dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Great care should be taken to avoid mixing facts from the police investigation, the multi-issue pretrial hearing, and the trial itself, thereby cloaking the magistrate’s probable cause finding with more credibility than it deserves. In my view, the record clearly indicates that before the warrant for defendant’s arrest was obtained, the police were unable to develop sufficient evidence upon which to legitimately charge him with, any crime. Because the officers could have presented to the magistrate only that which was known by them at the time, it is irrefutable that any evidentiary showing had to be deficient. Moreover, I disagree with the assertion that defendant failed to meet his initial burden of proof in this regard, and fear that today’s decision will make it all but impossible to challenge a magistrate’s probable cause finding where there is an absence of documentation and little or no available recollection of events.
In this ease, there is no record of what transpired before the magistrate. No affidavit or other supporting paperwork is in the official file. We have only the police officer’s testimony that he cannot recall what, if anything, he said or was asked before obtaining the warrant for defendant’s arrest. An examination of the flimsy evidence possessed by investigators at that time, however, illustrates the highly questionable nature of the proceeding.
*285THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE WARRANT
On March 8, 1991, John and Ginger Lee were found in a back corner of the Joyland Market, both having died as a result of blunt force injuries to the head. The store’s cash register was empty, and Ginger Lee’s purse was missing. A receipt found in the register showed that someone had rung up many items but never totalled them. No physical evidence at the crime scene linked defendant to the murders.
Two days later, an anonymous informant advised police that a Jake Johnson, defendant’s half-brother, and a black man named Kevin were involved in the killings. Officers located Kevin and searched his home. They also learned that Johnson was a white male whose parents lived in the general vicinity of the market.
A married couple reported having seen two white men near the market around the time the police believed the murders took place. These witnesses said one man was 20 to 25 years old, 5'8" to 5'10" tall, 125 to 130 pounds, clean-shaven, with brown curly hair. They described the other as 40 to 50 years old, 5'10", 160 pounds, with medium-length blonde, brown, or red curly hair, and wearing a black and red flannel shirt. Jake Johnson generally fit the second description, except that he was only 23 years old. Defendant, David Hyde, did not match either description, and it is undisputed that he had a beard and mustache when the crimes were committed. The witnesses did not describe facial hair on either man.
Officers learned from a former roommate of defendant and Jake that the two men were often in the company of one another, that they had relocated to Wichita, Kansas on or about March 10, and that this move had been planned by them for some time. Thereafter, the police showed photographs of the brothers to the married couple. These witnesses recognized Jake but could not identify defendant until an officer put his thumb over the beard and mustache in the picture. The wife then thought that defendant might look like one of the people they had seen.
The police further learned from the roommate that Jake had occasionally bragged about stealing a red Mustang convertible from a homosexual man at knife point, and at one time had actually possessed such a car. They confirmed that a red Mustang had been reported stolen in January 1991. The vehicle was recovered about a week after the report. Fingerprints lifted from the car were found to match those of Jake and Kevin. Defendant’s fingerprints were not then available, but a later comparison showed that none of those in the automobile matched his. According to the official account of this incident, the victim was assaulted and robbed by a man who picked him up in the Nu-Town Saloon. After they left the bar in the convertible, the assailant instructed the victim to pull over, struck him with a closed fist, took his wallet, and drove away.
On March 15, officers interviewed the robbery victim. From a photographic lineup, he identified Jake as resembling a man with whom his assailant stopped to talk on their way out of the bar. He gave a description of the assailant that was very generally consistent with defendant — a Caucasian in his mid-20s, 6'1", and 160 pounds. The victim made no mention of facial hair, however, and he could not identify defendant from a photograph even after an officer covered up his beard. According to a detective’s testimony at the suppression hearing months later, the victim also indicated that his assailant had dark hair, which was consistent with defendant’s. On cross-examination, however, the detective admitted that this information was not recorded in any document connected with the investigation and came entirely from his memory. The police also later claimed that their suspicions were based, in part, on the fact that the Mustang had been stolen near the home of defendant’s parents, where he sometimes visited.
This, then, is everything the police knew and all the evidence they had at 4:30 p.m. on March 15 when Detective Mike Chambers sought arrest warrants for defendant and Jake on robbery and theft charges.
THE FRUITS OF THE WARRANT
Virtually all of the significant evidence against defendant in the present case flowed *286from his arrest. This, of course, was the clear objective of the police, who from the outset paid almost no attention to the crime that was the subject of the warrant; they were unmistakably investigating the Lee murders. To this end, they immediately impounded and searched the brothers’ vehicles.
The physical evidence obtained was inconclusive at best. In defendant’s car, police found a small amount of blood and a black down jacket that had a blood smear across the front. Luminol testing also revealed scant traces of blood on the tan jacket defendant was wearing when arrested. In Jake’s vehicle, officers discovered a Bowie knife that later tested positive for a small quantity of blood near the hilt. Examiners could not determine the age of these blood samples. Moreover, only that found on the black jacket was confirmed as being of human origin, but it could not be identified as having come from either of the Lees. At the home where the brothers were staying, officers recovered a plaid shirt generally matching descriptions of that worn by one of the men observed outside the store on the night of the murders.
The critical evidence against defendant came from his statements while in custody. Phoenix detectives interrogated him in Wichita for approximately six hours on the evening of March 17. They spent little time on the robbery incident and moved quickly to the subject of the Lee murders. Initially, defendant denied being in the store on the night of the crimes. The officers replied that an eyewitness had seen him there and that they had enough evidence to convict him of both murders. Neither statement was true.
Defendant thereafter claimed that if he was seen on the premises, he must have been suffering from one of his alcohol-induced blackouts. By the end of the interrogation, however, defendant had given piecemeal statements that generally added up to the following inculpatory story: If people had seen him there, and if as the officers insisted, the eyewitnesses could not be mistaken, then he “couldn’t deny” being there, and he agreed with detectives that he and his brother “could have” gone to the Joyland Market on the night of the murders to pick up some food for their trip to Kansas; if they went there for that reason, both of them “would have” gone into the store; if a cart full of groceries was found at the checkout stand, as detectives informed him, he was probably the one who pushed it there, although they “could have both switched off’; if he was at the checkout counter, it probably “would have” been manned by Mr. Lee, as it “usually” was on previous occasions when he had been in the store, although “it could have been the lady, too”; if he did not pay for the groceries, as detectives assured him, then he “must have” given the money to Jake; and if neither of them paid, something must have happened to interrupt the transaction.
For a long while, defendant could not progress past the idea of being at the cash register, which he described as “something being put in my head.” He was then falsely informed that his fingerprints were found on the shopping cart. He began to insist that he did not even remember seeing the face of a “Japanese man” and once more denied being in the store. After a detective spoke to him at length, however, defendant again could picture himself in the market and remembered pushing the basket and talking to Mr. Lee.
Eventually, defendant stated that he may have been “shocked out of’ his memory of later events if he had seen something that scared him. After being shown a picture of the crime scene, defendant acknowledged he “may have” heard noises, “probably” screaming or yelling, “probably” from both Jake and “the lady.” He repeatedly stated that Mr. Lee “probably” went to the back to help his daughter, at which point he “probably just grabbed the bags and just left.” The detectives suggested that perhaps one of the Lees did something to provoke him or his brother. Defendant finally agreed with the suggestion that Ms. Lee may have caught Jake trying to steal her purse. He said Jake “probably just went wild.” Defendant also admitted owning the knife found in his brother’s vehicle, which matched the description of the weapon a witness had said Jake carried “constantly.”
Defendant recanted his statements the next day. He told the detectives that he was not at the store, although “you guys had me *287just about convinced that I was there.” He insisted that he was at his parents’ house at the time of the murders and suggested that another man might have been the person seen with his brother that night. A psychiatric expert later testified that defendant had a below-average IQ, was extremely susceptible to suggestion, and easily manipulated.
On April 4,1991, defendant and Jake Johnson were indicted on two counts of first degree murder and one count of first degree burglary. Charges were also twice brought against defendant for the robbery involving the red Mustang, the crime for which he was supposedly arrested in the first place, but both times they were dismissed. Jake, however, eventually pleaded guilty to theft, a class 3 felony, in connection with that matter.
THE PRETRIAL HEARING
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made during the interrogation because they were fruits of an unlawful arrest. He argued, in part, that the robbery warrant lacked probable cause and was merely a pretext to gather evidence on the Lee incident. At an extensive hearing designed to resolve this and other pretrial motions, witnesses outlined the state’s evidence. It is undisputed that this presentation of facts exceeded anything that was or could have been shown to the magistrate at the time of the warrant application. It is also undeniable that the hearing, which required four days of testimony, was intended not only to determine if probable cause existed for Hyde’s arrest warrant, but also whether Wichita police officers were aware of the warrant at the time of the arrest, whether they received valid consent to search Jake’s vehicle, whether both Phoenix and Wichita police acted in good faith, whether defendant’s and Jake’s separate statements were voluntary and admissible under Miranda, and whether their trials should be severed.
The superior court concluded that the “nub of the probable cause issue” had to do with the robbery victim’s description of his assailant, which the judge said matched not only defendant but “one-quarter of the males in Maricopa County,” including himself. He opined that the evidence connecting defendant with the robbery was extremely weak. In fact, he stated that had he been charged with the original determination of probable cause, he would not have issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest. He nevertheless denied the motion to suppress because he thought reasonable persons could differ on the sufficiency of the evidence presented to him. He also concluded that the police officers acted in good faith.
THE TRIAL
The brothers were tried separately. Jake’s trial was held first, on the state’s original theory that he had committed the murders and defendant was essentially a bystander. However, Jake’s confession was excluded at trial because detectives had continued to question him after he requested an attorney, and he was acquitted. At defendant’s trial, the state’s position drastically changed. The prosecutor argued that although Jake might have knocked Ginger Lee out, defendant killed both victims with the Bowie knife while Jake was turning out the lights. A redacted but highly inculpatory transcript of defendant’s statements to the police was admitted in evidence, and corresponding portions of the tape-recorded interrogation were played for the jury. Defendant was convicted of the premeditated first degree murders of John and Ginger Lee.
SENTENCING
The trial court considered in mitigation defendant’s age, mental status, and intelligence level. The judge also specifically noted testimony from defendant’s friends, family, and others that he had never acted violently. The judge did not find, however, that the mitigating evidence was sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.
DISCUSSION
Before arresting defendant, the police clearly did not have probable cause to assert that he was involved in the Lee murders. The only evidence impheating defendant was the anonymous tip that his brother had been involved, a highly questionable photo identification of both men, see, e.g., State v. Alexan*288der, 108 Ariz. 556, 562-66, 503 P.2d 777, 783-87 (1972), and the fact that they quit their jobs and went to Kansas shortly after the killings — a move that indisputably had been contemplated for some time.
Based on testimony at the suppression hearing, it is clear that the investigating officers were searching for ways to obtain more evidence regarding the homicides. The police declined an offer from defendant’s stepfather to have both men flown back from Kansas to answer questions. Instead, they wanted to arrest the brothers in Kansas, in their ears, as Detective Chambers’s testimony indicates:
[Defense Counsel]: And you figured the cars were there in Wichita, too, right?
[Chambers]: I expected they probably would [sic] and they wouldn’t fly them back.
Q: And you suspected there might be some evidence of these crimes, right?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And that’s why you didn’t want to separate the two, because it would be difficult to get a search of the vehicles in Wichita if the two men were here, correct?
A: I don’t know about the difficulty in getting a warrant or not, but I am sure it would create some difficulty in preserving the evidence.
Q: At any rate, you wanted to maintain — or have the two individuals remain where the vehicles were, right?
A: I think that’s accurate.
Before applying for the warrant, Phoenix police had requested that Wichita officers set up surveillance of the brothers in Kansas. They told these officers that if they picked up the brothers for anything, they should look for bloody clothing and a knife, evidence clearly relating only to the murders.
As previously indicated, once defendant was in custody, the officers spent little time questioning him about the ear robbery and instead moved almost immediately to the subject of the homicides. Furthermore, the owner of the home where Jake had been arrested was told that the brothers were being taken in connection with a murder in Arizona. The police obviously were focused all along on defendant’s suspected involvement in the killings but knew that they had nothing to justify the issuance of a warrant for those crimes.
In their zeal, detectives decided to arrest defendant for the unrelated robbery, despite a similar shortage of evidence connecting him to that crime. As the state conceded at oral argument before this court, the only basis police had for suspecting defendant was that he approximated the victim’s description of his assailant and was sometimes found in his brother’s company. It is settled, however, that general descriptions and mere association are not enough to establish probable cause for an arrest. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (association with known narcotics addicts is not in itself sufficient to establish probable cause); State v. Mendez, 115 Ariz. 367, 369, 565 P.2d 873, 875 (1977) (same); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 459 Pa. 669, 331 A.2d 189, 191 (1975) (general description not enough to support arrest warrant).
Nevertheless, Detective Chambers hurriedly sought these warrants at 4:30 on a Friday afternoon. He acted so hastily that he did not have the necessary paperwork in order. No warrant form was attached to the complaint, and detectives had to scramble to locate one. They also apparently did not have time to find a proper warrant, because the form finally used was for a justice of the peace court rather than the superior court in which the magistrate presided. Finally, the officers used the same form for both warrants. Thus, one of the documents on its face authorized police to arrest Jake for robbery, a class 4 felony, even though the underlying complaint charged him with theft, a class 3 felony. Beyond any doubt, these proceedings were conducted on short order.
It is clear that the magistrate had a duty to “inquire as to the sources of the complainant’s information and the grounds for [his] belief.” Rule 2.4 cmt., Ariz.R.Crim.P.; see State v. Lynch, 107 Ariz. 463, 464, 489 P.2d 697, 698 (1971). This requirement is not merely procedural; it has deep constitutional roots. Article 2, sections 4 and 8 of the *289Arizona Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution compel a magistrate to determine whether complaints are supported by probable cause. Before issuing a search or arrest warrant, a judicial officer must “be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant.” Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1035, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); see State v. Currier, 86 Ariz. 394, 399, 347 P.2d 29, 33 (1959). The magistrate “should not accept without question the complainant’s mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought has committed a crime.” Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 1250, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958); see Lynch, 107 Ariz. at 464, 489 P.2d at 698. Indeed, one who issues a warrant without performing a probable cause inquiry merely acts as a “rubber stamp” for the police in violation of federal and state constitutional protections. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1512, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Unfortunately, by articulating an almost insurmountable presumption of correctness and enlarging the defendant’s burden beyond that which any sensible interpretation of the law requires, today’s opinion renders the foregoing fundamental principles meaningless.
Because probable cause determinations are typically conducted without benefit of an official reporter, and thus no transcript is available to reviewing courts, other documentation becomes quite important. See Callahan v. State, 179 Ga.App. 556, 347 S.E.2d 269, 276 (1986) (encouraging recordation of magistrate warrant hearings). The majority not only tolerates a complete absence of evidence tending to show that correct procedures were followed in this case, but it also ignores facts strongly suggesting the contrary. The state has done nothing to establish that the magistrate complied with appropriate mandates. See Rule 16.2(b), Ariz.R.Crim.P. (state must show “by a preponderance of the evidence, the lawfulness in all respects of the acquisition of all evidence which [it] will use at trial”). This burden is always on the prosecution; it never shifts to the defendant. State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 455 n. 1, 556 P.2d 784, 789 n. 1 (1976), overruled on other grounds, State v. Jarzab, 123 Ariz. 308, 311, 599 P.2d 761, 764 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102, 100 S.Ct. 1069, 62 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980). While the initial obligation of going forward may be on the defense, see Kuhn v. Smith, 154 Ariz. 24, 26, 739 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1987), it is only required to produce “evidence of specific circumstances which establish a prima facie case that the evidence taken should be suppressed.” Rule 16.2(b), Ariz.R.Crim.P. I believe defendant easily met this test.
An arrest warrant can be supported by a “complaint, any affidavits filed, and any testimony taken.” Rule 2.4, Ariz.R.Crim.P. The complaint presented here was constitutionally deficient on its face. It generally averred, based on “information and belief,” that defendant had committed a robbery but recited no facts justifying that claim. See Whiteley, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031 (finding inadequate a complaint containing only a conclusion that named individuals perpetrated described offense). Moreover, it was unaccompanied by the customary affidavit detailing evidence upon which a finding of probable cause could be based. Thus, the only way in which the requisite showing could have been made was through the testimony of Detective Chambers. All signs, however, clearly point in the opposite direction.
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, this is not a ease in which the accused has made baseless assertions or has relied solely on an empty record to show that the magistrate acted inappropriately. See State v. Lubetkin, 78 Ariz. 91, 95, 276 P.2d 520, 522 (1954) (presumption of regularity not rebutted by mere showing of empty record). In addition to establishing that the conclusory complaint was unsupported by affidavit or other written documentation, defendant produced evidence suggesting that the magistrate very likely did not ask for facts and Detective Chambers probably did not volunteer any:
[Defense Counsel]: Did she ask you questions about the complaint?
*290[Chambers]: There was a problem as far as there not being a document she expected there to be — and I remember a conversation about that.... I don’t recall any thing specific about the circumstances that she asked me otherwise.
Q: You don’t recall that she asked you any questions about the facts supporting the complaint?
A: I recall her swearing to me the accuracy of the facts supporting the complaints, but I don’t recall a specific question of any kind.
Q: I’m not sure I’m understanding
your answer____ Are you saying you
don’t recall these specific questions, or you don’t recall whether she asked you specific questions?
A: I guess in part both. I don’t recall a specific question that she may have asked, or that in fact she asked me questions ____
Q: All right, you don’t recall her asking questions. Do you recall ... yourself relating the facts to Commissioner Gerst about what had happened, about what support you had for the criminal complaint?
A: I may have.
Q: My question is whether you recall that?
A: No, not specifically.
Following a four-day interruption in his testimony, Detective Chambers returned to the stand and admitted that he had believed all along that the complaint listed facts establishing probable cause:
Q: Detective, I had asked you what, if any, questions Commissioner Gerst had asked of you when you signed a complaint?
A: I believe I had already testified that my only specific recollection was of there not being a piece of paper, and I believe it was the warrant itself, in the packet that I presented her. I don’t recall if she had other questions period.
Q: You don’t recall that she asked you any questions about the facts supporting the complaint?
A: No, I don’t.
Q: Did you give her something in writing setting out some facts to support the complaint?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: What was it?
A: It was the direct complaint prepared by the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office given to me to hand carry to her office.
Q: Well, did you have something besides the complaints, something that set out a factual basis?
A: I thought the complaint had a factual basis like a synopsis.
I find incredible the state’s contention that this testimony shows that the magistrate asked questions but the detective just could not remember their specific nature. I also cannot agree that the officer’s equivocal claim that he “may have” related facts to the magistrate means that he did so. In my mind, Chambers’s testimony raises far more questions than it answers with respect to the propriety of this warrant. It plainly suggests that the magistrate may not have asked anything about specific facts and strongly implies that the officer provided little or nothing to support a probable cause determination. Moreover, his erroneous assumption that the complaint contained a sufficient factual basis further reduces the likelihood that Chambers personally related any facts to the magistrate; he apparently thought there was no need to do so. Regardless, any showing of probable cause attempted by the detective had to have been deficient considering the skimpy evidence he possessed at that time.
The trial judge essentially concluded that the magistrate must have taken evidence because she was required to do so. The majority makes the same leap of faith. I submit, however, that defendant’s showing was more than sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity. Thus, if there was any need to call the magistrate as a witness, that obligation had plainly shifted to the state.
In this regard, the majority mistakenly relies on Callahan v. State, 179 Ga.App. 556, 347 S.E.2d 269 (1986). That case is distinguishable. In Callahan, a written affidavit, *291supplemented by the police officer’s unrecorded oral testimony, was provided to the magistrate in support of the warrant’s issuance. At a later suppression hearing, the affiant described the factual showing he had made before the magistrate, which the trial court deemed sufficient to establish probable cause. Because the defense claimed that the officer had not actually presented such testimony to the magistrate, the appellate court observed: “[I]f [defendant] was dissatisfied with the affiant’s recollection [of what he told the magistrate], [defendant] was entitled to call the magistrate____” Id. 347 S.E.2d at 276. In context, this assertion is quite correct but has little or no application to the present case, where there is neither an affidavit nor evidence that the magistrate was told anything.
What may be significant about Callahan for our purposes is that the Georgia appellate court deemed it appropriate to evaluate the affidavit and oral testimony based on what the police knew at the time they applied for the warrant. It also expressed a clear preference for recordation or other documentation of all proceedings in which warrants are sought. Id. I believe we should do nothing less. See A.R.S. § 13-3914(C) (oral testimony in support of a search warrant must be recorded).
I am perplexed by the trial judge’s conclusion that although he would not have found probable cause to issue the warrant, reasonable minds could differ. The state conceded at oral argument that this judge heard much more evidence than had been presented to the magistrate. Nevertheless, the court was obligated to limit itself to a consideration of only those facts previously placed before that judicial officer. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2085-86, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984); see Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. “A contrary rule would, of course, render the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless.” Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 565 n. 8, 91 S.Ct. at 1035 n. 8. Given the paucity of evidence known by the police when the warrant was issued, I believe it highly improbable that the trial judge restricted his inquiry to those facts.
The majority disposes of this significant issue by again presuming regularity. It also relies on the assertion that defendant waived the matter by failing to specifically object. As noted earlier, however, the scope of the pretrial hearing was not limited to the narrow question of whether probable cause existed for the arrest warrant. All participants were aware of this. In an efficient and cost-effective manner, the trial court allowed extensive testimony regarding every legal issue to be decided. Some of this was received from witnesses who resided out of Arizona but were summoned for the hearing. While one cannot criticize the judge’s decision to hear everything at once, it was incumbent upon him to utilize an appropriate legal standard in deciding each issue. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (“Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.”). Having received more information than could possibly have been provided to the magistrate, he was obligated by law to disregard the excess in ruling on the probable cause challenge. This was understood by the parties, as the record clearly reflects. I find no waiver.
The majority’s fail-back position seems to be that even if defendant met his initial burden, the trial court should not have suppressed the evidence because the police acted in good faith. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3415, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). I disagree. Even Leon approves of the exclusionary rule in the following situations: (1) when warrants are issued on the basis of false or reckless statements in the affidavits; (2) when the issuing magistrate “wholly” abandons his or her judicial role; (3) when a search warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;” or (4) when a warrant is “so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421.
The majority holds that the second restriction does not apply unless there is evidence of systemic or patent partiality. It relies in large part on a case cited by Leon as an example of judicial abandonment. See Lo-Ji *292Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979) (magistrate actively involved in police investigation). I am persuaded, however, that if a magistrate fails to require evidence of probable cause, whether routinely or in an individual case, such conduct is tantamount to an abandonment of his or her judicial role. See United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 1992) (magistrate who didn’t read warrant affidavit not “neutral and detached”); State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353, 356-57 (1973) (same). Any other interpretation of Leon would effectively gut the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a magistrate have a substantial basis for his or her decision, and therein lies the danger of the majority’s holding. It essentially leads to a conclusive presumption of propriety, thus rendering review a futile and meaningless gesture.
With respect to the third restriction, the majority asserts that the trial court “did not err in finding that the police believed in good faith that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for robbery.” Ante at 274, 921 P.2d at 677. In reaching this conclusion, it affirms the lower court’s determination that this was not a situation in which Detective Chambers and his colleagues would realize that under “no conceivable circumstances” could probable cause exist. In my judgment, this finding is both factually flawed and legally irrelevant. The proper test to be applied is whether the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable, Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3420, not whether they conceivably could have believed that there was adequate cause to support it.
A reviewing court must look at the totality of the circumstances in determining reasonableness. For example, in State v. Coats, 165 Ariz. 154, 158, 797 P.2d 693, 697 (App. 1990), the court found that although the trial judge should not have issued a search warrant, reasonably well-trained officers could rely on it because there had been an affidavit containing factual, albeit stale, information. Id. at 159, 797 P.2d at 698. I respectfully submit, however, that no trained police officer should be entitled to claim ignorance of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against a warrant issued on the bare assertion that a certain person has committed a crime. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2320, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975), cited in Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 (finding suppression appropriate when the police have knowledge or can be charged with knowledge that arrest was unconstitutional). That is precisely what appears to have occurred here.
The majority argues that if the magistrate failed to ask questions, Detective Chambers was not to blame. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) (purpose of exclusionary rule assumes that police act willfully or negligently in depriving defendant of some right); State v. Greene, 162 Ariz. 383, 384, 783 P.2d 829, 830 (App.1989) (if police act deliberately or negligently, ends of exclusionary rule furthered). It adopts the state’s contention that this detective had personal knowledge of the case, was ready and willing to provide it, and should not be penalized for the magistrate’s failure to ask questions. I again disagree. Even under the state’s scenario, the officer is not blameless. If he was ready and willing to present the facts, he should have done so. He had served as a police officer for over 23 years and knew or should have known that the magistrate could not lawfully issue a warrant solely on the basis of a cursory complaint. See State v. Williams, 184 Ariz. 405, 408, 909 P.2d 472, 475 (App.1995).
Furthermore, nothing in this record supports the existence of a reasonable belief on the part of the authorities. Chambers and his fellow officers had to know they were “skating on thin ice.” All of the evidence suggests that they decided to take a chance on getting a magistrate to issue the warrant and hurriedly presented the matter at a late hour. They were at least negligent in failing to determine that the complaint contained no supporting facts. More likely, they had to know that there was little or nothing upon which to base a warrant for defendant’s arrest. I therefore conclude that Leon’s good faith exception does not apply. See id., 468 U.S. at 923 n. 24, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n. 24 (“Nothing in our opinion suggests, for example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on *293the basis of a ‘bare bones’ affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search.”).
Finally, I cannot conclude that the admission of defendant’s statements was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Fulmi-nante, 161 Ariz. 237, 245, 778 P.2d 602, 610 (1988) (noting that Arizona courts follow the Chapman test). Defendant’s statements were clearly damaging and not merely cumulative of other evidence. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); State v. Hensley, 137 Ariz. 80, 88-89, 669 P.2d 58, 66-67 (1983). Although his cellmate’s testimony corroborated many of defendant’s statements to police, that witness’s credibility was subject to serious attack. He not only testified as part of a plea bargain, but the defense was able to bring out inconsistencies between what he said and evidence at the crime scene. His testimony would have been far less convincing standing alone. Additionally, the only other direct evidence against defendant was one witness’s courtroom identification of him. The defense, however, used an earlier description to impeach her. The rest of the evidence was largely circumstantial. I also believe it noteworthy that the investigating police officers were convinced that Jake Johnson was responsible for the murders until their own improper interrogation techniques caused the trial judge to exclude Jake’s extensive statements. The prosecutor shared this view until he was unable to convict Jake.
I am sensitive to the ongoing debate surrounding the judicial exclusion of relevant evidence on constitutional grounds. The rhetoric is bound to be even more heated in a case like this, where two innocent people have tragically lost their lives. It is not my intention to suggest that proper police work should be punished or that the guilty should be set free. I strongly believe, however, that we cannot allow the end to justify the means. Because I fear that today’s opinion sends the opposite message and unreasonably narrows the scope of important constitutional protections, I must dissent.