dissenting:
Both the majority and myself start from a point of difficulty — attempting to interpret a statute which is unclear, or more simply put, is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
The operative words of A.R.S. § 23-901.-4(f), which determines the outcome of this litigation, are:
“Any person receiving vocational rehabilitation services under the department of economic security’s vocational rehabilitation program whose major evaluation or training activity is academic shall not be deemed to be an employee of the department for any purpose.” (Emphasis added.)
*589The question squarely before the court is whether a private vocational school which teaches welding under a curriculum of two hours of classroom work and six hours of shoproom work during a day, is a “program whose major . . . training activity is academic.”1 Based upon a review of the legislative history and socio-economic considerations, the majority concludes it is not. To me, at best, the legislative history is confusing, and the socio-economic policy considerations are either unproven or ill-defined.
As to the legislative history, the first version of A.R.S. § 23-901.4(f) appeared in 1964 (1970 Ariz.Sess.Laws, ch. 187 § 1, originally enacted 1964 Ariz.Sess.Laws, ch. 70 § 1). This version is set out in the majority opinion and need not be repeated here. What it basically provided was that vocational rehabilitation of on-the-job trainees would be considered, for workmen’s compensation purposes, to be employees of the person to whom they were rendering services.
From purely a philosophical standpoint, this statute appears consistent with the underlying rationale of workmen’s compensation laws — providing benefits in the traditional employer/employee setting resulting in commercial activity. However, on the face of the statute it appears self-defeating from the standpoint of the needs of occupational rehabilitation — providing a ready market for on-the-job trainees. While we have no history of how successful placing on-the-job trainees was under this statute, it would be reasonable to assume that many employers would be hesitant to increase their workmen’s compensation loss experience by employing previously injured workmen.
In any event, the statute was changed in 1971 (1971 Ariz.Sess.Laws, ch. 173 § 6), by providing that all vocational trainees, whether they were engaged in traditional workmen pursuits or not, were deemed for the purposes of workmen’s compensation benefits to be employees of the vocational rehabilitation division. This statute, it appears to me, cured the defect of the prior statute by opening up the on-job training placements, but by its terms included individuals who would not traditionally be covered by workmen’s compensation laws — individuals engaged in non-work-related activities. For example, I would assume that under this version of the statute, an individual who was in a doctor’s office being evaluated by vocational rehabilitation for the fitting of a prosthesis and was injured during that evaluation, would be entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits, although he was not engaged in any employment activities. Thus, while the 1964 statute can be said to be too narrow, the 1971 version appears to be too broad.
This brings us to the present statute. I agree with the majority that this statute now creates, for workmen’s compensation purposes, three separate classes of individuals receiving vocational rehabilitation services: (1) on-the-job trainees who are covered by workmen’s compensation; (2) non-academic trainees who are likewise covered by workmen’s compensation; and (3) academic trainees who are not covered. But, from the legislative history, I am at a loss to understand why these classifications exist, nor is this legislative history helpful in defining the key word to this legislation, “academic.” This lack of understanding is directly related to my ignorance of what services vocational rehabilitation offers so that I can intelligently evaluate the legislative intent in applying the competing policies of encouraging rehabilitation efforts while still maintaining the concepts of work-related activity. Unfortunately, the record in this case does not supply that information, nor am I able, primarily because of the extensive use of “bureaucratese”2 in the department’s regulations, to ascertain this information. See generally Rules and Regulations of the Department *590of Economic Security, Rehabilitation Services, A.C.R.R. R6-4-101 et seq.
However, I do glean from the regulations that there is a wide variety of “evaluation and training” activities available through vocational rehabilitation. Since “evaluation” is not involved here, this subject need not be explored; however, from the regulations, I am unable to determine how “evaluation” can ever be “academic.”
As to “training” activities, there appears to be offered, “private business and vocational technical schools,” “tutors,” on the job training, rehabilitation, “work adjustment services,” “sheltered work shops,” “pre-vocational adjustment,” and “personal and social adjustment.” R6-4-302(A)(3) and (B)(4).
Moreover, in order to qualify as “providers” of educational services as private, business or technical schools, the institutions must be licensed in accordance with A.R.S. § 15-931. R6-4-302(A)(3)(a). It is clear under A.R.S. § 15-931 that in order to be licensed, the school must have a printed curriculum, adequate facilities, qualified instructors, sound educational management, and a testing system for students. Further, course offerings are to be evaluated before licensing. See Rules and Regulations of the Board of Private Technical and Business Schools, A.C.R.R. R7-3-12 et seq. In addition, the school must offer a course “comprehensive enough, and of sufficient length, to enable a graduate to demonstrate a level of knowledge and skill to be employable.” R7-3-40. In short, the licensed vocational school, in fact, must be an institution providing an educational objective.
With this background in mind, some definitions are in order. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1969) gives one definition of “academic” as “of, belonging to, or associated with an academy or school.” In turn, that same source defines “academy” as “a high school or college in which a special act, technical skills or business courses are taught often to the exclusion of a liberal curriculum in languages and sciences.”
I would agree that “academic” can be viewed, as the majority does, to mean only theoretical “book learnin’.” However, given the context of the services offered by vocational rehabilitation at vocational schools, and the regulations placed on these schools to assure an adequate education in the skills taught, the dictionary definitions quoted above seem to me more apropos. I would therefore hold that the term “academic” as used in A.R.S. § 23-901.4(f) refers to a course of regulated study which results in the student attaining “a level of knowledge and skill to be employable.” The fact that the student acquires this level through more time spent in practical application of his skills than in studying the theories underlying those skills should not be controlling.
Since it is uncontradicted that the claimant was enrolled at a vocational school offering solely a regulated course of study to reach a level of employability, I would necessarily conclude under A.R.S. § 23-901.4(f), that he was engaged in a program “whose major training activity was academic.” I would further conclude that he was not an employee of the department and hence not covered under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
I would set aside the award.
. The statute itself does not define “academic.”
. To an outsider, the rules and regulations of Vocational Rehabilitation appear to be written for the guidance and direction of persons intimately associated with the department, rather than to clearly and intelligently inform the public of what these rules and regulations require.