¶ 21. (dissenting). The majority has concluded that the Johnsons' complaint should be dismissed because the majority predicts that the John-sons will not be able to prove their case. I do not read the majority opinion as relying on any of the six policy factors Wisconsin courts use to reverse a jury's finding of negligence, causation, and damages. See Sussex Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Mainline Sewer & Water, Inc., 231 Wis. 2d 404, 417-18, 605 N.W.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1999). It seems, therefore, that the majority has invented a seventh policy factor: "the plaintiff will be unable to prove a negligence case." To me, that goes far beyond the error-correcting function of this court. See Deegan v. Jefferson County, 188 Wis. 2d 544, 559, 525 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1994). And even if a suspected inability to prove a case is a policy factor, "it is usually better practice to submit the issue to the jury insofar as determining the issues of negligence and causation." Padilla v. Bydalek, 56 Wis. 2d 772, 779, 203 N.W.2d 15 (1973). Neither I nor the majority knows how the Johnsons plan to prove their case. When the Johnsons' daughter told them that they sexually and physically abused her when she was a child, she may have explained why she believed this was true. An expert witness might provide the necessary information. Their daughter might change her mind at a deposition and provide the necessary information. I believe that it is a dangerous practice forjudges to guess what a plaintiff may or may *242not be able to prove at trial, and to dismiss cases that they predict cannot be proven.
¶ 22. Nothing in Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999), requires this result. The most that case holds concerning the facts we face today is: "Perhaps problems of confidentiality would preclude liability from being imposed in a future case, but here it does not." Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 150. I agree that problems of confidentiality may prevent the Johnsons from being able to prove their case, but I cannot agree that they should not be allowed to try.
¶ 23. It is better to decide cases that come to us with a record than those that do not. With a record, we need not speculate on what might or might not be proven. We can write a narrow opinion that does not venture far into the unknown facts of future cases. Even summary judgment cases have a better record than the one before us now. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. Were I writing for the majority, I would let the Johnsons try to prove their case against the therapists.
¶ 24. Nor do I believe that WlS. Stat. § 893.55(1) (1997-98), the applicable statute of limitations, bars the Johnsons' claims against Rogers Memorial Hospital. Although the Johnsons' complaint could have been more specific, a reasonable inference from the facts alleged would be that the Johnsons' daughter's care at Rogers continued until at least October 28, 1993. The complaint, filed on May 29, 1996, was filed within the required three years.
¶ 25. Because I conclude that the trial court erroneously granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, I respectfully dissent.