dissenting:
Section 1 of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 48, par. 60) specifies the particular activities to which the legislature has extended the benefits of the special cause of action which the Act creates. The purpose of the Act, as gathered from the provisions of section 1, is to protect employees and others on or about a construction site from the special dangers inherent in the use of mechanical and other contrivances mentioned in section 1 when these contrivances are used “in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure.” The activities covered are clearly specified by the statute. The legislature has not extended the special benefits of the Act to all construction activities. Also, all activities carried on in the immediate construction area do not enjoy the benefits of the Act. This court has held that the statutory purpose was “to prevent injuries to persons employed in this dangerous and extra-hazardous occupation, so that negligence on their part in the manner of doing their work might not prove fatal.” Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 164; Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Ry. Co., 22 Ill.2d 305, 318.
This court has also stated that a liberal construction of the Act is necessary to carry out the clear purpose of the legislature. (Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Ry. Co.; Crafton v. Knight & Associates, Inc., 46 Ill.2d 533.) However, this court also stated in Crafton that despite the fact that a liberal construction of the Act is within the clear purpose of the legislature, “The Structural Work Act has never been interpreted nor is it the opinion of this court that the legislature intended the statute to cover any and all construction activities whatsoever.” 46 Ill.2d at 536.
The employee in this case was injured while unloading a heavy piece of equipment which at some time in the future was to be installed in a structure. Admittedly, the work in which he was engaged was dangerous. However, the danger inherent in his work had no peculiar connection with the construction of the structure in which the equipment was to be installed. The employee was exposed to the same hazard he would have been exposed to if the equipment which was being unloaded from the gondola car were simply going to be stored for future delivery to some yet undesignated destination or if it were being unloaded for the purpose of being scrapped. The majority opinion attaches importance to the fact that a crane which was available should have been used to hold the pedestals while the rods and welded plates were being cut. However, the dangers inherent in the use or failure to use a crane in this situation were not the dangers peculiar to the use or failure to use a crane in “the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure,” which are the activities specified in the Act as enjoying its special benefits. The use or failure to use the crane in our case related to the unloading of this 20,000-lb. piece of equipment from a gondola car for the purpose of storing it on a temporary storage site. The crane was not to be used for one of the purposes specified in section 1. I do not think this activity comes within the purpose of the Act.
The majority opinion accepts the appellate court’s disposition of the constitutional questions that were raised. However, I do not feel that the appellate court came to grips with the constitutional issue involved. If the Structural Work Act is construed to cover the injured employee in this case, I feel that through construction an arbitrary classification has been created. The appellate court opinion refers to Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U.S. 680, 57 L. Ed. 1022, and quotes from that opinion to the effect that the danger involved in a particular occupation is a test upon which an acceptable classification can be based. As I have pointed out above, the danger to which our employee was exposed was not a danger peculiar to the extra-hazardous work covered by the Act but was a danger inherent in the work of unloading the equipment from the gondola car. It was the same danger that any other employee would have been exposed to who may have been unloading a similar piece of equipment for a purpose other than to be installed in a structure. Thus, the classification stemming from the construction of the appellate court is not based on the danger involved but upon the particular purpose for which the item of equipment is ultimately to be used. I feel such a classification is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the evil sought to be remedied by the legislature.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
SCHAEFER and DAVIS, JJ., join in this dissent.