with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
Assuming that on this record a dismissal under Civil Rule 41(e) is warranted, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the dismissal be with prejudice.
In Zeller v. Poor, 577 P.2d 695, 697 (Alaska 1976), this court stated,
Where a case is dismissed without qualification under Civil Rule 41(e) the dismissal is without prejudice. The court may, however, dismiss a case with prejudice but this sanction should be reserved for gross violations of the rule. We have expressed a policy favoring adjudication of cases on the merits, and we are reluctant to bar a litigant from his day in court where an alternative remedy would suffice to make the adverse party whole.1
(Footnotes omitted.) Review of the record persuades me that here dismissal with prej*1057udice constituted an abuse of discretion and that the case should be remanded for imposition of alternative sanctions.
In reaching this conclusion, consideration has been given to the following factors: (1) whether the conduct of P.C.I. was willful; (2) any lack of reasonable diligence on P.C. I.’s part; (3) the degree of prejudice to Acres and Ebasco caused by the delay; and (4) the superior court’s consideration of sanctions less drastic than dismissal with prejudice. Compare McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 396 (4th Cir.1976). Study of the record fails to disclose adequate support for a finding of willful failure to prosecute. Nor is there evidence of bad faith or purposefully dilatory conduct by P.C.I. Further, I agree with P.C.I.’s contention that the sixteen month delay does not constitute a gross violation of Civil Rule 41(c). Of particular significance is the fact that at the time the superior court dismissed P.C. I.’s claims with prejudice, the six year statute of limitations had not run on P.C.I.’s contract claims against Acres and Ebasco.
Additionally, I am not persuaded that Acres and Ebasco made any affirmative showing of prejudice due to the fact that certain witnesses have relocated. While relocation may make it more costly and difficult to interview and depose these individuals, this is a normal risk of litigation. Nor was it shown that P.C.I.’s management of the litigation significantly inhibited Acres’ and Ebasco’s ability to adequately prepare their defense.
Given the absence of egregious conduct on P.C.I.’s part, and the fact that the commencement of the contract actions could have been deferred until the end of the six year limitation period, I would vacate the superior court’s dismissal with prejudice and remand the matter for imposition of appropriate sanctions as a precondition to P.C.I. refiling its contract claims.2
. We have noted that: ”[t]he dismissal of an action with prejudice or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic remedies, and should be applied only in extreme circumstances." Mely v. Morris, 409 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1966) (quoting Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960)).
. For example, the superior court may assess against P.C.I. both Acres' and Ebasco’s actual costs and attorney’s fees incurred as an appropriate condition to the refiling of P.C.I.’s contract claims.