I concur with the majority conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s subsequent robbery offense for the purpose of establishing his intent to steal during the present offenses. That error requires a retrial of the robbery and burglary offenses, and of the special circumstances findings which were based upon them.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the entirety of that portion of the opinion (part III) which holds that no substantial evidence existed to support the jury’s findings with respect to the special circumstances allegations, and which sets those findings aside, precluding further retrial thereof. In my view there was ample evidence to sustain findings that defendant committed his murder during the commission, or attempted commission, of both a robbery and burglary. Accordingly, in fairness, the People should be permitted to reestablish those findings in *335the course of a retrial which is limited to the issue of defendant’s intent to steal.
The majority acknowledges (ante, pp. 322-323) that our present review of the record must be made “in the light most favorable to the judgment below....” {People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738], italics added.) Yet the majority, contrary to the foregoing rule, has proceeded to isolate only those portions of the record which would negate the special circumstances findings, disregarding entirely the contrary evidence which supports the jury’s findings. Thus, while the majority enunciates the correct standard for review it refuses to apply it.
The majority agrees that “it is at most a close question whether the perpetrator [i.e., defendant herein] had any intent to steal at all.” (Ante, p. 323, italics added.) If so, all such “close questions” must be resolved to support the judgment. Within the context of “special circumstances” the statutory requirement of proof of a murder is that it be committed “during the commission or attempted commission” of a robbery or burglary (former Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (c)(3)(i), (v), italics added). The record contains substantial evidence supporting the jury’s findings that defendant murdered the victim while under such special circumstances.
First, as soon as defendant confronted his victims at their residence, he pointed a gun at them and demanded money. Although he refused the few crumpled bills displayed by victim Whalen, the $5 supposedly in victim Filice’s purse, and the ring worn by her, the jury might well have found that defendant was seeking a larger cash hoard which he believed was hidden on the premises. Such a finding would be supported by (1) defendant’s explanation to Filice that he selected her house because he was told “it would be a good hit,” and (2) defendant’s subsequent repeated demand for money from his victims.
In addition to demanding money, defendant ordered Whalen to produce his car keys, which defendant took and removed from the key ring. Although defendant did not take Whalen’s car, the jury might well have found that he was inhibited only by the fact that, as Whalen subsequently told him, the car bore personalized plates and could readily be identified. Defendant’s original intent to steal Whalen’s car is further substantiated by repeated record reference to his involvement *336with car thefts. The majority itself characterizes defendant as an “accomplished automobile thief.” {Ante, p. 324.) Indeed, defendant was arrested after negotiating with an undercover officer for the sale of a stolen car. Moreover, his alibi was that he had gone to Long Beach to steal yet another car.
The majority suggests that defendant’s demand for money and car keys may have been a ruse to hide his true intent to kill Filice. In this regard, the majorities rely upon defendant’s statement to Filice, “you know why I’m here and you know who sent me.” Yet it is just as likely that defendant entertained a joint intent to kill and to steal. In any event, there is no sound basis for concluding, as does the majority, that Filice’s murder was defendant’s “primary” intent, while the attempted robbery and burglary were of “secondary importance.” (Ante, p. 324.) This is purest speculation and violates, again, the cardinal principle of appellate review that trial records are to be viewed favorably to, and in support of, the conviction. Based upon the substantial evidence above discussed, the jury was entitled to find that defendant’s murder of Whalen occurred during the commission, or attempted commission, of a robbery and burglary. Accordingly, any expression contained in People v. Green (1980) ante, pages 1, 59-61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], is inapplicable to the case before us.
As noted, a murder committed during the course either of the commission or attempted commission of a robbery or burglary constitutes “special circumstances.” Viewed in a light “most favorable to the judgment below,” there was ample evidence that the victim Whalen was killed by defendant during the course of the “attempted commission” of either or both robbery and burglary.
I would affirm the murder and attempted murder convictions, reverse the robbery and burglary convictions and special circumstances findings, and permit a limited retrial of the robbery and burglary charges together with the special circumstances allegations.
Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 1980.