concurs in results.
¶ 1 I concur in the result reached in this case. I do not agree with portions of the rationale, however, and therefore I write separately to address those points of disagreement.
¶ 2 First, I do not agree that the doctrine of collateral estoppel “prevents Wilson from raising the issue of whether the dual jury procedure is authorized in Oklahoma.” To find Appellant bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, he would have to be found a “privie” of his co-defendants. Such is not the case. Appellant did not file a Petition for Extraordinary Relief as did his co-defendants. The application of procedural bar in the context of criminal procedure is not necessarily the same as in civil procedure. Here, we should simply be speaking in terms of Appellant’s failure to raise this issue below, thereby waiving the claim on appeal. Otherwise, we should simply reiterate the position we took in denying the Petitions for Extraordinary Relief filed by Appellant’s co-defendants.
¶3 Second, while I am of the opinion Oklahoma law does not prevent the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, from impaneling dual juries, I remain skeptical regarding the value of this procedure, especially in capital cases. Although I do not find reversible error occurred in the instant case, some of the issues raised by Appellant are illustrative of future problems we will likely encounter when dual juries are impaneled. Rather than broadly endorsing the dual jury procedure, as did the majority in Cohee v. State, 942 P.2d 211, 213 (Okl.Cr.1997) (Lumpkin, J. Concurring in part, dissenting in part), I will continue to monitor its impact on the trial on a case-by-case basis.
*474¶ 4 Third, with respect to proposition eleven, I believe the opinion goes too far in its discussion of post-autopsy photographs. While I agree with the general principal that post-autopsy photographs should be viewed with a certain degree of suspicion because of their potential to be more prejudicial than probative, we must recognize that post-autopsy photographs may have their place in certain cases. See Mitchell v. State, 884 P.2d 1186, 1196 (Okl.Cr.1994) (post-autopsy photograph more probative than prejudicial). In addition, the post-autopsy photograph of the interior of the skull which revealed the hinge type fracture at the base of the skull did not show “the handiwork of the medical examiner”. It showed the level of force used by Appellant and his co-defendants as they beat the victim to death. If this injury had been visible on the outside of the victim’s body, a photograph of those injuries would have been admissible regardless of how prejudicial it might have been. As the Court recognizes “photographs of the numerous wounds to the victim’s head suffered by the victim were properly admitted. These photographs were far more prejudicial than the sterile, clinical photograph. of the inside of the victim’s skull”. Opinion at Pg. 468. I find the photograph was admissible and no error occurred.
¶ 5 Finally, I cannot concur with the totality of the language and analysis used in the opinion in resolving proposition twelve.