Concurring. I agree that the order of summary judgment should be affirmed and with the exposition of principles in the majority opinion. However, my approach varies somewhat.
This civil action arises out of an automobile accident on November 30, 1974. Plaintiff’s claim is barred if it was not commenced on or before November 30, 1976, unless the two-year limitations period prescribed by K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) was tolled by reason of application of K.S.A. 60-517 and the action was commenced on or before such later date as determined by adding to the two-year period time equivalent to the time during which the running of the limitations period was tolled.
K.S.A. 60-203 intertwines definition of commencement of a civil action and fixation of the date of commencement of such an action. It is conceded and agreed that by operation of K.S.A. 60-203 this action was commenced on February 3, 1977, when service was obtained by delivery of suit papers to defendant personally in Riley County by a deputy sheriff of that county.
As correctly and directly stated by the majority, the tolling provisions of K.S.A. 60-517 affect only K.S.A. 60-501 et seq., including K.S.A. 60-513. There is no interplay of K.S.A. 60-517 and K.S.A. 60-203. If limitations has once run, it is immaterial that by happenstance there are facts that would support a finding of subsequent abscondence or concealment even though occurring prior to the date as of which the action is deemed commenced under K.S.A. 60-203.
The pivotal inquiry here is whether under the facts and by operation of K.S.A. 60-517 the expiration of the limitations period occurred as of some date after November 30, 1976, and, if so, what that later date was. The “arithmetic” involved is frequently encountered by every lawyer whose practice includes any significant number of litigated matters.
Restatement of the facts expressed by the majority is not required. There are two needed additions. The first is the fact that *29defendant’s twenty-one day absence to visit his parents in Tacoma, Washington, was from December 18, 1976, through January 8, 1977.
The second needed addition concerns the attempted service prior to December 6, 1976. The first summons was issued November 3, 1976, to the sheriff of Geary County; it was returned December 5, 1976, and recited that after diligent search and inquiry defendant was not found in that county. The deposition of the deputy sheriff involved reflects that on the various occasions when the officer knocked at the door of defendant’s Junction City apartment residence, there was no answer and that when the officer tried to “catch [defendant] on the move,” by watching the apartment house from the officer’s parked automobile, defendant was never seen. Substantially contemporaneous inquiries of the officer to defendant’s landlady and apartment neighbor disclosed that defendant resided in the subject apartment, was a student at Kansas State University, which is located in Riley County, an adjacent county, and was frequently absent from the apartment.
Prior to November 30, 1976, there was a period of approximately six months when defendant was out of state, in Raytown, Missouri. Service was available under K.S.A. 60-308(o). The availability of such service of process existed without reference to the last sentence oí K.S.A. 60-304(0). That the running of the limitations period was not tolled during this period is not seriously disputed in plaintiff’s brief; at oral argument plaintiff’s counsel commendably conceded there was no tolling.
Also prior to November 30, 1976, there were two brief periods, totaling not more than six days, when defendant was out of state and as to which all agree that for the purpose of our decision it is to be deemed the limitations period was tolled. Taking into account these two absences, the expiration date of the limitations period became December 6, 1976.
The circumstances attending the fruitless efforts of the process server during the period from November 3, 1976, to December 5, 1976, simply are insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of abscondence or concealment to trigger application of K.S.A. 60-517 and tolling of the limitations period.
Defendant did not depart to visit his parents in the state of Washington until December 18, 1976, and claim of inability to *30effect service at any time after December 6, 1976, is wholly immaterial. Simply put, defendant’s visit to the state of Washington and any facts disclosing problems encountered by plaintiff, or the process servers, in obtaining service upon defendant after December 6,1976, are matters of not even academic interest.
The ninety-day period for service of process provisions of K.S.A. 60-203 being unrelated to K.S.A. 60-517 and not a statute of limitations, and the defendant’s absence from Kansas while visiting in the state of Washington having occurred subsequent to December 6, 1976, renders plaintiff’s position on appeal merit-less.