SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERGdelivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing raises nine points upon which we will comment as follows.
Plaintiff first contends that this court has ovérlooked the legal requirement that the factual conclusions of the Commission be supported simply by a preponderance of the evidence rather than judged by the manifest weight principle. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 858.01(c).
In reviewing a determination by the Commission, the responsibility of this court is twofold. First, we must ascertain whether the Commission applied the proper test of “a preponderance of the evidence” as required by the statute which plaintiff cites. Second, we must then determine whether the agency’s determinations are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. This point is most clearly made in General Electric Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 967, 977, 349 N.E.2d 553, appeal denied (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 556. Our opinion discharges this responsibility from both points of view.
As a basis for the second, third, seventh and eighth contentions in the petition, plaintiff urges that the Commission never reached the factual conclusion that the initial termination of defendant Monroe was discriminatory or that plaintiff’s failure to rehire him was an act of discrimination. In its opinion, the Commission noted that, due to the legal issue of the statute of limitations, it was not required to enter a finding as to whether the initial termination of defendant was raciaUy discriminatory. However, the language used by the Commission in its discussion of the facts demonstrates strongly that it believed the evidence showed that defendant’s discharge was discriminatory. Pertinent portions of the Commission’s decision read as foUows:
“The record reveals that, at the time of the alleged theft, Miller’s identification was the only evidence linking Complainant [defendant] to the incident. Respondent [plaintiff] was aware that a number of employees had witnessed Miller pursuing one or two men through the building immediately following the theft. These men, who had known Complainant [defendant] by sight prior to the incident, told Respondent’s [plaintiff’s] officials that Complainant [defendant] was not one of the men pursued. Moreover, another employee had told his supervisor that Complainant [defendant] was at his work station during the time the theft occurred. In addition, Complainant [defendant] himself had continuously protested his innocence. Respondent [plaintiff] has not proffered any evidence to explain why this evidence was ignored in its decision to terminate Complainant [defendant]. Against the statements of all these employees, Respondent [plaintiff] chose to befieve Duane Miller, who had never seen or known Complainant [defendant] prior to this incident.”
The Commission further stated flatly that it rejected the contention that plaintiffs rehiring poUcy was uniform and nondiscriminatory:
“Respondent [plaintiff] has not shown any evidence of white employees who have been terminated for theft, later acquitted, and subsequently refused re-employment. The Hearing Examiner found, and we agree, that in view of the circumstances surrounding both Complainant’s [defendant’s] termination and his subsequent acquittal, Respondent [plaintiff] should have at least reevaluated the termination. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we decline to surmise that white employees have received the same treatment.”
Finally, the Commission noted specifically that “the Hearing Examiner and the Commission have reviewed the evidence and merely find that, using our standard of proof, there was no legitimate reason to support Complainant’s [defendant’s] termination for theft.” These portions of the Commission’s opinion establish that although the Commission believed it not necessary to make a formal finding of discrimination because of the legal issue of the statute of limitations, it definitely reached the conclusion that the facts adduced in the hearing were sufficient to substantiate the defendant’s charge of discrimination. We find that the second, third, seventh and eighth points raised in the petition are without merit.
In the fourth point, plaintiff argues that termination of an employee is not considered a continuing violation so as to toll the limitations period. The cases cited by plaintiff, such as Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1975), 514 F.2d 594, are factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Collins, an airline stewardess was required to resign because of marriage. Some four years later, she filed a charge of discrimination. Dismissal of the charge by the Federal commission was affirmed by the court of appeals. In that factual context, the aggrieved individual could have filed a complaint immediately upon termination. Quite to the contrary, in the instant case it would have been futile for defendant to have attempted to secure his reinstatement while the theft charge was still pending against him. Furthermore, as we noted in our opinion, we are not dealing with a single act of discriminatory termination here but with a continuing course of discrimination which ended only with the refusal of plaintiff to rehire defendant. In addition, the cases cited by plaintiff for this proposition were decided prior to the decisions in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. (1975), 424 U.S. 747, 47 L. Ed. 2d 444, 96 S. Ct. 1251, and Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc. (7th Cir. 1976), 534 F.2d 1247. We reject plaintiff’s fourth contention.
With regard to the fifth issue raised in the petition, we refer to City of Cairo v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 358, 315 N.E.2d 344. While plaintiff argues that we cannot impose upon a potential employer the duty of reevaluation of its own records, we noted in Cairo that exclusion of an individual from employment due to a past arrest record is inherently discriminatory. This principle is equally applicable to a former employer who is also a potential future employer.
In the sixth point, plaintiff objects to our statement of the general principle that a statute of limitations begins to run from the time the plaintiff’s remedy ripens. That time-honored principle was stated years ago in Parmelee v. Price (1902), 105 Ill. App. 271, 281, aff’d, 208 Ill. 544, 70 N.E. 725. Furthermore, as this is a situation in which there was a continuing violation of defendant’s rights, the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the date of the last injury. See City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 359, 364, 300 N.E.2d 331.
Our opinion is itself a refutation of plaintiff’s ninth point stating that we “overlooked and failed to closely consider the inconsistent and confused testimony * ‘ * *” that defendant was not guilty of the alleged theft. The factual conclusions reached by us are identical to those of the hearing examiner and the Commission.
While this supplemental opinion was being written, plaintiff filed herein, with our permission, a copy of an opinion of the United States Supreme Court (United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans (1977),-U.S--,-L. Ed. 2d_, 97 S. Ct. 1885), reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals in Evans, 534 F.2d 1247. As directed by this court, defendant filed responding comments upon this decision. As we view this situation, the decision of the United States Supreme Court does not require modification of the result reached in our original opinion.
The Supreme Court concluded that “such a challenge to a neutral system [seniority] may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event which has no present legal significance has affected the calculation of seniority credit.” (_U.S._,_,_L. Ed. 2d_,_, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 1890.) This statement has reference to the original discharge of the employee regarding which she took no action for a time period far in excess of the statutory limitation. In the instant case we are dealing with an initial discriminatory discharge, followed by a discriminatory refusal to rehire and the institution of legal action well within the limitation period following the final event.
As we pointed out in our original opinion, the factual background of the case at bar “cannot be fragmented or considered in segments. It must be viewed as one cohesive and indivisible unit.” The statute of limitations could not and did not commence to run until the matter was finalized by the plaintiff’s refusal to rehire. The petition was filed well within the limitation period.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
O’CONNOR and BUA, JJ, concur.