(concurring):
I concur with the majority opinion that our Courts have personal jurisdiction over *382Defendant Carnes in this case. But I wish to make an additional statement of the facts by which that jurisdiction is established.
Carnes entered into a written contract with Brown in 1961 by which Carnes granted to Brown the right to act as Carnes’ exclusive sales agent in the State of Utah. The contract was terminated by Carnes in 1968. In the evidentiary hearing in the District Court on the matter of jurisdiction, Mr. Brown testified that during the seven years of the existence of the contract, Carnes’ volume of business in this State amounted to many hundreds of thousands of dollars. Brown brought this action to recover commissions it alleges are owed to it under the contract. Carnes does not deny the existence of the contract, nor does it deny that it has done a substantial amount of business here. Carnes contends that Brown’s claim does not “arise out of” any transaction of business conducted by Carnes in this State, nor the contracting or supplying by Carnes of any goods or services in this State. In short, Carnes denies jurisdiction under Subsections (1) or (2) of our long arm statute, Section 78-27-24, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.
It is my opinion that this record shows that Carnes has been doing substantial and continuous business in this State, sufficient probably for the assertion of general jurisdiction,1 and the issues of limited or special jurisdiction under Section 78-27-24 would, if this is true, be unnecessary. Nevertheless, the arguments of the parties focused on the bases for limited jurisdiction, as does the majority opinion. Assuming that this is a case under the long arm statute, an analysis of Section 78-27-24 here must involve recognition that there is evidence that the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities”2 within this State, by which it could be said that it had knowingly submitted itself to our jurisdiction for the purpose of litigating this particular claim.
By entering into a contract by which Carnes granted Brown the exclusive right to act as its sales representative and designating Brown’s territory as the State of Utah, Carnes purposefully entered this State to transact business here.3 By doing so, it knowingly submitted itself to the jurisdiction of our Courts for the adjudication of any claim arising out of that contract under Section 78-27-24(l).4
ELLETT, Retired J., dissents. HALL, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.. See Abbott G. M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Utah, 578 P.2d 850 (1978).
. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1957).
. It was the intention of the parties to the contract that it be performed in the State of Utah. Compare Belmont Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court of Stanislaus County, 31 Cal. App.3d 281, 107 Cal.Rptr. 237 (1973) where one of the basic facts on which the court determined the lack of jurisdiction was that the contract of parties did not require plaintiffs services to be performed in the State of California.
. Compare our recent case of Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., Utah, 610 P.2d 1307 (1980), wherein we found no such purposeful activities on the part of defendant by which it could be said it had knowingly submitted itself to the jurisdiction of our courts for the purpose of litigating plaintiffs claim.