This is a suit to quiet title to certain lands in Stephens County, Oklahoma, brought by the plaintiff, H. C. Pettigrew, against the defendants, Richard Garvin, Everett Garvin, also known as E. C. (Pete) Garvin, John B. Garvin, Madge Garvin Vandever, Lillian Estelle Bible, Lucretia May Richards, Herbert Garvin, Roy D. Garvin, Pearl Garvin, Winston B. Garvin, and James Robert Garvin. The parties will be referred to in the same order in which they appeared in the trial court.
The various parties therein named, owners of various contiguous tracts of land, each specifically therein described, entered into the following written contract, to-wit:
“This contract, made and entered into, this the 10th day of May, 1923, by and between J. R. Garvin, and his wife, Lucretia M. Garvin; Thomas Pettigrew and his wife, Anna Pettigrew; James W. *972O’Quin and his wife Lena O’Quin; and J. M. Littrell and his wife, Ella Littrell; and Corbett Littrell and his wife, Pearl Littrell,
“Witnesseth: That Whereas, J. R. Gar-vin and his wife, Lucretia M. Garvin are the owners of the following described lands, situated in Stephens County, Oklahoma, to-wit: (Specifically Described Lands) comprising 755 acres.
“Whereas, J. M. Littrell and his wife, Ella Littrell and Thomas Pettigrew and his wife, Anna Pettigrew, are the owners of the following described lands, situated in Stephens County, Oklahoma, to-wit: (Specifically Described Lands) comprising 1865 acres.
“Whereas, J. M. Littrell and his wife, Ella Littrell are the owners of (Specifically Described Lands) comprising 160 acres, and
“Whereas, J. M. Littrell and wife, Ella Littrell and Corbett Littrell- and Pearl Lit-trell are the joint owners of (Specifically Described Lands) Comprising 320 acres, and
“Whereas, J. W. O’Quin and wife, Lena O’Quin, are the owners of an undivided 14 interest in the oil and gas royalties on (specifically described lands) and
“Whereas, the parties hereto are desirous of combining their interests in any royalties accruing or to accrue from all the oil and gas that may be produced from the lands hereinbefore described, that is that each party hereto shall participate in the royalty, accruing or to accrue from the oil and gas produced from said above described lands, or any part thereof, in the proportion that their 'respective interests bear to the total number of acres embraced within the lands hereinbefore described, which interests have been fixed and agreed upon as hereinafter set forth.
“Now Therefore, in consideration of the sum of One Dollar, in hand paid, by each party to each of the other parties hereto, it is agreed:
“That J. R. Garvin and his wife, Lucretia M. Garvin shall be the owners of and entitled to 24½ per cent of the royalty accruing or to accrue from all oil and gas or either of them, which may be produced from the described lands, or from any part thereof.
“That Thomas Pettigrew and his wife, Anna M. Pettigrew, shall be the owners of and be entitled to 30½ per cent of the royalty accruing from all oil and gas or either of them, which may be produced from the above described lands, or from any part thereof.
“It is agreed by and between all of tbe parties hereto that this contract shall in no wise interfere with or divest any party thereto of the right to separately lease his or her part of the lands hereinbefore described, for oil and gas purposes, and that the several interests set apart to each of the parties hereto, as hereinbefore provided, shall not attach to the royalties from oil and gas until oil and gas or either of them, has been produced from the above described lands, or from some part thereof, and any bonuses, down payments, and rentals accruing, or to accrue, from any oil or gas lease, now existing, or that may hereafter be executed, covering any part of the lands hereinbefore described, shall be the sole and separate property of the owner of that part of said lands, covered by such oil and gas lease or leases, and each party hereto disclaims any interest in that portion of the above described lands belonging to each of the other parties hereto, and each party hereto agrees and acknowledges that the only rights conferred, by this contract, upon each of them is that right to participate in the royalties accruing or to accrue from oil or gas or either of them, according to their percentage interest as hereinbefore set out, after said oil or gas has been produced from said lands or from any part thereof.
“This contract is in lieu of and supersedes all former contracts between the parties hereto or any of them, with reference to division of royalty from oil and gas, produced from the lands hereinbefore de*973scribed, and particularly the contract with reference thereto, recorded in Book 71, page 596, of the records of the County Clerk of Stephens County, Oklahoma.
“This contract, with all the rights and privileges thereof to inure to the benefit of our heirs, executors, administrators and assigns.
“In Witness Whereof, we have hereunto set our hands this 10th day of May, 1923.”
Subsequent to the execution and recordation of the above quoted contract, the plaintiff became the owner of the land which is the subject matter of the present litigation. It consisted of 380 acres out of the lands in said contract described as owned jointly by the Littrells and the Pettigrews. The purpose of the litigation is an adjudication of whether or not plaintiff’s said property is still burdened with rights which the Garvins acquired therein under the provisions of the contract. In March of 1930, the Garvins conveyed all of the lands owned by them to one T. L. Wade by a warranty deed containing no reservations or exceptions. The following year, Mrs. Garvin died leaving as her heirs, her husband and the named defendants herein, who were her children and grandchildren. Several months thereafter, Mr. Garvin and said T. L. Wade and others executed a quit claim deed to plaintiff to all of the property herein involved. In 1947, Mr. Garvin died, leaving as his heirs the defendants herein.
Plaintiff brought this suit in January 1953 seeking to quiet his title as against the heirs of the two Garvins and to determine the heirship of Mrs. Garvin. The defendants answered and claimed, as heirs of Mr. and Mrs. Garvin to be the owners of the right to participate in all oil and gas production from plaintiff’s land in the same manner that their decedents were entitled under the terms of the contract. Trial was had to the court, resulting in judgment for defendants to the extent that they were entitled to participate in Mrs. Garvin’s estate. Plaintiff’s motion for new trial was sustained and the defendants have perfected this appeal.
Ordinarily, in reviewing the action of the trial court’s order sustaining a motion for new trial, it is unnecessary for this court to determine the issues on the merits. But, in the instant case, only a pure question of law is involved. In the order appealed from, the trial court gave the following reasons therein as grounds for the decision granting a new trial to-wit:
“ * * * said contract of May 10, 1923, involved herein, under which the said defendants claim herein and on which they claim, was and is entirely void and ineffective for any purpose under the rule and holding as announced and set forth in the case of Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136, and because such contract was and is ambiguous and uncertain and violates the rule against per-petuties and too remote vesting. * * ”
In effect, the trial court granted a new trial for the reason that the plaintiff, and not the defendants, was entitled to judgment. Thus, the order amounted to a general finding for plaintiff. Although this court is committed to the rule that, in reviewing an order of the trial court sustaining a motion for new trial, the review will be confined to the reasons given by the trial court for granting the motion (Browne v. Bassett, 191 Okl. 22, 126 P.2d 705), if the reasons assigned require an examination of the record to ascertain whether the granting of the motion for new trial amounts to an abuse of discretion, an exercise of arbitrary power, or error as to some simple and unmixed question of law, this court will examine the record and if it reveals such condition, will reverse the trial court. Cooke v. Sinopoulo, 194 Okl. 352, 151 P.2d 791, 792. However,
“In the absence of abuse of discretion, arbitrary action or error with respect to some simple and unmixed question of law this court will not *974disturb an order which grants a new trial.” Cooke v. Sinopoulo, supra.
An examination of the record in the case at bar fails to disclose that the granting of a new trial was either an abuse of discretion, an arbitrary action, or an error as to some simple and unmixed question of law.
The contract here involved constituted a pooling agreement. It was so referred to in the record and in the briefs of the parties. It could not have been a conveyance of a mineral interest. Nowhere does there appear therein a granting clause of any kind. Nor was it an assignment of royalties in perpetuity. There was-no word of assignment in it nor was any duration stated. Snider v. Snider, 208 Okl. 231, 255 P.2d 273. Defendants in their brief argue at length the importance of the provision that the contract with all rights and privileges should inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the parties. But, as pointed out in the Snider case, supra, that is merely one of the provisions necessary for an assignment of royalties in perpetuity. The others are lacking. In addition the contract specifically provided that “each party thereto disclaims any interest in that portion of the above described lands belonging to each of the other parties hereto.”
After Mr. and Mrs. Garvin conveyed to Wade, they owned no realty to be contributed to the pool. Having nothing to contribute, they were not entitled to further participate. A very similar situation was before the Kansas Court in the case of Hover v. Cleveland Oil Co., 150 Kan. 531, 95 P.2d 264, 266, and, because the reasoning therein contained is so peculiarly applicable to the case here we quote it at length, as follows:
“The very essence of the agreement was that the contracting parties were owners of adjacent properties suitable to be explored and exploited for oil and gas, and that any resulting royalties should be divided proportionately to their respective acreages. When the Hovers parted with their property what did they have to contribute to the common pool of possible royalties? Nothing. The agreement had quite properly provided the oil royalties should be shared until it was changed by the parties. But that result would follow when they sold their property if the agreement had not mentioned it. After the Hovers disposed of their property there was no possibility that the Boyersmiths could thereafter get any benefit from the agreement of 1927. It was of no consequence that the cattle company filed a disclaimer and that its managing officers knew of the agreement of 1927 between the Boyersmiths and Hovers. They could have had no concern with that agreement. Neither was it of any significance that the Hovers continued to receive a portion of the Boyersmith Oil well royalties for several years after 1931.”
To the same effect but not so nearly parallel is the case of Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital Nat. Bank of Jackson, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So.2d 666. Upon a thorough independent investigation, we find no case in any jurisdiction where parties to a pooling agreement were permitted to participate in the production of minerals from other parts of the pool after they parted with title to the lands they agreed to contribute to the pool unless such lands had first been released therefrom. Equity demands that conclusion.
Therefore, at the times of their deaths, the Garvins had no right to participate in any oil or gas production from plaintiff’s lands and none could descend to their heirs, the defendants herein. The trial court committed no error in vacating the judgment in their favor.
We need not here determine what rights in plaintiff’s property were acquired by Wade when he purchased the Garvin land because he subsequently executed a quit claim deed to the plaintiff. Also, having reached the conclusion herein above dis*975cussed, it is unnecessary for us to consider what the original effect of the pooling agreement was.
The judgment of the trial court in granting a new trial is affirmed.
HALLEY, WILLIAMS, BLACKBIRD, and JACKSON, JJ., concur. CORN, V. C. J., and CARLILE, JOHNSON, JJ., dissent.