The opinion of the court was delivered by
Prager, J.:This is an action brought by an unemancipated minor child against her mother to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the child as the result of an automobile collision. The plaintiff-appellant, Rosanna Nocktonick, was a minor three years of age on October 15, 1976, the date of the collision. She was a passenger in an automobile operated by her natural mother, the defendant-appellee, Regina Nocktonick. The Nocktonick vehicle collided with an automobile driven by Eleanor Milner at the intersection of two county roads in Jackson County, Kansas. The plaintiff’s injuries included multiple fractures of her leg, requiring extensive hospitalization.
On August 17, 1977, Regina Nocktonick was appointed conservator of Rosanna for assertion of Rosanna’s claim against Eleanor Milner. This claim was satisfied by a settlement which was approved by the court and paid by Milner’s insurance company. The settlement was based upon a covenant not to sue, and reserved Rosanna’s right to proceed against her mother, Regina. Regina’s insurance carrier, Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company, asserted a lien for the PIP benefits paid, and that sum *759was refunded from the settlement proceeds pursuant to court order. On October-3, 1977, Wayne Matson, Rosanna’s maternal grandfather, was appointed her conservator to pursue her claim against her mother. Rosanna’s petition was filed October 5, 1977, against both her mother, Regina, and Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company. In her petition, Rosanna alleged her personal injuries were the result of her mother’s negligence in the operation of her motor vehicle. She claimed damages in the amount of $50,000, the limit of her mother’s liability insurance coverage. Farmers Alliance was later dismissed as a named party defendant. The defendant, Regina Nocktonick, then moved for summary judgment on the basis that the doctrine of parental immunity barred an action by an unemancipated minor against her parent to recover damages for negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the doctrine of parental immunity should be applied in Kansas to bar such a claim. Plaintiff brought a timely appeal to this court.
This appeal requires us to consider whether an unemancipated minor may recover damages in an action against a parent for injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of the parent in the operation of an insured motor vehicle. This issue has never before been presented to an appellate court in Kansas. In Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 580 P.2d 876 (1978), the doctrine of “intrafamily immunity” was referred to in the opinion at page 286 but the issue was not decided.
This court recognized the existence of interspousal tort immunity and applied it in Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952), where it was held that in this state neither spouse may maintain an action in tort for damages against the other. Here, the court is free either to adopt the doctrine of parental immunity or to reject it, without overruling any prior Kansas case law, rejecting any rule of the common law, or invalidating any Kansas statute. Stated simply, our task is to decide which rule best serves the needs of justice in Kansas in the closing years of the twentieth century.
It would be helpful at the outset to discuss generally the history of parental immunity, the justifications usually advanced for its adoption or rejection, and the exceptions to the doctrine adopted in various cases. There is a comprehensive annotation on the subject of “Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child *760Caused by Parent’s Negligence” in 41 A.L.R.3d 904. There the views presently followed in the various states are discussed in depth and the cases supporting each position are cited. All of the cases agree that parental immunity in tort is a creature of relatively recent American jurisprudence. The early English law is discussed at length in McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1031-1050 (1930). It is clear that both the English and American cases have long permitted actions between parent and minor child in disputes involving property rights. Professor Prosser has suggested that there is no good reason to think that the English law would not permit actions for personal torts as well, subject always to the parent’s privilege to enforce reasonable discipline against the child. Prosser, Law of Torts § 122 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser points out that there are decisions in Canada and Scotland holding that such an action will lie. Other legal scholars have concluded that there is nothing in the English law which precludes an action in tort by a minor who has been wronged by his parent. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts § 8.11 (1956). Thus, the general consensus seems to be that the doctrine of parental immunity has no foundation in the English law, but originated in the United States.
The doctrine of parental immunity was judicially created in a Mississippi case, Hewlett v. Ragsdale, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). In Hewlett, an unemancipated minor brought an action against her mother for the child’s illegal imprisonment in an insane asylum motivated by the mother’s desire to obtain the child’s property. The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to entertain the daughter’s claim, giving the following explanation:
“[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interest of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection from parental violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand.” p. 711.
The Mississippi court cited no authority in support of its holding.
The Hewlett decision was followed by McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903), in which a minor was *761precluded from asserting a claim for damages resulting from cruel and unusual treatment at the hands of her father and stepmother. The court concluded that sound public policy supported the decision. Two years later in 1905, in Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), the Supreme Court of Washington reversed a decision in favor of an unemancipated female child who had been raped by her father. The court held that such an action between the father and daughter did not lie because of the interest that society had in preserving harmony in domestic relations. Boiler was an aggravated case, and plaintiff’s counsel suggested to the court that the child having been raped by her father, it would seem that the harmonious relationship had already been disrupted. The court rejected this argument stating that “if it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line of demarkation which can be drawn.” p. 244. Hence the child was denied a remedy. Following these cases, most of the jurisdictions in the United States adopted the doctrine of parental immunity, holding that an unemancipated minor child may not maintain an action in tort against a parent to recover damages for personal injuries.
The doctrine of parental immunity has been justified on the basis of public policy. There are five policy reasons primarily relied on to support it:
(1) Disturbance of domestic harmony and tranquility;
(2) Interference with parental care, discipline, and control;
(3) Depletion of family assets in favor of the claimant at the expense of other children in the family;
(4) Possibility of inheritance by the parent of the amount recovered in damages by the child; and
(5) The danger of fraud and collusion between parent and child.
Domestic tranquility and interference with parental discipline, care, and control are the policy reasons most frequently offered by courts which have approved the rule. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972); Barlow v. Iblings, 261 Iowa 713, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968). In support of parental immunity, many courts have relied heavily upon the interspousal immunity between husband and wife, pointing out that the same public policy is applicable to parent-child relationships as to husband-wife relationships.
*762After the parental immunity doctrine had become well accepted, many legal scholars and judges began to criticize the doctrine on the basis that its practical effect was to produce manifest injustice in many factual situations. See for example, Prosser, Law of Torts § 122 at 864; 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts § 8.11 at 650. Some of the writers point out the fact that litigation between parent and child over property rights is quite common, yet family harmony has seemed to survive. These writers argue that the law cannot reasonably make a distinction between the enforcement of property rights and the enforcement of personal rights. Furthermore, the “family harmony” rationale has been rejected on the basis that it is improbable that a suit would be filed against a parent by a child where there is not already discord in the family. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975). Others have questioned why a child not related to the tortfeasor should be permitted to recover in situations where a child of the tortfeasor is precluded from recovery, and, further, why an emancipated sibling, age 18, should have a cause of action against a parent for personal injury where an unemancipated child, age 17, does not.
These criticisms resulted in a series of judicial decisions which have eroded the doctrine by the creation of numerous exceptions to it. Today, there are very few jurisdictions, if any, which recognize parental immunity in its absolute form. The exceptions to the doctrine which have been recognized by various courts are the following:
(1) As noted above, parental immunity was never extended beyond personal torts.' It has never been recognized in cases in tort affecting only property, such as trespass to land or deceit.
(2) It was held almost from the beginning that the immunity did not apply to adult children or to minor children who had been emancipated by the surrender of parental control over them.
(3) Some courts hold that, where death has terminated the parent-child relationship, there is no longer any basis to apply the parental immunity rule, thus making it appropriate for claims to be brought against the child’s estate or the parent’s estate for personal wrongs. Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1972).
(4) Another exception, recognized fairly early and supported by *763a good many decisions, has been that there is no immunity for the intentional or reckless infliction of bodily harm. This exception has been adopted on the theory that a parent who intentionally inflicts bodily harm on his child steps outside of his capacity as a parent. One application of this exception has been in the case of a parent who injures his child by his drunken driving of an automobile. Kobylanski v. Board of Education, 22 Ill. App. 3d 551, 317 N.E.2d 714 (1974); Hoffman v. Tracy, 67 Wash. 2d 31, 38, 406 P.2d 323 (1965).
(5) Another exception is that there is no immunity for bodily harm inflicted by conduct that is merely negligent, if the harm is inflicted in the course of a business activity carried on by the parent. The explanation usually given is that the parent has not injured his child while acting in his capacity as a parent but rather in his capacity of one conducting a business enterprise and that the enterprise should have no parental immunity. See Farley v. M M Cattle Company, 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Cody v. J.A. Dodds & Sons, 252 Iowa 1394, 110 N.W.2d 255 (1961).
(6) It has been held that the immunity of the parent or child is a personal one that does not protect a third party who is liable for the tort of either. Thus, when a parent within the scope of his employment by another negligently inflicts personal injury upon his own child, his employer is not protected by the parent’s immunity and is subject to liability to the child as if the negligence had been that of the employer himself. Stapleton v. Stapleton, 85 Ga. App. 728, 70 S.E.2d 156 (1952); Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938).
(7) The immunity of the parent has not been extended to the case of one who stands in loco parentis — one who performs the functions of a parent without being one. When there is bodily harm inflicted by a stepfather, a grandparent, or a teacher looking after the child, there is no immunity. Thus, in a second marriage, the husband may be liable for negligent injury to the wife’s children but is not liable for injuries suffered by his own although arising out of the same negligent act.
(8) In recent years, several jurisdictions have carved an exception to the parental immunity rule to allow the child to sue his parent for injuries caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See for example, Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350. The main *764justification relied on for allowing an action by a child against a parent in automobile accident cases is the prevalence of automobile liability insurance. While courts concede the existence of automobile insurance cannot create liability where none before existed, the prevalence of liability insurance has been held to be a proper factor to consider in determining the applicability of parental immunity. The courts which have recognized this exception have proceeded on the theory that where the reason for a rule of law no longer exists, the rule itself ceases. The existence of liability insurance is, therefore, recognized as preventing family discord and depletion of the family exchequer in automobile negligence cases. See for example Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 411, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass, at 362.
Prior to 1963, the only attempt at complete abrogation of parental immunity had been made by an intermediate appellate court in Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932), but that decision was not followed by other courts. In 1963, in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 402, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin abrogated parental immunity in negligence cases except in two situations: (1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. Goller has now been followed by a substantial minority of jurisdictions. See for example, Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8. In recent years seven jurisdictions have abolished parental immunity without restrictions:
California — Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 918, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971);
Hawaii — Petersen v. City & County, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969);
Nevada — Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974);
New Hampshire — Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966);
New York — Hairston v. Broadwater, 73 Misc. 2d 523, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1973);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969);
*765North Dakota — Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (1967);
Pennsylvania — Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
It is obvious from this historical review of the doctrine of parental immunity, with its many exceptions, that there has been a wide variance in the acceptance and application of the rule throughout this country.
In 1977,-the American Law Institute adopted § 895G of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979), which rejected the immunity from liability in tort between parent and child. In lieu thereof, it recognized privileges arising out of the parent-child relationship. It states as follows:
Ҥ 895G. Parent and Child.
“(1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship.
“(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious.”
In the comment to § 895G, the Restatement discusses the history, justifications, exceptions, and abrogation of the doctrine of parental immunity. The comment to subsection (2) states in part as follows:
“k. With the abrogation of the general tort immunity between parent and child, the courts soon discovered that there still remain difficult problems of determining when a physical harm should be regarded as actionable. Intentional infliction of physical harm might appear to be clearly tortious. But there is the privilege of parental discipline. (See §§ 147-155). The intimacies of family life also involve intended physical contacts that would be actionable between strangers but may be commonplace and expected within the family. Family romping, even roughhouse play and momentary flares of temper not producing serious hurt, may be normal in many households, to the point that the privilege arising from consent becomes analogous.
“The intimacies of family life also affect the determination of whether conduct is negligent or not. If the conduct giving rise to an injury does not grow directly out of the family relationship, the existence of negligence may be determined as if the parties were not related. A similar attitude is taken regarding the driving of an automobile on the street or highway; most of the cases abrogating the immunity have involved automobile accidents.
“Conduct involving the exercise of parental authority or supervision is essential to the parent-child relationship. This is also true of the performance of parental duties such as the use of care to provide a safe place to live or adequate necessaries or proper instruction and training. Parental discretion is involved, and to say that the standard of a reasonable prudent parent is applied should be to recognize the *766existence of that discretion and thus to require that the conduct be palpably unreasonable in order to impose liability. . . .
“Just as the parent-child relationship creates an analogy to consent in the case of an intentional tort, so in the case of a negligent tort there is an analogy to the defense of assumption of risk. For activities central to that relationship, particularly within the home itself, there is some relaxation of the stricter standard of conduct applied in dealing with third persons. A child thoughtlessly leaves his skates in a hallway and the parent trips over them or slides on them and falls, or a parent delays fixing a slightly broken step or calling in a carpenter to do it and the child falls as a result; these occurences are normally regarded as commonplace incidents in family life and usually treated as accidents rather than the basis for imposing legal liability.
“These problems are comparatively new to the courts as a result of the recent abrogation of immunity, and the courts have not yet worked out a full analysis of the proper legal treatment. The reasons put forward for a general tort immunity still carry weight and some courts conclude that there should be a remaining immunity for certain types of activities. The analysis here, however, seems more appropriate than the granting of a categoric immunity for these types of activities, regardless of the blatancy of the negligence or the wilfulness of the conduct.
“Ostensibly extraneous matters that have significantly affected some decisions in the past and will probably continue to do so, include the presence of liability insurance and the fact that a suit is brought by a third-party defendant for contribution rather than by the injured party for compensation.”
As we observed in the beginning, our task is to decide which rule best serves the needs of justice in Kansas in the closing years of the twentieth century. In so doing, we must recognize that the more recent decisions rejecting parental immunity are indicative of a “growing judicial distaste for a rule of law which in one sweep disqualified an entire class of injured minors.” Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 918. We believe that the authorities which favor abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine state the proper approach in light of modern conditions and conceptions of public policy. We see no good reason why children should not enjoy the same right to protection and to legal redress for wrongs done them as others enjoy. We question the view that a regard for family harmony and tranquility necessitates denial of tort recovery to a child injured in an automobile accident.
We are inclined to agree with Judge Fuld’s dissent in Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 478, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 174 N.E.2d 718 (1961), which states in part as follows;
“Those parents who are worthy of affection will make provision for the crippled child to the extent of their ability without the spur of legal process. The child will be unwilling to sue, will have no need or thought to sue. What is right will be done, and it will be done out of love that is stronger than the law. There may be *767some parents who are selfish or indifferent or cruel; if they turn the crippled child adrift when his minority is over, he will be a drag upon society and a burden to himself. We should say that they may not do so with impunity. There are other parents who, though willing, may be helpless. We should hold that the child is not to be denied the benefit of insurance that would be available for a stranger.”
We have concluded that, under the factual circumstances of this case, an unemancipated minor child may recover damages in an action brought against a parent for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the parent in the operation of a motor vehicle. This conclusion is consistent with a growing list of states which, in recent years, have adopted this position. States which have abolished parental immunity in all cases or in automobile accident cases include:
Alaska — Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (1967);
Arizona — Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970);
California— Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971);
Connecticut — G.S. 1979 Supp. 52-572c;
Hawaii — Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Hawaii 40, 450 P.2d 998 (1969);
Petersen v. City & County, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1969);
Illinois — Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968);
Kentucky — Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (1971);
Massachusetts — Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975);
Michigan — Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972);
Minnesota — Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 438-439, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968);
New Hampshire — Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 P.2d 588 (1966);
New Jersey — France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970);
New York — Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969);
Nevada — Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974);
North Carolina — G.S. 1979 Supp. 1-539.21;
*768North Dakota — Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (1967);
Pennsylvania — Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971);
Virginia — Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971);
West Virginia — Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976). It should be noted that the states listed above have followed for many years the rule which we have adopted today. Yet there apparently has been no significant disruption in family relationships as grimly predicted by the prophets of doom who insist on the application of parental immunity in automobile negligence cases.
We believe that the argument that parental immunity is necessary to preserve the tranquility and harmony of domestic life misconceives the facts of domestic life. The primary disruption to harmonious family relationships is not the lawsuit brought for damages after the injury but the injury itself, resulting from the misconduct of a parent. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. at 380. It can hardly aid family reconciliation to deny an injured child access to the courts and, through them, to any liability insurance which the family might maintain.
In Kansas, motor vehicle liability insurance is mandatory under K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 40-3104. The required contents of each insurance policy are set out in K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 40-3107. Although insurance cannot create liability where no legal duty previously existed, it remains, nevertheless, a proper element to be considered in a discussion of the public policy supporting abrogation of parental immunity. As pointed out in Streenz v. Streenz, where liability insurance exists, the domestic tranquility argument is hollow, for in reality the sought after litigation is not between child and parent but between child and parent’s insurance carrier. Far from being a potential source of disharmony, the action is more likely to preserve the family unit in pursuit of a common goal — the easing of family financial difficulties stemming from the child’s injuries. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d at 438; Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d at 412.
We recognize a practical problem is that of possible collusion between parent and child aimed at securing an unjustified recovery from an insurance company. But the possibility of collusion exists to a certain extent in any case. Every day we depend on *769juries and trial judges to sift evidence in order to determine the facts and arrive at proper verdicts. Experience has shown that the courts are quite adequate for this task. In litigation between parent and child, judges and juries would naturally be mindful of the relationship and would be even more on the alert for improper conduct. We further must recognize that, under provisions ordinarily included in an insurance policy, the insurance company has the right to disclaim liability when there is lack of cooperation with the insurance company on the part of the insured. Lack of cooperation may be found in inconsistent or contradictory statements by the insured or in collusion between the injured party and the insured which results in false statements to the company.
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass, at 365, the court commented on the danger of collusion between parent and child in the following language:
“The existence of collusion and lack of cooperation is not difficult to establish in the ordinary motor vehicle accident case. Prompt, effective insurance company investigation and the requirement of prompt reports of accidents to the registry of motor vehicles and to the insurer quickly establish the essential facts. Normally, any attempt at deviation from the facts by the insured will be speedily evident and will warrant disclaimer by the insurance carrier. The parent is usually represented by counsel provided by the insurance company. Such counsel is ever alert to protect the interests of the insurance company and ready to expose any attempts at collusive and fraudulent conduct. Any overt attempt at collusion constitutes a criminal offense and will be punishable as such.
“Some collusive claims may succeed. But this does not justify the formulation of a rule of blanket denial of recovery for all minors. It would be unjust to bar arbitrarily the claims of injured minors deserving of relief solely because some cases may involve possible collusion between two parties (citations omitted).”
The possibility of collusion was advanced as an argument to justify the Kansas guest statute which was held unconstitutional in Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974). In Henry, we rejected this argument, stating that it is unreasonable to éliminate causes of action of an entire class of persons simply because some undefined portion of the designated class may file fraudulent lawsuits. We emphasized that courts must depend upon the efficiency of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular cases.
Our holding is limited to the factual circumstances of the case now before us — an automobile tort action brought by an unemancipated minor child against a parent. Allowance of such an *770action does not undermine parental authority and discipline nor does it threaten to substitute judicial discretion for parental discretion in the care and rearing of minor children. We recognize that there may be parental exercises of discretion and authority which should be provided special protection in a court of law. Here we merely remove any barrier to the enforcement of liability between parent and child in an automobile accident case brought by an unemancipated minor against a parent. When confronted with other cases involving claimed parental immunity, we will at that time determine to what extent parental immunity or privilege should be recognized under the particular circumstances of the case then before us.
For the reasons set forth above the judgment of the district court is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court with directions to set aside the order of summary judgment entered below and to permit the parties to proceed with the determination of the issues presented in the case.