authority. * * *
“As in Porter, the trooper in this case exceeded his authority to detain defendant in the context of a traffic stop, and the evidence that the trooper found during the ensuing investigation should be suppressed.” 321 Or at 212-14 (emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted).
Dominguez-Martinez and Farley are about unlawful detentions or restraints of liberty after a traffic stop has ended. Neither is on point factually with this case, and therefore, the principle of stare decisis is inapplicable. In those cases, it was the additional physical detentions of the defendants after the traffic stops had or should have ended that resulted in the court ruling that the statute had been violated. In this case, the questions were asked during the traffic stop, not after it terminated. In all likelihood, Kelly’s questions took less than 30 seconds to ask. Certainly, there is no support in this record for a finding that the physical action of asking the questions occurred after the stop had ended or that it prolonged the duration of the stop. Because of the factual differences, Dominguez-Martinez and Farley are of no legal import under the principle of stare decisis. The majority’s reliance on their holdings as the basis for its interpretation of the meaning of the statute is misplaced for that reason.
Similarly, the holding in Porter does not control the issue before us based on the principle of stare decisis because of material factual differences. In Porter, the statute was violated because the investigating officer undertook a separate search after completing his investigation of the traffic violation that was unrelated to the authorized investigation. *192Here, Kelly’s questions occurred during the traffic investigation, not after its completion. More importantly, his questions did not constitute a search, unlike the unlawful actions of the officer in Porter. As will be amplified below, the nature of the physical actions taken by an officer during a traffic stop will determine whether the statute has been violated, and a proper analysis requires that the facts of each case be evaluated independently in the light of the legislature’s intent. In summary, because the questions asked by Kelly did not unlawfully detain defendant nor did they constitute an unlawful search, the principle of stare decisis is inapplicable, and the majority errs when it utilizes that principle as a basis for its rationale.
We are left then with an absence of any indication from the text of the statute, its legislative history and the cases interpreting it, as to whether the legislature intended the statute to reach the specific issue before us. When, after consideration of the text, context, and legislative history, the intent of the legislature as to a particular interpretation of the statute remains unsettled, we resort to a determination as to how the legislature would have intended the statute to be applied, had it considered the issue. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 612, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Ultimately, we must give effect to the policy of the statute in the light of the legislative histoiy and general maxims of statutory construction. Westwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Lane County, 318 Or 146, 158, 864 P2d 350 (1993), adhered to as modified on recons 318 Or 327 (1994).
The majority’s result is sustainable only if it carries out a policy that the statute imposes. We know from the legislative history that the statute was intended only to address the concern that the prosecution of traffic violations could implicate criminal prosecution constitutional guarantees and that the legislature sought to obviate the problem by restricting the physical actions of officers to the investigation occasioned by the traffic stop. Accordingly, it necessarily followed that once a traffic investigation ended, the officer’s authority under the statute also terminated. That tells us that the legislature was concerned about conduct that had constitutional implications. This case presents facts that give *193rise to a different policy choice because they do not involve officer conduct after the traffic stop ends, but conduct that occurs during the traffic stop and which would be constitutionally permissible in other contexts.
The majority’s result finds its genesis in the dissenting opinion in State v. Bonham, 120 Or App 371, 852 P2d 905, rev den 317 Or 584 (1993), an argument that we previously considered and rejected in that case and in State v. Allen, 112 Or App 70, 826 P2d 127, rev den 314 Or 176 (1992). In Bonham, a majority of this court held that a request to consent to search could be made lawfully under the statute after the traffic stop had ended. The dissenting opinion disagreed, opining that the authority to stop a motorist for a traffic violation circumscribed the officer’s authority to ask questions about matters only related to the reason for the stop, absent probable cause that other offenses had been committed.1 We rejected the dissent’s argument in Bonham because the request to a motorist for consent to search after a traffic stop did not raise a constitutional question, and the statute on its face governs only what occurs during a traffic stop. Now, the dissent’s reasoning in Bonham reappears in the majority opinion and is applied to the factual context of a request for consent to search being made during the traffic stop. By adopting that reasoning, the majority sub silentio overrules our holdings in Bonham and in Allen.
Thus, the inquiry must be made anew, “Does the policy of the statute as intended by the legislature require the majority’s conclusion?” Relying on the holding in Porter does not answer the question, because making a request to search does not implicate constitutional guarantees in the way that a search does. A “search,” such as what occurred in Porter, involves the invasion of a person’s privacy interests. State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 206, 729 P2d 524 (1986). Defendant’s *194privacy interests were not invaded by Kelly’s questions. Police officers may approach private citizens at any time and ask those kinds of questions without implicating any constitutional guarantees or invading privacy interests. State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 409, 813 P2d 28 (1991); see also State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 624 P2d 99 (1981) (holding that inquiring about whether the defendant was carrying narcotics as he was leaving the terminal building of the Portland International Airport was not a “stop” within the meaning of ORS 131.605 et seq, nor did it violate the defendant’s constitutional rights).
In State v. Underhill, 120 Or App 584, 853 P2d 847, rev den 318 Or 26 (1993), we held that an officer’s “checking out” of the defendant by asking him for his full name, his date of birth and perhaps his social security number did not constitute a stop under ORS 131.615 or implicate constitutional concerns. We concluded:
“Thus, even though most citizens would find it beyond 'ordinary social intercourse’ to be asked by a stranger for name, date of birth and Social Security number, and would find it objectionable that the inquiries were made, especially with the sole purpose of further investigating the individual, those considerations are not factors in determining whether there has been a seizure. It is the physical action of the officer that determines that result. Id. at 588-89 (emphasis supplied).
The questions that Kelly asked defendant could be asked lawfully in the context of any other citizen-police encounter, whether they took place in a suspect’s home, on the street, at the police station or in a public place. In addition, the facts of this case do not trigger any other policy concerns such as an unauthorized detention or restraint of liberty.2 When these facts are juxtaposed with the purpose of *195the statute (to permit prosecution of traffic violations without furnishing constitutional criminal procedural guarantees), there is no nexus. Because the majority’s result does not engage with the purpose of the statute, the majority has, in effect, created a new exclusionary rule by judicial fiat. Therein lies its error. It may be meritorious to be concerned about the psychological advantage that police may have when they ask questions outside the purview of a traffic investigation during a traffic stop. There also could be disagreement about whether public policy should permit the use of a lawful traffic stop as a springboard to inquire about matters such as possession of controlled substances or firearms. However, those are legislative concerns, and our authority is restricted to carrying out the legislative purpose for this statute. We are not authorized to insert into a statute what has been omitted. ORS 174.010. That is only for the legislature to do.
For that reason, I dissent.
As authority for its position in Bonham, the dissenting members relied on the holding in State v. Porter. However, their reliance was misplaced, because they failed to recognize that the facts in Porter implicated constitutional issues. That distinction is important because, had the Porter court upheld the officer’s search without probable cause under the statute, it would have run afoul of the constitutional prohibitions against unlawful searches and seizures. The legislature could not have intended that result.
In contrast, the holdings in Farley, Porter and Dominguez-Martinez all implicate constitutional concerns because the facts in those cases constituted unlawful restraints of liberty or as in Porter, an unlawful search. The actions of the officers in those cases were inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the statute to confine traffic investigations to conduct other than that which could trigger the full quiver of criminal procedural rights.