dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s holding that Miller has failed to demonstrate that Alaska Bar Rule 40(u) violates due process under Alaska’s Constitution. More particularly, I *619agree with Miller’s argument that mandatory fee arbitrations are constitutional only when there is judicial review on the merits — that is, that awards should be reviewable for clearly erroneous findings of fact and arbitrary and capricious applications of the law.
As noted in State v. Public Safety Employees Ass’n, 798 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Alaska 1990):
Compulsory arbitration is different. The parties have not agreed voluntarily to accept reduced possibilities of appellate review in order to resolve their dispute swiftly. It is by operation of law that the parties are denied their usual right to have their disputes resolved by the courts. Therefore, a standard of review higher than gross error is appropriate.
In the case at bar I would hold, as a matter of constitutional law, that the arbitrator’s or panel’s findings of fact are reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard.
In my opinion none of the reasons advanced by the court for rejecting Miller’s constitutional argument are persuasive. The mere fact that a fee arbitration system, which denies due process, has worked well— some 400 cases having been disposed of during the last decade — does not prove that the system is constitutionally sound. The pre-DeLisio1 system of court appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants worked well for many, many years.
At present parties to mandatory attorney fee arbitrations can seek review of an arbitrator’s or fee arbitration panel’s award on seven separate grounds:
(1) the award was procured by fraud or other undue means;
(2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of a party;
(3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown for postponement or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of AS 09.43.050, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party;
(5) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(6) the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or
(7) the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
AS 09.43.120(a)(l)-(4); AS 09.43.130(a)(l)-(3).
Given the fact that seven discrete grounds are subject to review I am not persuaded that additionally according the parties to mandatory fee arbitration proceedings the right to appellate review of findings of fact will lead to significantly greater delays, expense, or judicial involvement, or will have the effect of eroding the public’s confidence in lawyer-client relationships or in the judicial system. In my view fundamental fairness mandates that findings of fact filed by arbitrators or panels in mandatory fee arbi-trations should be reviewable on the merits. Alaska Bar Rule 40(q) highlights the importance of the arbitrator’s or panel’s findings. This rule requires that the decision of the arbitrator or panel will include “the findings of the arbitrator or panel on all issues and questions submitted which are necessary to resolve the dispute.” Alaska Bar R. 40(q)(3).2
In conclusion I would hold that the attenuated standard of review provided for under Alaska Bar Rule 40(u) violates due process *620under Alaska’s Constitution.3
. DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987). In DeLisio this court rejected a long tradition of compulsory representation of indigent defendants without full compensation.
. If necessary this court can devise inexpensive and streamlined procedures in order to expedite review of fee arbitration appeals that place ill question the arbitrator’s or panel’s findings of fact.
. To the extent necessary I would overrule Breeze v. Sims, 778 P.2d 215 (Alaska 1989).