specially concurring:
I am in complete agreement with the decision of the majority; however, I feel that the opinion is not complete.
The majority opinion states:
“In recent opinions of this court we have discussed at length the issue of law involved in this case. Our opinions in Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P. (2d) 614; Geer v. Alaniz, 138 Colo. 177, 331 P. (2d) 260; Zerobnick v. Denver, 139 Colo. 139, 337 P. (2) 11; Davis v. City and County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P. (2d) 674; and City and County of Denver v. Pike, 140 Colo. 17, 342 P. (2d) 688, point inescapably to the conclusion that the subject of the ordinance involves a matter of statewide concern covered by a state statute as distinguished from a matter of local and municipal concern.”
To all of that I subscribe, but I do not subscribe to ignoring the most recent pronouncement of this court — Retallick v. Colorado Springs, No. 19,076, decided March 28, 1960.
In the Retallick case the majority of this court (Mr. Chief Justice Sutton not participating), in spite of the fact that the statutes of the State of Colorado constitute a complete legislative scheme governing the operation of motor vehicles within the boundaries of the state, held *315that reckless and careless driving were matters of local and municipal concern. In the case at bar, the majority holds that the statutes of the state cover the whole field of larceny and therefore the subject is a matter of statewide concern and cannot be considered as local and municipal.
As I view the situation, it is impossible to reconcile Retallick with the case at bar — they are parallel cases — all the arguments presented in Retallick can be urged with equal force in this case — all the arguments advanced in this case apply with equal force to Retallick.
Any effort to distinguish the cases can lead only to frustration, futility and failure. Significantly, the majority make no such effort, but ignore Retallick as completely as though it were nonexistent.
Though the majority opinion serves the useful purpose of giving to Gazotti his freedom — which may well be short lived — it is, as I view it, wholly inadequate and will, I fear, serve only to create conflict and confusion.
If there are substantial and legitimate grounds for distinguishing Retallick from the case at bar, those reasons should be pointed out in the majority opinion and the results reconciled. If such cannot be done, then we should face, rather than ignore, the problem and resolve it with some semblance of consistency.
Mr. Justice Frantz concurs.