dissenting: I dissent from the result reached here for two reasons.
First, a plaintiff is entitled to recover for the reasonable value of medical services rendered to treat an injury as long as there is proof the services were necessary. 2 Minzer, Nates, Kimball, Axelrod, and Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions § 9.10, p. 9-8 (1991). The reasonable value of necessary medical treatment is recoverable even though such charges have not been paid. “[T]he actual payment of medical expenses is not necessary in order to recover for their reasonable value. It is sufficient to show that the services have been rendered, and that the plaintiff or some other party has therefore become liable for the amount claimed.” 2 Minzer, Nates, Kim-ball, Axelrod and Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions § 9.40, p. 9-36 (1991). However, a plaintiff’s recovery for medical expenses, nursing care and other out of pocket expenses is limited to the reasonable value of these services. “The reasonable value of the services is generally [defined as] the reasonable charges of the profession for those services, and not the usual charges of the particular physician or surgeon.” 2 Minzer, Nates, Kimball, Axelrod, and Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions, § 9.20, p. 9-14 (1991).
The purpose of the collateral source rule is to prevent a wrongdoer from escaping from full liability for the consequences of his or her negligence. 2 Minzer, Nates, Kimball, Axelrod, and Gold-stein, Damages in Tort Actions § 9.60, p. 9-88 (1991).
“Thus, if the basic goal of tort law is only that of compensating plaintiff for his [or her] losses, evidence of these benefits should be admitted to reduce the total damages assessed against the defendant. At the same time, reducing recovery by the amount of the benefits received by the plaintiff would be, according to most courts, granting a ‘windfall’ to the defendant by allowing him [or her] a credit for the reasonable value of those benefits. Such a credit would result in the benefits being effectively directed to the tortfeasor and from the intended party — the injured plaintiff. If there must be a windfall, it is usually considered more just that the injured person should profit, rather than let the wrongdoer be relieved of full *710responsibility for his [or her] wrongdoing.” 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages § 566, p. 638.
Concerning services provided gratuitously:
“It does not seem reasonable that a tortfeasor should be permitted to profit by any gratuity extended to his [or her] victim. Thus, as a general rule, the fact that the plaintiff received gratuitous medical care, continued salary or wage payments, proceeds from insurance policies, or welfare and pension benefits will not be taken into account in computing damages.” 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages § 570, p. 641.
“The collateral sources rule generally permits an injured person to recover full damages without regard to benefits paid by Social Security and its subsidiary Medicare and Medicaid programs. Social Security and Medicare benefits have been likened to payments under private insurance plans, since they will ordinarily have been at least partially financed by contributions from the recipients in the form of employee taxes. Similarly, Medicaid has been described as a system of social insurance, although in operation it more closely resembles a system of public welfare under which benefits do not depend on contributions.” 3 Minzer, Nates, Kimball, Axelrod and Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions § 17.23, pp. 17-89-93 (1991).
While the plaintiff can only recover the reasonable value of the medical services provided, there is no requirement in Kansas that it be shown that any amount was actually paid. Were it otherwise, there is no way an injured party could recover damages for services provided gratuitously by family members or charity. See Lewark v. Parkinson, 73 Kan. 553, 85 Pac. 601 (1906).
Second, I am convinced the district court erred in finding plaintiff did not meet the threshold requirements of K.S.A. 40-3117.
K.S.A. 40-3117 reads in relevant part:
“In any action for tort brought against the owner, operator or occupant of a motor vehicle or against any person legally responsible for the acts or omissions of such owner, operator or occupant, a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience and other non-pecuniaiy loss because of injury only in the event the injury requires medical treatment of a kind described in this act as medical benefits, having a reasonable value of $2,000 or more, or the injury consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, a compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability, permanent loss of a bodily function or death. Any person who is entitled to receive free medical and surgical benefits shall be deemed in compliance with the requirements of this section upon a showing that the medical treatment received has an equivalent value of at least $2,000. Any person receiving *711ordinary and necessary services, normally performed by a nurse, from a relative or a member of such person’s household shall be entitled to include the reasonable value of such services in meeting the requirements of this section. For the purpose of this section, the charges actually made for medical treatment expenses shall not be conclusive as to their reasonable value. Evidence that the reasonable value thereof was an amount different from the amount actually charged shall be admissible in all actions to which this subsection applies.”
The problem with the majority opinion is that the jury verdict form did not differentiate between shoulder and non-shoulder damages. Additionally, there was evidence in the record from both medical experts that plaintiff was permanently injured by virtue of her shoulder injury, and there was evidence of permanent disfigurement. Therefore, while the amount of damages awarded by the jury does give credence to the court’s findings, it cannot be said as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to meet the statutory requirements of K.S.A. 40-3117. While it is possible for the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that there has been no serious permanent injury or disfigurement where the injury is very slight, in a close case such question should be left to the jury. See Stang v. Caragianis, 243 Kan. 249, 258, 757 P.2d 279 (1988). In this case, because there was uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff had been seriously and permanently injured, the court should not have speculated on what the jury was thinking when computing the damages.
I would remand the cause for a new trial on damages.