dissenting.
I agree with the observations of Justice Lohr that the provisions of section 17-27-114, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1991 Supp.), require a trial court to grant credit for time spent as a nonresident of a community correctional facility when resentencing such defendant because of an unsuccessful placement. As the majority recognizes, trial court authority to place offenders in community corrections programs is controlled by statute. Trial courts are authorized to “sentence” a nonviolent felony offender to either a residential or nonresidential facility or program. § 17-27-105(l)(a), 8A C.R.S. (1986). Section 17-27-114 authorizes a sentencing court determining that an offender shall not “remain” in community corrections to resentence the offender, providing that the length of the subsequent “sentence” does not exceed the length of *15the original sentence. As a trial court has no control over the amount of time a defendant resides within or without a community correctional placement facility during the length of the initial sentence, it appears directly contrary to the purpose as well as the language of the statutes authorizing sentencing and resentencing to community corrections programs to create an artificial distinction between residential and nonresidential placements. However compelling the arguments based on differing statutory purposes and provisions regarding probation and parole might be, in my view the General Assembly has clearly provided a different scheme for different purposes with regard to offenders sentenced to programs administered by independent community corrections boards.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
LOHR, J., joins in this dissent.