dissenting:
The witness testimony during the rehearing failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that the defendant is in need of inpatient care and that, if released, the defendant was reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct. My review of the evidence shows that the circuit court’s finding was manifestly erroneous and the defendant is entitled to discharge. Each of the expert witnesses testified that the defendant suffered from a mental illness at the time of the hearing. The diagnoses, however, were diverse and vague. The law requires that the defendant be diagnosed with a specific mental illness and that he be found to be dangerous. Here, these criteria were not met.
As the majority states, Dr. Mahmood, Dr. Flippen and Dr. KimAnsbro each testified that, if the defendant was released and his future goals started falling apart, the stress factors could contribute to a psychosis and defendant could act violently. The doctors stated concerns about defendant’s lack of coping skills. The doctors were concerned that the defendant would not be able to cope with stress outside the hospital, yet they acknowledged that defendant had not become violent when faced with stress in the hospital setting. Dr. Flip-pen and Dr. Kim-Ansbro believed that if defendant was released he would be a potential danger over time. All three doctors stated their concerns that because of defendant’s narcissistic traits, defendant could become violent when he suffered failure or rejection.
The evidence and the testimony of the doctors, however, belie their opinion that he could be dangerous. The doctors acknowledged that in the 12 years that defendant has been in mental health facilities, he has never acted violently, never made any threats, never been restrained and never been medicated. Moreover, during the four-year period the defendant eloped from the Elgin facility, he lived on his own, was employed, and did not act violently against anyone. The defendant has no symptoms of psychosis or delusions.
Significant for each of the doctors was that the defendant never accepted that he suffered from a mental illness and he never accepted therapy to help him develop coping skills. Dr. Mahmood testified that she believed when things in defendant’s life started to deteriorate, the defendant would not recognize if he were developing a psychosis and would not seek out mental health treatment to help himself. Dr. KimAnsbro and Dr. Flippen also testified that they did not believe the defendant possessed the necessary coping skills because of his lack of insight into his mental illness. The doctors explained that defendant’s refusal to accept and acknowledge his mental illness increased his potential for dangerousness.
This, however, does not support the finding that defendant is reasonably expected to harm himself or others. The defendant has not demonstrated any aggressive or threatening behavior. In fact, the defendant has demonstrated that he is not dangerous both in the hospital setting and in the community.
The fourth doctor to testify, Dr. Dinwiddie, disagreed with the other three and stated that in his opinion the defendant was not in need of inpatient mental health treatment and that defendant was not reasonably expected to inflict harm on himself or anyone else. In my humble opinion, Dr. Dinwiddie came closest to the proper diagnosis of the defendant. Dr. Dinwiddie testified that his opinion was based in part on the absence of risk factors for violence. Dr. Dinwiddie acknowledged that those same risk factors were absent in 1985 when the defendant violently attacked his father; however, the doctor pointed to the defendant’s nonviolent history for the past 19 years. Dr. Dinwiddie explained that the defendant has lived in a variety of settings, both in and out of mental health facilities, where he experienced many stressors that might provoke violent behavior. Yet even in situations that tested the defendant’s ability to cope with frustration and failure, the defendant apparently has not acted violently in any of those settings.
I believe that the findings of the circuit court are not supported by clear and convincing evidence and the decision of the circuit court was manifestly erroneous. The trial court failed to make a finding giving defendant a specific diagnosis. Further, the evidence simply does not support the court’s finding that the defendant is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future. This defendant should be released today.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.