dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify chasing the defendant. The majority states the correct test for resolving the issue: “whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the intrusion into the defendant’s security.” At 1274.
The question is whether the defendant’s flight upon seeing the police officers, his putting his hand in his pocket as he was running, the fact that this happened in a high-crime area, and the knowledge and experience of the police officers who recognized the defendant (“there’s Cherokee” At 1273) created a reasonable suspicion in the officers of criminal activity.
In order to support a finding that a reasonable suspicion was justified, particular supporting facts, not merely “inarticulate hunches,” are required, People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 146, 544 P.2d 392 (1975), *1278although the police may rely on their training and experience. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) This assessment is based upon the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Detective Chavez testified at the suppression hearing that “based on our experience before, anytime we enter the Five Points area, we see somebody move very quickly like that, they either have contraband or a weapon or something of that nature on them.”
In People v. Waits, 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391 (1978), we held that an investigatory stop was justified in circumstances quite similar to those in the case before us. There, a police officer in a marked patrol car observed an automobile approaching him at a distance of seventy-five to one hundred yards. As the automobile neared the patrol car, it stopped suddenly, backed up, turned around, and drove rapidly away. The police pursued the automobile and pulled it over. We stated:
“Although the police officers in this case did not directly observe the commission of a crime, or even a traffic violation, the appellee’s abrupt, evasive maneuver upon confronting their marked police cruiser was clearly sufficient to raise a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminal activity. Without dwelling on the obvious, it is sufficient to observe here that the clear inference to be drawn from the appellee’s sudden change of course was that he wished to avoid any police contact. Similarly, the obvious implication of that desire was that the appellee had recently been involved in illegal activity, and feared recognition or that his crime would be detected.
“Based on these reasonable inferences and the officers’ experience in law enforcement, we cannot say that their actions in stopping the appellee’s vehicle, for limited investigatory procedures, was unreasonable. To the contrary, in this situation, failure to investigate further might have been considered inconsistent with good police practice.”
196 Colo, at 39, 580 P.2d at 393-94 (Footnote omitted).
The same reasoning should apply in the case before us. I believe that the defendant’s actions upon seeing the detectives, in addition to the other surrounding circumstances, clearly raised a reasonable suspicion in the officers’ minds. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of . .. law officers are strong indicia of mens rea .... ” In my view, it defies common sense to conclude that the police were acting unreasonably. Consequently, I believe the court today errs in affirming the suppression ruling and in overruling Waits.
The majority also states that “[i]t is only when a person’s effort to avoid police contact is coupled with an officer’s specific knowledge connecting that person to some other action or circumstance indicative of criminal conduct that the evasive action, whether running or otherwise, takes on a sufficiently suspicious character to justify a stop.” At 1275. For this proposition, the majority cites Sibron v. New York, supra, 392 U.S. at 66-67, 88 S.Ct. at 1904-05. I believe the majority’s conclusion to be incorrect for two reasons. First, the cited opinion was discussing what were proper factors to be considered and not what was required. Second, and more important, Si-bron was discussing what constitutes probable cause to arrest, not what constitutes grounds for an investigatory stop. The majority is thus establishing a rule that suspicion occasioned by a person’s flight from police, without more, is unreasonable per se. I believe this to be an unrealistic view of the term “reasonable suspicion.”
I also disagree with the majority’s statement that “[wjhere, as here, a police chase is not based upon objective criteria pointing to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, ‘the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.’ ” At 1277 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). The stop here was based upon *1279objective criteria, and under the facts of this case11 perceive little risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices. The majority apparently believes that the police were acting merely on an inchoate hunch, when in fact they had articulable and articulated facts to support their decision.
It was clear that the officers had to act quickly if they were going to act at all. Where immediate action is required a police officer is justified in acting on less objectively articulable evidence than when there is more time for consideration of alternative courses of action.
The officers’ experience and judgment are important factors to be taken into consideration, see Terry y. Ohio, supra, and in my judgment weigh heavily on the scale in approving the attempted stop.
The question of what amounts to reasonable suspicion is a common-sense question: What would the reasonable police officer believe in light of his training and experience? I can only guess at the majority’s definition of “reasonable,” but I am certain that it differs from mine. Given the circumstances surrounding the stop, I would venture a guess that virtually all police officers would entertain a suspicion of criminal activity. I fail to see how we can conclude that such suspicion is unreasonable. Accordingly, I would reverse the suppression order.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice HODGES joins in this dissent.
. While a result cannot justify the means, it is of more than passing interest to note that the reasonable suspicion of the officers was proved correct when they recovered the cocaine that the defendant had in his possession.