dissenting
I disagree with the majority when it concludes that Dickenson’s conviction should be reversed. Instead, I would remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether juror Lane was biased.
Generally, when the defendant presents evidence that a juror was possibly biased, and concealed this bias on voir dire, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the juror was in fact biased. Berkman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), trans. denied. However, in order to receive such a hearing, a defendant must first present some specific, substantial evidence showing a juror was possibly biased. Id. It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a strong enough indication of bias exists as to entitle the defendant to a hearing on the matter. Id. Proof that a juror was biased against the defendant or lied on voir dire entitles the defendant to a new trial. Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind.1988). In order to warrant a new trial, there must be a showing that the misconduct was gross, and that it probably harmed the defendant. Id.
Here, after the trial, Dickenson presented affidavits to the court alleging that juror Lane was a friend of the victim’s wife, Karen. The affidavits further claimed that Lane and Karen were seen frequently together and were overheard to have discussed the case before trial. I find that the evidence presented by the defendant was strong enough to indicate possible bias on the part of the juror. Thus, the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on this matter to *243determine whether the juror was in fact biased. Instead, the trial court heard only the testimony of Lane and determined that Lane was not biased and that the defense had not “made even a prima facie case with regard to that.” Record at 654. Thereafter, the defense made an offer of proof by presenting the oral statements of several witnesses.
Based on this offer of proof and the defense affidavits, the majority concludes that Lane was biased, was untruthful during voir dire, and that her misconduct was gross and probably harmed the defendant. In order to reach these conclusions, the majority had to believe the witness statements and affidavits over Lane’s testimony. Put differently, the majority reweighed the evidence and judged the credibility of the witnesses. The majority was wrong to do so. These are functions of a trial court and not an appellate court.
Consequently, I would remand this ease to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.2 At the hearing, the trial court should hear evidence from both sides before deciding whether juror Lane was in fact biased.
. In the event this case were remanded, the trial court should consider recusing itself since it has already determined that the juror was not biased.