CONCURRING OPINION OP
CASSIDY, J.The ultimate issue for decision under the submission on agreed facts in this case is whether or not Act 22 and Act 23, First Special Session, First Legislature, State of Hawaii, or either of them, can be upheld against the contention that they violate the State debt limitations of the Constitution.
The key constitutional provisions are contained in Article VI, section 3, paragraph 2, which reads: “Sixty million dollars is established as the limit of the funded debt of the State at any time outstanding and unpaid. Bonds and other instruments of indebtedness in excess of such limit may be issued when authorized by a two-thirds vote of all the members to which each house of the legislature is entitled, provided such excess debt, at the time of authorization, would not cause the total of state in*190debtedness to exceed a sum equal to fifteen percent of the total of assessed values for tax rate purposes of real property in the State, as determined by the last tax assessment rolls pursuant to law.”
Condensed, the essential facts of the case are that Acts 22 and 23 were passed by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature and that as of the date of their enactment:
(1)There were outstanding and unpaid bonds, issued by the Territory of Hawaii, of the following types and amounts:
General Obligation......................................$115,262,000
Highway Revenue........................................ 49,225,000
Aviation Revenue ........................................ 14,000,000
$178,487,000;
(2) There were unused authorizations for the issuance of general obligation bonds, under Acts passed by the Territorial legislature, in the total amount of $58,494,753; and
(3) Fifteen percent of the total of assessed values for tax rate purposes of real property in the State was $172,859,671.
A determination of the primary issue raised herein, the validity vel non of Acts 22 and 23, depends upon the determination of two subsidiary questions, namely: (1) how are the highway and aviation revenue bonds, aggregating $63,225,000, to be considered in computing, under Article VI, “the total of state indebtedness” as of the date of such Acts, and (2) how is the $58,494,753 of unused Territorial bond authorizations to be considered in the same respect?
On the ultimate issue before us it is the holding of Mr. Justice Marumoto, joined by Mr. Justice Wirtz, that Acts 22 and 23 are invalid. I concur in that holding and thereby *191make it the ruling and judgment of the court in this case. However, as I do not concur in the entire opinion of Mr. Justice Marumoto and do concur in part with the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice and Mme. Justice Lewis, it is in order to indicate my position respecting the two subsidiary issues so that the alignment of the members of the court on the issues and the basis for the ruling in this case shall be directly made to appear.
It is my position that both the highway revenue bonds and the aviation revenue bonds are to be included in determining the amount of the outstanding and unpaid funded debt of the State. I agree with the underlying reasoning and concur in the holding of the prevailing opinion to that effect.
In respect to the authorizations for the issuance of general obligation bonds under the several Territorial Acts which have not been resorted to, I disagree with the holding in the prevailing opinion that $17,605,011 of these bonds may be issued and that such amount is to be included in determining the outstanding State indebtedness for the purpose of ascertaining whether the fifteen percent of assessed valuations has been reached. In this connection I agree with the dissenting opinion that, for the purpose of determining excessive debt limitation under the proviso of the second paragraph of section 3 of Article VI, no part of the $58,494,753 of the unissued bonds authorized by the Territorial Acts is to be considered or included.
In conformity with the foregoing, it is my conclusion that since the $63,225,000 of highway revenue bonds and aviation revenue bonds added to the $115,262,000 of outstanding general obligation bonds exceeded the applicable maximum debt limitation of $172,859,671, the legislature was without power to authorize the incurrence of any further bonded indebtedness and that, therefore, Act 22 and Act 23 are invalid and ineffective.
*192Our views do not coincide with, those of the members of this court who hold that the general obligation bonds provided for in Acts 22 and 23, First Special Session, First Legislature, State of Hawaii, may not be issued. Accordingly, we are impelled to respectfully dissent.
The ultimate question submitted on agreed statement of facts is whether defendant, as director of the budget, can legally issue, sell and deliver $6,000,000 worth of general obligation bonds authorized by Act 22 and an additional $5,000,000 worth of general obligation bonds authorized by Act 23.
In order to resolve that question, it is incumbent upon us to consider and determine the status of certain bonds issued or authorized prior to August 21, 1959, the date when Hawaii attained statehood, and the countability of those bonds in the computation of the total of State indebtedness under the provisions of the State Constitution. This brings up two issues upon which the members of the court are divided, to wit:
(1) Are the $63,225,000 of highway and airport revenue bonds to be counted in determining, within the meaning of Article YI, section 3, paragraph 2, the “total of state indebtedness” which would be caused by the debt authorized by Acts 22 and 23?
(2) Are the territorial general obligation bond authorizations in the amount of $58,494,753, or any amount thereof, to be added to the $115,262,000 of outstanding general obligation bonds in determining, within the meaning of Article VI, section 3, paragraph 2, the “total of state indebtedness” which would be caused by the debt authorized by Acts 22 and 23?
We are of the view that the highway and airport revenue bonds and the territorial general obligation bond authorizations are not to be counted, except to the extent that provision has been made for the carrying out of the *193territorial general obligation bond authorizations by Acts 22 and 23 themselves. The question in difference requires consideration of certain pertinent provisions of Article VI, section 3, and of Article XVI, State Constitution.
ABTICLE VI, SECTION 3.
[Par. 1] “All bonds and other instruments of indebtedness issued by or on behalf of the State or a political subdivision thereof must be authorized by the legislature, and bonds and other instruments of indebtedness of a political subdivision must also be authorized by its governing body.
[Par. 2] “Sixty million dollars is established as the limit of the funded debt of the State at any time outstanding and unpaid. Bonds and other instruments of indebtedness in excess of such limit may be issued Avhen authorized by a two-thirds vote of all the members to which each house of the legislature is entitled, provided such excess debt, at the time of authorization, would not cause the total of state indebtedness to exceed a sum equal to fifteen percent of the total of assessed values for tax rate purposes of real property in the State, as determined by the last tax assessment rolls pursuant to law.
[Par. 3] “Instruments of indebtedness to meet appropriations for any fiscal period in anticipation of the collection of revenues for such period or to meet casual deficits or failures of revenue, which shall be payable within one year, and bonds or other instruments of indebtedness to suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, to defend the State in war or to meet emergencies caused by disaster or act of God, may be issued by the State under legislative authorization Avithout regard to any debt limit.
[Par. 6] “All bonds or other instruments of indebtedness for a term exceeding one year shall be in *194serial form maturing in substantially equal annual installments, the first installment to mature not later than five years from the date of the issue of such series, and the last installment not later than thirty-five years from the date of such issue. Interest and principal payments shall be a first charge on the general revenues of the State or political subdivision, as the case may be.
[Par. 7] “The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to indebtedness incurred under revenue bond statutes by a public enterprise of the State or political subdivision, or by a public corporation, when the only security for such indebtedness is the revenues of such enterprise or public corporation, or to indebtedness incurred under special improvement statutes when the only security for such indebtedness is the properties benefited or improved or the assessments thereon.”
ARTICLE XVI
“Section 2. All laws in force at the time this constitution takes effect and not inconsistent therewith, including, among others, acts of the Congress relating to the lands in the possession, use and control of the Territory of Hawaii, shall be the laws of the State and remain in force, mutatis mutandis, until they expire by their own limitation, or are altered or repealed by the legislature.
“Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, all existing writs, actions, suits, proceedings, civil or criminal liabilities, prosecutions, judgments, sentences, orders, decrees, appeals, causes of action, contracts, claims, demands, titles and rights shall continue unaffected notwithstanding the taking effect of this constitution, except that the State shall be the legal successor to the Territory in respect thereof, and may be maintained, enforced or prosecuted, as the case may *195be, before the appropriate or corresponding tribunals or agencies of or under tbe State or of the United States, in tbe name of tbe State, political subdivision, person or other party entitled to do so, in all respects as fully as could have been done prior to taking effect of this constitution.
“Section 3. The debts and liabilities of the Territory shall be assumed and paid by the State, and all debts owed to the Territory shall be collected by the State.
“Section 4. All acts of the legislature of the Territory authorizing the issuance of bonds by the Territory or its political subdivisions are approved, subject, however, to amendment or repeal by the legislature, and bonds may be issued by the State and its political subdivisions pursuant to said acts. Whenever in said acts the approval of the President or of the Congress is required, the approval of the governor shall suffice.”
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the Territory was governed by the Hawaiian Organic Act and other acts of Congress. The provisions regulating the issuance of bonds and the incurrence of indebtedness were changed or added to as set out in the appended note. It is by reason of such changes, during territorial status, not anticipated by the framers of the Constitution, that is to say, by reason of changes made in the interim between the framing and adoption of the Constitution in 1950 and the admission of the State in 1959, that the question in difference has arisen. The unforeseen delay in the admission of the State has interfered with the smooth transition into statehood for which the framers endeavored to provide.
The Constitution was agreed upon by the delegates in convention on July 22, 1950. It was adopted by a vote of the people of Hawaii in the election held on November 7, 1950. The Congress accepted the Constitution, subject to *196the adoption by the people of three propositions set out in section 7(b) of the Admission Act, the Act of March 18, 1959, P.L. 86-3 (73 Stat. 4). These propositions (which effected certain amendments of the Constitution in areas not here involved) were adopted at an election held on June 27,1959. This was proclaimed by the President, and the State was admitted, on August 21, 1959.
The provisions of a state constitution are limiting, the power existing unless the constitution otherwise provides. This rule, as applied to the subject at hand, is well stated in State ex rel Capitol Addition Building Comm'n v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P. 2d 1097, 100 A.L.R. 878, as follows:
“The debt limitation provisions of our State Constitution are just what the term implies, ‘limitations’ and not ‘grants’ of power. * * * the power of the Legislature [is] plenary in the matter of incurring indebtedness, except as limited by the Constitution.”
As provided in the Constitution, it took effect “immediately upon the admission of Hawaii into the Union as a State” i.e., August 21, 1959. The provisions of the Constitution are prospective, not retrospective, unless the contrary clearly appears. 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 35; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 40a; Shreveport v. Cole, 129 U.S. 36.
Section 3 of Article VI contains requirements as to the “bonds and other instruments of indebtedness” which may be issued “by or on behalf of the State.”
By the sixth paragraph of this section it is required that: “Interest and principal payments shall be a first charge on the general revenues of the State.” Accordingly we start with the proposition that, in authorizing the issuance of bonds, the State Legislature is limited to general obligation bonds.
The only exceptions to the requirement of issuance of *197general obligation bonds are contained in the seventh paragraph of the section. It has been argued that the highway and aviation revenue bonds could not have been issued under this paragraph.
It is not necessary to decide whether the State could or could not have issued the highway and aviation revenue bonds under the seventh paragraph. If it could have, then of course there would be no instrument of indebtedness already issued by the Territory which could not have been issued by the State. Each existing instrument would be classifiable as either a general obligation or a revenue bond. It then would be beyond doubt that only general obligation bonds were to be counted in determining the total of State indebtedness within the meaning of the second paragraph.
If the State could not have issued the highway and aviation revenue bonds under the seventh paragraph, the interpretation of the second paragraph is not so simple. We then have bonds which are not classifiable as either general obligation bonds or revenue bonds, and we are confronted with the question whether they nevertheless fit into the pattern of section 3 of Article VI of the State Constitution.
The territorial laws and congressional acts under which these bonds were issued — see paragraph (f) of the appended note — provided that they were payable from fuel taxes, and in the case of the aviation revenue bonds, also from rents, fees, and other charges of the Hawaii Aeronautics Commission. It was required that each bond state that it was not a general obligation of the Territory.
For present purposes, we assume that the bonds so issued by the Territory could not have been issued by the State under the seventh paragraph. As contracts already made they nevertheless are valid, and were assumed by the State under Article XVI, section 3. That is beyond question. See Baxter v. State, 9 Wis. 32; Jewell Nursery *198Co. v. State, 4 S.D. 213, 56 N.W. 113; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Taylor, 79 Okla. 142, 192 Pac. 349. The pertinent question is whether the debt limit provisions of the second paragraph, section 3, Article VI, are affected by them. We turn therefore to the interpretation of that paragraph.
The second paragraph has to do only with the issuance of general obligation bonds by the State. This is by reason of the sixth paragraph. The amount of general obligation bonds issuable by the State is limited by the first sentence of the second paragraph, which establishes $60,000,000 “as the limit of the funded debt of the State at any time outstanding and unpaid.”
In the computation of outstanding debt there sometimes is a problem as to whether general obligation bonds, which have been issued for construction of certain works under an exception to the debt limit, are to be counted in determining the available margin for issuance of general obligation bonds which are subject to the debt limit. See City of Truth or Consequences v. Robinson, 58 N.M. 111, 266 P. 2d 356; Knight v. Allen, 109 S.E. 2d 585 (S.C. 1959) ; Iron Products Inv. Co. v. City of Picher, Oklahoma, 83 F. 2d 443 (10th Cir. 1936), and cases cited; cf., Austin v. Snodgrass, 209 Ala. 353, 96 So. 139; State ex rel Luscombe v. Kansas City, 101 Kan. 806, 168 Pac. 907; Keplinger v. Kansas City, 122 Kan. 158, 251 Pac. 413; Adams v. East River Savings Institution, 20 N.Y.S. 12, S. Ct., Gen. Term, 2d Dept., aff’d 136 N.Y. 52, 32 N.E. 622. There could be no such difficulty here as to the bonds issued under the seventh paragraph, which are not general obligation bonds and to which, by express provision of the seventh paragraph, the provisions of section 3 “shall not be applicable.”
This brings us to consideration of the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” The maxim undoubtedly signifies that a stated exception presupposes there are no other exceptions. However, the maxim is not of invariable *199application. It should not be applied when other provisions, or the surrounding circumstances, indicate that a different result is called for. 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, §57; In re Opinion of the Justices, 248 Ala. 590, 29 So. 2d 10; Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627; Collingsworth County v. Allred, 120 Tex. 473, 40 S.W. 2d 13; Matter of Buoneto v. Buoneto, 278 N.Y. 284, 16 N.E. 2d 284; see also Cangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 134 A. 2d 1. The maxim is to be used with other rules of construction, and among them is the rule that the established usage is presumed intended, unless negatived. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 4917, note 14 (3d ed.); Bland v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 102 F. 2d 157 (7th Cir. 1939); see also State ex rel White v. Grant Superior Court, 202 Ind. 197, 172 N.E. 897; United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281.
Here at first blush it appears that the exception of certain indebtedness from the provisions of section 3, Article YI, made by the seventh paragraph of that section, signifies that all other types of indebtedness will be subject to the provisions of the section. But this must be laid aside when we look at the remainder of the section, and the surrounding circumstances, and see what types of indebtedness were in view. Upon full consideration, we have concluded that the seventh paragraph of section 3, Article YI, should not be given retrospective effect to include in the computation of the available margin of debt limit all territorial bonds which do not meet the requirements of that paragraph.
On the assumption that the highway and aviation revenue bonds could not have been issued under the seventh paragraph of section 3, Article YI, it equally would follow that they could not have been issued by the Territory under the Act of August 3, 1935, 49 Stat. 516, c. 436 (48 U.S.C.A. 562d), paragraph (d) of the appended *200note, and were beyond tbe power of tbe Territory and wholly uncontemplated at the time the Constitution was written. It must be remembered that bonds of this type were dependent upon the guarantee of the levy of a particular type of tax, but during territorial status Congress could have nullified the tax if the power to guarantee the levy had not been obtained. See as to the retention by Congress of legislative control over territorial legislation, Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 43; Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co. v. Hawaii, 305 U.S. 306, 314; National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129.
That bonds of this type were not contemplated appears also from Standing Committee Report No. 51 of the Committee on Taxation and Finance of the Constitutional Convention. See the portion of the committee report relating to what was then section 10 providing for debt limitations.
Hence, it was contemplated that the |60,000,000 of funded debt would consist of general obligation bonds.
For convenience, we have used the expression “bond” throughout this opinion to signify any instrument of indebtedness which is part of the “funded debt.” Possibly the funded debt includes instruments of indebtedness payable within one year, issuable under the first portion of the third paragraph of section 3, which are not “bonds.” However, to the extent that such instruments are part of the funded debt they also come under the requirement that: “Interest and principal payments shall be a first charge on the general revenues of the State.” This sentence, now part of the sixth paragraph of section 3, originally was a separate paragraph. It was combined into the sixth paragraph by the Committee on Style, Standing Committee Report No. 122. Its effect is not confined to bonds. Hence all of the instruments issued under the Constitution as part of the funded debt, unless issued under *201the seventh paragraph, necessarily constitute general obligations.
We note the provisions of the third paragraph, though the effect of instruments issued thereunder on the computations under the second paragraph is a question not before us. The permission to issue instruments of indebtedness under the third paragraph “without regard to any debt limit” does not necessarily signify that, when issued, the debt so incurred will not be counted in determining “the funded debt of the State * * * outstanding and unpaid” (“the total of state indebtedness”) within the meaning of the second paragraph. It may very well be that some or all of the instruments issued under the third paragraph will have to be counted for purposes of the second paragraph.
Considering now the second sentence of the second paragraph, this is a provision whereby the legislature by a two-thirds vote may set aside the $60,000,000 limit and authorize “excess debt,” i.e., debt in excess of $60,000,000. The “excess debt” so authorized could consist only of general obligation bonds by reason of the sixth paragraph.
It is provided that the excess debt, at the time of authorization, shall not cause the total of State indebtedness to exceed “a sum equal to fifteen percent of the total of assessed values for tax rate purposes of real property in the State, as determined by the last tax assessment rolls pursuant to law.” This provision contemplates that the legislature will measure the amount of excess debt authorizations, using only such margin as remains between “the funded debt of the State * * * outstanding and unpaid” and the 15% figure, except that no such measure need be applied if the purpose is to defend the State or to meet other needs set out in the third paragraph.
It again was not contemplated that the margin thus carefully provided for general obligation bonds would be *202absorbed by other types of bonds which as we have assumed were not within the power of the Territory in 1950, and which subsequently were issued pursuant to a grant to the Territory of further power made on the theory that there was not involved any debt which needed to be measured against assessed values. And since the debt limit at the time of writing of the Constitution was 10% of assessed values, as compared with 15%, with an alternate limit of $50,000,000 under the Act of October 26, 1949, 63 Stat. 926, c. 754 (48 U.S.C.A., sec. 562m), as compared with $60,000,000, it seemed to the framers of the Constitution that the general obligation bonds of the Territory could not use up this margin and some would remain for the State Legislature to act upon by an excess debt authorization by two-thirds vote. This in itself is a reason why only general obligation bonds of the Territory should be considered, for purposes of the second paragraph, in determining the amount of the funded debt outstanding and unpaid at the time of admission of the State. Otherwise the general obligation bonds would be limited below the amount intended to be authorized. See Eastern Kentucky Lunatic Asylum v. Bradley, 101 Ky. 551, 41 S.W. 556; City of Tiffin v. Griffith, 74 Ohio 219, 77 N.E. 1075.
The circumstances were the same when the Constitution was adopted at the election held November 7, 1950. And if we consider the intention of the people when they voted at the election held on June 27, 1959, the highway and aviation revenue bonds then were provided for by acts of Congress which specifically stated that their issuance should “not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of the Hawaiian Organic Act,” and the Constitution contained no provision repudiating the territorial practice under which only the general obligation bonds were counted in applying the debt limit.
In territorial practice, the curb on revenue bonds was *203the control of Congress over the legislative power, not the debt limit. That which was authorized as a revenue bond was thenceforth deemed outside the debt limit. It was taken for granted that only general obligation bonds would be counted in applying the debt limit. (See Sen. Rep. No. 2353, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., which accompanied H.R. 9768 enacted as P.L. 720, approved July 14, 1956, 70 Stat. 552, c. 606; Sen. Rep. No. 2155, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., which accompanied H.R. 11954, enacted as P.L. 85-691, approved August 20, 1958, 72 Stat. 685.) In connection with the airport revenue bonds it was stated in Sen. Rep. No. 1800, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., accompanying H.R. 10347, which became P.L. 85-534, approved July 18, 1958 (72 Stat. 379) :
“The committee members are satisfied that the issuance of the bonds will not constitute the incurrence of an indebtedness within the meaning of the Hawaiian Organic Act, and will not be a general obligation of the Territory, * *
Though this practice was expressed in the acts of Congress, the same result would have followed if this had not been expressed.
Special funds for the payment of the highway and aviation revenue bonds were provided by the congressional enactments of 1956 and 1958, and the obligation to the bondholders was limited thereto. This in itself showed that the bonds so issued were not to be counted in applying the debt limit. As stated in State ex rel Syvertson v. Jones, 74 N.D. 465, 23 N.W. 2d 54, 63, when a later provision of the organic law authorizes the payment of obligations out of a special fund, obligations payable solely out of that fund are “not to be considered in determining the extent of the debt limit,” prescribed by an earlier provision of the organic law; see also State ex rel State Road Comm. v. O’Brien, 140 W.Va. 114, 82 S.E. 2d 903; Johnson v. Mc*204Donald, 97 Colo. 324, 49 P. 2d 1017; cf., Curlin v. Wetherby, infra, which rejected the special fund doctrine even when the special fund had been created by a constitutional provision.
The special funds hypothecated by the congressional enactments of 1956 and 1958, subsequent to the framing of the Constitution in 1950, were continued by the State Constitution upon admission of the State in 1959 by assumption of the contracts made. The hypothecation of these special funds was an accomplished fact and beyond legislative control. Only if clearly required should bonds so issued be counted in applying the debt limit of the State.
The word “funded,” in the term “funded debt,” differentiates funded debt from floating debt. We do not dispute that debt is “funded” when it exists “in the form of obligations to pay interest, and in the case of bonds the principal also, at certain fixed dates.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, on definition of “funded.” Indeed, the third paragraph of the debt limitation section as it read in the Committee Proposal No. 10, RD 1, attached to Committee of the Whole Report No. 18, made this clear in providing for “Instruments of indebtedness to fund appropriations for any fiscal period.” The underscored word was changed, but without any change in substance, by Standing Committee Report No. 122 of the Style Committee, that is, the word “fund” was deleted at this point and the word “meet” inserted instead.
Though “funded debt” is that represented by instruments of indebtedness, this is not decisive of the point before us. The meaning of the word “debt” still remains a question, and presents a choice between two definitions, each of which is supported by respectable authority. We have accepted the definition which represents both territorial practice and also that which was contemplated by *205the framers of the Constitution, that is, that the debt limited by the debt limit provisions consists of general obligations. The limits on other types of debt are to be found elsewhere.
We follow that line of cases which holds that “debt” within the meaning of a constitutional provision which fixes the debt limit, means “one pledging the general faith and credit of the state * * *, with a consequent right in the holders of such indebtedness to look to the general taxing power to satisfy the same.” State ex rel Capitol Addition Building Comm. v. Connelly, supra; Stone v. City of Hobbs, 54 N.M. 237, 220 P. 2d 704; Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153; Alabama State Bridge Corp. v. Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695; State ex rel Bugge v. Martin, 38 Wash. 2d 834, 232 P. 2d 833; Ziegler v. Witherspoon, 331 Mich. 337, 49 N.W. 2d 318, 326. Especially is this interpretation called for when the debt limit is expressed as a percentage of assessed value and is placed upon “debts” and not upon “debts and liabilities.” State ex rel Capitol Addition Building Comm. v. Connelly, supra; cf., State ex rel Diederichs v. State Highway Comm., 89 Mont. 205, 296 Pac. 1033, and Behnke v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 13 N.J. 14, 97 A. 2d 647, which applied a different interpretation when liabilities were limited as well as debts.
It has been argued that the use of a percentage of assessed value as a measure of the State debt limit is without significance, since the real property tax is a county revenue. However, as explained by the chairman of the Committee on Taxation and Finance during debate in the Committee of the Whole upon consideration of the debt limit provisions, June 19, 1950:
“* * * the people that buy the bonds are interested in the ratio of your debts to your assessed value because while all of the tax revenues of the State or the counties *206naturally are available for the payment of the debt, it’s been customary for bondholders to look to the real property tax as their real collateral.”
It is noteworthy that the power to impose a real property tax is reserved to the State by Article VII, section 3, so that this customary collateral may be looked to when the general faith and credit of the State are pledged as is done in the case of general obligation bonds, even though there be no real possibility that resort to the real property tax will be necessary.
The principle set forth in the line of cases we follow is referred to as the “special fund doctrine.” See annotations in 72 A.L.R. 687, 96 A.L.R. 1385, 100 A.L.R. 900, 146 A.L.R. 328. It is argued that this doctrine should not be followed, as there is no end to the amounts and varieties of taxes which could be impounded in special funds, thereby riddling the constitutional debt limit by the simple expedient of avoiding the undertaking of a general obligation. According to some cases: “An instrument that is to be paid through a tax levied by the State, is a State debt. * * * The special fund doctrine * * * does not extend to obligations payable from taxes, which, in whatever form the legislature may collect them, are State revenues.” People ex rel City of Chicago v. Barrett, 373 Ill. 393, 26 N.E. 2d 478; Boswell v. State, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P. 2d 940; Curlin v. Wetherby, 275 S.W. 2d 934 (Ky. 1955).
This argument would be a good one if the second paragraph of section 3 stood alone. Instead, it is supplemented by the sixth and seventh paragraphs. These paragraphs govern all bond issues from and after the admission of the State. The sixth paragraph precludes resort by the State Legislature to the special fund doctrine except as permitted by the seventh paragraph. Thus the limits on the special fund doctrine are to be found in the sixth and seventh paragraphs, not the second paragraph.
*207If the meaning of “debt” stated in the above cited Illinois case should be applied, it would be only insofar as instruments issued by the Territory are concerned. It is clear that, so far as instruments issued by the State are concerned, only general obligation bonds are referred to in the second paragraph. There could be only one reason for applying the Illinois rule to the instruments issued by the Territory, i.e., to reduce the amount of general obligation bonds which can be issued by the State, in order to compensate for the “tax anticipation bonds” issued by the Territory, to use the plaintiff’s nomenclature. However, we do not feel called upon to do this.
The principal question, from the standpoint of amount, arises from the highway bonds. These were issued for “an accelerated highway improvement program” under “plans for a 5-year highway program that normally would be constructed over a span of 15 years.” Sen. Rep. No. 2354, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. accompanying H.R. 7426, which became the Act of July 14, 1956, 70 Stat. 545, c. 602 (48 U.S.C.A. sec. 562s, et seq.). As further shown by the cited committee report these bond issues were related to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 70, c. 181), which had made increased apportionments of federal aid money as part of a national policy of stepping up highway construction (Sen. Rep. No. 1093, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., accompanying S. 3184, the text of which was substituted for the language of H.R. 8127, enacted as the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954). Congress recognized that the method of payment of these bonds was in general use, and expressed no concern over the effect of the bonds on the credit of the Territory. It was stated in the above cited Sen. Rep. No. 2354, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.: “Act 250, Session Laws of Hawaii, 1955, provides for a 1 cent per gallon increase in the Territorial liquid fuel tax. Proceeds realized from this tax will meet the requirements of the *208highway program described above. Many States are financing their highway programs in this manner.”
This accelerated program is not compax’able to the highway program which, as conducted in the past, was known to the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. In the past the fuel tax customarily had been earmarked by a legislative continuing appropriation for highway purposes, including payment of general obligation bonds issued for those pux’poses. That was a different method of financing highways. At the time of the Constitutional Convention there was no established practice of counting, as “debt,” bonds issued in the manner that the highway bonds later were issued to finance the accelerated program under the 1956 congressional authorization. To the contrary, under territorial practice it was taken for granted that only general obligation bonds would be counted.
The framers of the Constitution geared the debt limit to the assessed values in order to provide a “flexible debt limit,” and because: “Permitting the debt limit to be increased by using a fixed percentage of the assessed valuation will provide a much more stable ceiling than using revenues collected.” Standing Committee Report No. 51 (see portion of committee report relating to what was then section 10 providing for debt limitations). Thus there was no intention to gear the debt limit and available revenues in any exact manner. Instead reliance was placed upon the good judgment of the legislature. As stated in Standing Committee Report No. 51, supra,, the “maximum percentage indebtedness”:
“* * * is higher than authorities in the field of public finance generally believe should be allowed for state and local indebtedness in order to assure a ready sale of their bonds at reasonable rates of interest, and care should be exercised to keep the actual indebtedness as much below these limits as possible, * * *.”
*209Plaintiff argues that the highway and aviation revenue bonds imposed upon the Territory such liabilities as to cause them to he considered general obligations. Of course, the State has assumed all of the liabilities of the Territory pursuant to Article XVI, section 3, as already noted. However, the argument is effectively answered by Von Damm v. Conkling, 23 Haw. 487, which was followed in E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Conkling, 33 Haw. 731.
For the foregoing reasons we have concluded that the issuance of general obligation bonds by the State is not limited by reason of the issuance of the highway and aviation revenue bonds by the Territory. If we assume that they do not constitute revenue bonds within the meaning of the seventh paragraph, this simply means that they do not fit into the pattern of section 3 at all. There is no necessity that they should.
We also have concluded that the issuance of general obligation bonds by the State is not limited by reason of the $58,494,753 of unissued general obligation bonds, which had been authorized by the Territorial Legislature but were not outstanding at the time of admission of the State.
There are two limits provided by the Constitution, i.e. :
The $60,000,000 limit, which is self-executing, and which governs the amount of debt “outstanding and unpaid,” calling for a computation at the time of issuance of bonds; and
The 15% limit, which is not self-executing, and which governs the amount of “excess debt” authorizations, calling for a computation “at the time of authorization.”
This was clearer in Committee Proposal No. 10, BD 1, attached to Committee of the Whole Beport No. 18, than in the final form adopted on the recommendation of Standing Committee Beport No. 122 of the Style Committee. Nevertheless, the substance remains the same.
*210Except for bonds which may be issued without regard to the debt limit (see third paragraph of section 3, Article VI), no general obligation bonds may be issued at a time when the outstanding and unpaid “funded debt” amounts to $60,000,000, unless: (1) the “excess debt,” i.e., State funded debt outstanding and unpaid in excess of $60,000,000, is authorized by a two-thirds vote of the legislature, and (2) at the time of the authorization it can be carried out, and the bonds then and there issued, without causing the total to exceed the 15% limit.
Prior authorizations which can be carried out must be considered when “excess debt” is voted. Otherwise the authorization last voted might cause the “excess debt” to pass the 15% limit. But only those authorizations which can be carried out at a time when the $60,000,000 mark has been reached, i.e., only those for which an excess debt authorization has been provided, need be considered.
Plaintiff has argued that under section 4 of Article XVI, the $58,494,753 of unissued general obligation bonds, which had been authorized by the Territorial Legislature, all could be issued without regard to the debt limit and therefore must be considered.
Section 4 of Article XVI was added to Committee Proposal No. 23 of the Committee on Ordinances and Continuity of Law, during Committee of the Whole consideration of that proposal. As explained in Committee of the Whole Report No. 25, section 2 of the redrafted proposal reported by the Committee of the Whole, which became section 2 of Article XVI, was a new form of several sections of the original committee proposal. The committee report stated that the new form “includes and fully covers, among other things, all matters covered by the original sections” having the advantage of “being couched in broader and therefore more inclusive terms, and of greater brevity.” The new section 4 was deemed, as stated in *211Committee of the Whole Eeport No. 25, “undoubtedly fully covered by the broader provisions of section 2 * * * and by a further general provision in Committee Proposal No. 24,” reference here being made, apparently, to the section which became section 3 of Article XVI. However, section 4 was included because:
“* * * your Committee felt that due to (1) the great importance of maintaining the credit of the state in respect of its past bonded indebtedness (to be inherited from the Territory) and proposed future bond issues, (2) the necessity of expressly providing a substitute for the provisions of territorial laws authorizing bonds not yet issued, which require Congressional or Presidential approval, and (3) the rigid scrutiny given to our laws by mainland bond attorneys whenever a bond issue is proposed, it would be wise to have a separate section dealing expressly with such territorial bond laws.”
Had it been intended that these prior authorizations would be carried out without regard to the debt limit, that easily could have been said, as in the third paragraph of section 3, Article VI.
As originally reported by the Committee on Taxation and Finance, Standing Committee Eeport No. 51, the debt limitation provision of Committee Proposal No. 10, which became the second paragraph of section 3, Article VI, carried the figure $50,000,000 instead of $60,000,000. The latter figure was reported by Committee of the Whole Eeport No. 18 and adopted.
On June 19, 1950, in explaining to the Committee of the Whole the original $50,000,000 figure, the chairman of the Committee on Taxation and Finance said:
“In the case of the Territory they have a 50 million debt limit now, but on — outstanding and authorized but unissued bonds amounts to about 56 million. How*212ever there are a number of those issues that I understand that not much chance that they will be sold.”
On June 22, 1950, the chairman of the Committee on Taxation and Finance submitted the new $60,000,000 figure to the Committee of the Whole, pointing out that the authorizations at that time, both issued and unissued, totaled $56,000,000. This was more than 15% of the then assessed value of $333,643,899. At a later point in the debate of the same day, the chairman of the Committee on Taxation and Finance stated that the purpose of the fixed figure, as distinguished from the percentage of assessed value which was expected to produce a higher limit in future, was as follows:
“* * * you’ve got authorized — outstanding plus authorized and unissued bonds. That would bring the total up to 56 million. So in other words, we are trying to take care of the situation that exists at the present time until such time as we could catch up with it.”
Had it been intended that territorial authorizations would be carried out without regard to the State debt limit, there of course would have been no object in considering whether the State debt limit was high enough to permit them to be issued.
Nothing in connection with the later addition of section 4 of Article XYI suggests a new purpose to permit territorial authorizations to be carried out without regard to the State debt limit. To the contrary, the intention was to carry out the original purpose of the Committee of the Whole in connection with the redrafted Committee Proposal No. 10. The text of section 4 of Article XVI had been recommended for consideration by the Committee on Ordinances and Continuity of Law, in reporting on Committee Proposal No. 10 in Committee of the Whole Report No. 18. The recommendation was carried out at the time of consideration of Committee Proposal No. 23, as above stated.
*213Had the outstanding bonds remained well below $60,000,000 as was the situation at the time of the Constitutional Convention, the prior territorial authorizations could have been carried out under section 4 of Article XVI without more ado. When, in the long interim before admission of the State the $60,000,000 limit was so greatly exceeded, section 4 no longer had practical significance though the territorial acts referred to therein were continued in force. By reason of the excessive State indebtedness the territorial acts became dormant, to remain so until and unless either the total State indebtedness was reduced to a point below $60,000,000, or else the State Legislature by two-thirds vote, under the second sentence of the second paragraph, section 3, Article VI, provided for issuance of these bonds.
Section 4 of Article XVI is a part of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, intended to take care of a temporary situation upon the admission of the State. Ketchikan Packing Co. v. Seaton, 267 F. 2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1959). As a temporary provision, it is to be construed in such manner as to carry out the general design. People ex rel Jackson v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375, 380; see also the following transitional cases: State ex rel Johnson v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 173; State v. McNally, 13 Utah 25, 43 Pac. 920; Driscoll v. Jones, 1 S.D. 8, 44 N.W. 726; Independent Cotton Oil Co. v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 Pac. 969; St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Rushing, 31 Okla. 231, 120 Pac. 873; Muskogee Vitrified Brick Co. v. Napier, 34 Okla. 618, 126 Pac. 792; Cusic v. Douglass, 3 Kan. 117; St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry., 296 Fed. 749, rev’d on other grounds 4 F. 2d 359, app. dism’d 269 U.S. 535; cf., Border v. Carrabine, 30 Okla. 740, 120 Pac. 1087 and cases cited; Yavapai County v. Stephens, 20 Ariz. 115, 177 Pac. 261.
It is suggested that section 4 says more than section 2, *214in that section 2 preserved only laws in force upon the admission of the State “not inconsistent” with the State Constitution. If we assume that section 4 eliminated the words “not inconsistent,” so far as the mentioned bond authorization acts of the Territorial Legislature are concerned, that reading does not affect the result — for it does not appear that these acts are inconsistent with the State Constitution. This section 4 was inserted only out of abundance of caution, as shown by the above quoted committee report.
Though the territorial acts recognized the congressional control over the territorial debt limit, and sometimes petitioned Congress on that subject, they could not and did not legislate thereon. Thus, to attribute to those acts a significance “inconsistent” with the State Constitution is to give them a meaning they did not have when enacted. At the time of enactment there was not (except for emergency purposes which are not involved) any power in the territorial legislature to lift or set aside any debt limit, and under the territorial acts the bond authorizations made by them had to await issuance until and as permitted by the organic law. As approved by section 4 they stand the same. See San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 255 U.S. 547.
If section 4 of Article XYI perpetuated the debt limit set by Congress, that would have had a strange result had admission occurred promptly, as was expected by the framers of the Constitution. At that time the debt limit set by Congress was $50,000,000; hence section 4, so read, would have invalidated that which it was intended to validate. That is, section 4 would have invalidated the $6,000,000, more or less, of territorial general obligation bond authorizations in excess of the $50,000,000 limit.
It will be noted that section 4 says nothing about “acts of the Congress,” though section 2 does. Section 4 does *215not employ the general term “laws in force,” though section 2 does. Even if strong emphasis is placed on the words “pursuant to said acts,” contained in section 4, nevertheless only acts of the Territorial Legislature are referred to by section 4. This reference cannot be deemed to supply that which was well known to be outside the legislative power of the Territory, namely, the fixing of the debt limit.
Two members of the court have pointed out that, at the time of admission of the State, under the acts of Congress there remained a territorial debt limit margin of $17,000,000, more or less. If the State debt limit already had been reached at the time of admission, there could be no reason for the Constitution to perpetuate this territorial debt limit margin. That would create an exception to the State debt limit having lasting effect for twenty years or more, going far beyond the scope of a transitional provision. However, it is only by counting the highway and aviation revenue bonds that the majority of the court concludes that the State debt limit has been reached.
In summary, the majority of the court would accord the highway and aviation revenue bonds a different treatment for State purposes than was accorded them for territorial purposes, but two members of this majority entertain the view that the territorial treatment is pertinent to a certain extent. These two members would apply the territorial debt limit to territorial authorizations so far as section 4 of Article XYI is concerned. It seems to us that the highway and aviation revenue bonds are essentially the same as they were before, and not to be counted irrespective of whether the new issues under consideration have been territorially authorized or not. We think the difference is one of underlying reasoning, which in the framework of this case calls for a difference in ultimate conclusions.
Turning now to the provisions of Acts 22 and 23, we *216note that the purposes of these Acts are certain, i.e., water development projects (Act 22), and acquisition of land, preparation of plans and the construction of State buildings (Act 28). The references to prior authorizations to identify the projects more than cover the amounts authorized. By reference to R.L.H. 1955, § 137-2, it appears that the proceeds of the bonds issued under the Acts will be allocated to the various projects by the Governor, within the limits set by the specification of purposes in the Acts. Whether less definite provisions could have been enacted is a matter not before us.
Holding, as we do, that the excess debt authorizations made by Acts 22 and 23 will not cause the total of State indebtedness to exceed the 15% limit, it is our conclusion that the Acts are valid and in effect.
Note
(Appended to dissenting opinion of Tsukiyama, C. J., and Lewis, J.)
(a) Section 55 of the Hawaiian Organic Act, as it read at the time of the Constitutional Convention, provided in part:
“* * * nor shall any debt be authorized to be contracted by or on behalf of the Territory, * * * except to pay the interest upon the existing indebtedness, to suppress insurrection, or to provide for the common defense, except that in addition to any indebtedness created for such purposes the legislature may authorize loans by the Territory, * * * for the erection of * * * public improvements, but the total of such indebtedness incurred in any one year by the Territory * * * shall not exceed 1 per centum of the assessed value of the property in the Territory * * *, and the total indebtedness of the Territory shall not at any time be extended beyond 10 per centum of such assessed value of property in the Territory * *
*217(b) By the Act of August 20, 1958, P.L. 85-691 (72 Stat. 685), also mentioned in paragraph (h) of this note, Congress deleted the limitation on the amount of indebtedness which might be incurred in any one year.
(c) The Act of October 26,1949 (68 Stat. 926, c. 754) provided as follows:
“That, during the years 1949 to 1955, inclusive, the Territory of Hawaii is authorized and empowered to issue, any provision of the Hawaiian Organic Act or any other Act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding, public-improvement bonds in such amounts as will not cause the total indebtedness of such Territory to exceed $50,000,000. Any extension of the total indebtedness of such Territory beyond $50,000,000 shall be made solely in conformity with the Hawaiian Organic Act.”
(d) The Act of August 3, 1935 (49 Stat. 516, c. 436, 48 U.S.C.A. 562d) read in part as follows:
“That the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii may cause to be issued on behalf of the Territory * * * bonds and other obligations payable solely from the revenues derived from a public improvement or public undertaking (which revenues may include transfers by agreement or otherwise from the regular funds of the issuer in respect of the use by it of the facilities afforded by such improvement or undertaking). The issuance of such revenue bonds shall not constitute the incurrence of an indebtedness within the meaning of the Hawaiian Organic Act, and shall not require the approval of the President of the United States.”
(e) The Territorial Legislature, by S.L. 1953, Act 211, had provided for the issuance of $20,000,000 of general obligation bonds for financing of veterans’ loans. This act was approved by Congress and certain other provisions made by P.L. 640, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., approved August *21824, 1954 (68 Stat. 782, c. 889), P.L. 648, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., approved August 24, 1954 (68 Stat. 785, c. 892), P.L. 720, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., approved July 14, 1956 (70 Stat. 552, c. 606), and P.L. 85-691, approved August 20, 1958 ( 72 Stat. 685). P.L. 640 as amended appears in 48 U.S.C.A. 562n. See paragraphs (g) and (h) of this note.
(f) Highway and aviation revenue bonds were provided for by acts of Congress, P.L. 716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., July 14, 1956, and P.L. 85-534, approved July 18, 1958. These acts provided that the issuance of the bonds “shall not constitute the incurrence of an indebtedness within the meaning of the Hawaiian Organic Act.” The Act of July 14,1956, approved R.L.H. 1955, sections 137-80 to 137-93, inclusive, added by S.L. 1955, Act 249, which provided for the issuance of highway revenue bonds in the amount of $50,000,000 in accordance with the congressional authorization. The Act of July 18, 1958, approved R.L.H. 1955, sections 137-94 to 137-107, inclusive, added by S.L. 1957, J.R. 32, which provided for the issuance of aviation revenue bonds in the amount of $14,000,000 in accordance with the congressional authorization.
The territorial acts so approved provided that each bond “shall distinctly state that it is not a general obligation of the Territory.” The highway revenue bonds were “payable from funds derived from highway vehicle fuel taxes,” and the aviation revenue bonds were “payable from funds derived from aviation fuel taxes and all other revenues of the Hawaii Aeronautics Commission, including rents, fees, and other charges,” as provided in the acts of Congress.
(g) On the same day as the earlier of the acts cited in paragraph (f) of this note, July 14, 1956, Congress also enacted by P.L. 720, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., a provision later transferred into and made an amendment of the above noted P.L. 640, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., clarifying the relation*219ship between special congressional acts providing for issuance of general obligation bonds notwithstanding the debt limit and the computation of the debt limit when applicable (Sen. Rep. No. 2353, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.). P.L. 720 read in part:
“In applying the Territory’s debt limitation, whether prescribed by this or other specific Act of Congress or by the Hawaiian Organic Act, the computation of the amount to which the total indebtedness of the Territory may be extended at any time shall include all general obligation bonds, whether for public improvements or for other purposes for which general obligation bonds are or may be authorized to be issued by the Congress: * *
(h) An amendment later was made by the Act of August 20, 1958, P.L. 85-691 above cited, which provided that “the computation * * * shall not include” the general obligation bonds issued pursuant to S.L. 1953, Act 211, and the Act of August 24,1954, approving the same (paragraph (e) of this note).