(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority-opinion.
The pertinent dates are these:
April 20, 1955, husband obtained the decree in controversy.
August 10, 1956, wife filed motion seeking to modify the divorce decree as to custody of the children.
September 6, 1956, order entered modifying divorce decree as to custody of children.
April 4, 1957, husband filed motion seeking to modify decree as to custody of children.
January 31, 1958, wife filed motion seeking to modify decree as to custody of children and also sought to defend as to property rights.
The trial court found and held that wife “by her general appearance in these proceedings on September 6, 1956, and her prayer for affirmative relief directed to this court, the defendant (wife) is bound by the terms of the judgment of this court and is estopped from, and has waived her right to subsequently assert the inconclusiveness of the judgment of this court.”
I am of the opinion that the foregoing conclusion is in keeping with well-established principles of law.
In Stephenson v. Hammons, Okl., 308 P.2d 317, 318, this was said in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
“1. If a defendant invokes the jurisdiction of the court upon any question except that of the power of the court to hear and decide the cause, the appearance is general.”
See also Jameson v. Harvel, 139 Okl. 39, 280 P. 1080; Hecker v. Sadler, 176 Okl. 34, 54 P.2d 382, and cases cited under 3 Okl.Dig., Appearances,
At page 326, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 93b. Appearance, this is said:
“The general rules as to appearances, * * * usually apply to appearances in divorce proceedings. * * * ”
In Reineke v. Northerner, 119 Ind.App. 539, 84 N.E.2d 900, 902, the appellate court said this:
“(4) It is apparent that the Daviess Circuit Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when the appellee brought suit for divorce and she came into court seeking and obtaining custody of her infant child. * * ”
I respectfully dissent.