(concurring) — I concur in the result for I find that under traditional standards of retroactivity, the decision in State v. Aleshire, 89 Wn.2d 67, 568 P.2d 799 (1977), cannot be applied to the present case, which was tried before the announcement of the Aleshire decision.
In Aleshire, we held for the first time that the speedy trial requirements of CrR 3.3 apply to retrials following a mistrial. Although the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial provided some foreshadowing of this principle, the principle did not become a part of our law until it was adopted in Aleshire.
Under the retroactivity standards applied in prior cases, the question of whether a new rule is to be limited to prospective application turns on
*619the particular rule and its purposes and effects. Three factors are deemed relevant to a resolution of the question: (1) The purpose of the new rule and whether retroactive application of the rule would effectively serve that purpose; (2) whether and to what extent law enforcement agencies, including courts, justifiably relied upon the preexisting rule; and (3) the effect of retroactive application upon the administration of justice, including the number of jurisdictions whose past procedures did not measure up to the new rule, the probable percentage of those individuals whose former trials would be invalidated by retroactive application of the new rule coupled with the practical difficulties which would be encountered in retrials of such persons, and the availability of remedies to correct the deficiencies aimed at by the new rule other than invalidation of former proceedings. All three factors must be examined, and the process is one of balancing each against the other.
Brumley v. Charles R. Denney Juvenile Center, 77 Wn.2d 702, 707, 466 P.2d 481 (1970). These standards have been employed to determine the retroactivity of new constitutional principles (see, e.g., Brumley), as well as retroactivity of new interpretations of court rules. See, e.g., Wood v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 501, 514-15, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976); see also Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832, 23 L. Ed. 2d 16, 89 S. Ct. 1498 (1969).
Applying the first of these tests to the present case, it is evident that the retroactive application of the Aleshire principle would not effectively serve the purpose of the rule. The underlying policy objectives of speedy trial guaranties are to "prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627, 86 S. Ct. 773 (1966). The speedy trial rule accomplishes these objectives by requiring dismissal of the charges for violation of the speedy trial deadlines (see CrR 3.3(i)), and thereby establishes a deterrent to violation of these deadlines. Accordingly, the underlying purpose of the *620Aleshire rule, like other speedy trial requirements, is to deter violations of speedy trial deadlines by threatening the sanction of dismissal of the charges. It has been recognized in other contexts that when a procedural requirement is adopted for the purpose of deterring governmental misconduct, this purpose will not be furthered by applying the requirement retroactively to misconduct which occurred prior to announcement of the rule. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965) (nonretroactivity of newly announced state exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence).
The second of the three retroactivity tests provides some support for the position that the Aleshire holding should not be limited to prospective application. It was to a certain degree unjustifiable for law enforcement agencies to rely on an assumption that CrR 3.3 did not apply to retrials following mistrial, since the ABA standards called for application of speedy trial requirements in that context and our earlier decisions relied on the ABA standards in interpreting other aspects of CrR 3.3. However, this factor does not call strongly for retroactive application of Aleshire. The ABA standards were never declared binding on our construction of CrR 3.3, and we had not given any indication prior to Aleshire that we would follow the ABA standards on this point.
The third retroactivity factor does not tip the balance any further in favor of or against retroactive application of Aleshire. There are, it may be assumed, a number of cases that would be affected by a finding that Aleshire is retroactive. However, the nature of the Aleshire rule is such that there would not be so great a number as to call definitively for exclusively prospective application of the rule.
Thus, one of the factors relevant to the retroactivity determination provides definite support for restricting Aleshire to prospective application, one factor weighs (although not strongly) in favor of retroactivity, and the *621third factor is essentially neutral with respect to this question. I conclude that on balance, it must be found that the Aleshire decision is limited to prospective application.
Williams, J., concurs with Utter, C.J.