dissenting
I dissent. Cobb has produced sufficient evidence to support an inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from the Owens-Corning product on the job site. This inference was made when Cobb showed that Kaylo, as it was used during his tenure at IPS, did produce a significant amount of asbestos dust and that Cobb could have inhaled the asbestos dust while he was at work.
Cobb was a steam fitter for IPS between 1963 and 1966. While he was on the job sites doing pipe repair, he would work with the insulators who were actually covering the pipes with asbestos material. At times he would be working next to them and at other times he would be several feet away from them.
Q In the course of the insulation, did you ever see dust created by the products that the insulators were using?
A On a new construction job, yes, there’s always dust.
Q New construction within IPS?
A Well, some of it would be new construction with IPS, some of it would be — what do I want to say — remodel work or — it could have been remodel work.
Q And when you were in the area with these people, were you exposed to dust
that they were creating during the course of their insulation duties?
A Yes.
Q What type of activity would they engage in that created the most amount of dust?
A Probably pipe covering.
Q And how would the dust be created?
A As they cut it and as they put it on the piping, and as they would seal the edges, just the handling of it.
Q Do you recall how close you were to these insulators as they were covering the pipe?
A I could have been within two feet of them. I could have been within 40 feet of them.
Q Do you recall any specific product names that you saw the AC & S insulators using?
A Primarily Armstrong.
Q Do you remember any other particular types of Armstrong products you might have seen on the work site?
A Well, I remember the Kaylo ...12
When a trial court grants summary judgment its decision is presumed valid and will be affirmed if sustainable on any theory. Prall v. Indiana National Bank, 627 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). The evidence designated by both parties establishes a genuine issue of material fact that only a jury could determine.
In the summary judgment standard of review cited by the majority, Cobb need only make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of each challenged element upon which he has the burden of proof. Under this standard, Cobb has made a sufficient showing to allow the conclusion that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Cobb’s exposure to OC’s asbestos containing product, Kaylo. OC has not established the absence of a question of fact on the outcome-determinative issue of causation.
I believe it is important to first analyze the differences in summary judgment standards between Indiana and federal practice as enunciated by our supreme court in Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994).
Indiana’s summary judgment procedure abruptly diverges from federal summary judgment practice. Under the federal rule, the party seeking summary judgment is not required to negate an opponent’s claim. The movant need only inform the *305court of the basis of the motion and identify relevant portions of the record ‘which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.E[d].2d 265, 272. The burden then rests upon the non-moving party to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of each challenged element upon which the non-movant has the burden of proof. Id. Indiana does not adhere to Celotex and the federal methodology.
The burden in federal court rests upon the non-moving party to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of each challenged element upon which the non-movant has the burden of proof. Indiana does not adhere to this methodology. Merely alleging that Cobb has failed to produce evidence of causation, an essential element to Cobb’s case, is insufficient to entitle Owens-Corning to summary judgment under Indiana law. Here, Cobb has made a sufficient showing on the essential element of causation to which he bears the burden of proof at trial. The dictate of Jarboe is consistent with the recognition that summary judgment terminates the right to trial and that summary judgment will be denied even though it appears that the plaintiff may not succeed at trial. Greathouse v. Armstrong, 616 N.E.2d 364, 365-366 (Ind.1993).
Although neither this court nor the supreme court has adopted a test for causation in asbestos cases, the “job site” test for causation as stated in Peerman v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 35 F.3d 284, 287 (7th Cir.1994) best fits our summary judgment standard. It holds that a plaintiff need not produce evidence of actual exposure to the product alleged to have caused an asbestos-related disease, but must produce enough evidence to support an inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from the defendant’s product. Id.
Hands v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 102 F.3d 1429 (7th Cir.1996) holds that a claim survives a dispositive motion only if it can be established that the OC’s product caused the person’s illness. To adopt such a standard in asbestos cases in Indiana is contrary to our summary judgment procedure that diverges from the federal summary practice. Indiana does not permit a summary judgment to be used as an abbreviated trial. Flott v. Cates, 528 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). To adopt the . Harris standard is to conclude in a summary fashion that the Kaylo product was not the cause of death.
Instead, we must adopt the Peerman standard that is in line with summary judgment practice in Indiana, allowing a material issue of fact to be tried by a jury. Cobb has produced enough evidence to support an inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from the Kaylo product. The standard does not require that Kaylo was the only product on the job site. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Cobb has identified Kaylo as a product on the job site that could have possibly produced a significant amount of asbestos dust that he could have inhaled during his tenure at IPS. I would affirm the trial court’s order denying OC’s motion for summary judgment.
. The excerpted questions and answers are found at pages 218-222 of Cobb's deposition.