(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that respondents have failed to state a claim for fraud. But I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that respondents failed to state a claim for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The matter before us has been treated throughout under a Rule 12 motion and, in the context of such a motion, the majority has prematurely dismissed this action.
There is no dispute that a bilateral employment contract exists between respondents and 3M. But we have acknowledged that “an original employment contract may be modified or replaced by a subsequent
unilateral contract.” Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.1983). Therefore, the central issue before us is whether 3M’s oral and written statements formed a binding unilateral contract offer. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we should address the issue of whether the oral and written statements alleged to have been made by 3M can constitute a unilateral contract offer as a matter of law. But it is here where I depart from the majority’s analysis. The majority establishes a test for specificity in the complaint that is too stringent — it demands too much. Further, the majority defines the test in terms of standards for individual advancement. Such a test does not address the nature of the contract alleged — that is, that under 3M’s dual ladder system, there would be equivalent or comparable opportunities for advancement.
The respondents assert that 3M’s offer is of equivalent or comparable opportunities. Therefore, the issue at this stage of the proceedings is not whether an individual employee deserves a certain salary, position, or benefit, but whether there was any opportunity for scientific and technical employees to achieve equivalence. It is not clear to me, especially in an action of this type, why respondents’ allegations *749which include cumulative disparities in salaries, benefits, and promotions, together with the allegations specific to themselves, are not sufficient for this action to survive a Rule 12 motion. Whether respondents can survive a summary judgment motion or will have problems proving causation or in proving any particular individual’s case are separate issues, but these issues are not before us, at least not yet.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the terms “comparable compensation” and “equivalent recognition and reward” are so ambiguous that respondents’ claim lacks any expression of a standard sufficiently definite to determine to what respondents are entitled. Such a conclusion ignores the fact that similar terms are routinely used and analyzed by courts as standards in employment actions and other similar cases. See, e.g., Marty v. Digital Equip. Corp., 345 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn.1984) (evaluating whether an offered, but refused, position was “substantially equivalent” to the original position held by the employee); Polley v. Gopher Bearing Co., 478 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Minn. App.1991), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992) (evaluating whether duties, salary, and hours were “comparable” as required under the Parenting Leave Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 181.940-.944 (1990)); Holbrook v. Minnesota Museum of Art, 405 N.W.2d 537, 539-40 (Minn.App.1987), rev. denied (Minn., July 15, 1987) (evaluating whether the pay scales in two positions were equivalent). Equal Pay Act eases address similar concepts. See, e.g., Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 400-01 (Minn.1978) (analyzing the “validity of differing pay rates given for allegedly different jobs”).
Finally, lurking in the background of the breach of contract issue is whether there is or should be a more stringent standard of specificity for a unilateral offer of contract than for a bilateral contract. I doubt we would have this dispute before us if respondents and 3M had entered into a written contract promising “equivalence” in the same terms as represented by 3M’s oral and written statements. Under such circumstances, there would be a contract, but in such an instance, at least both sides would know that they were contracting for something. Arguably, in the unilateral offer situation, the standard of specificity should be higher because an employer may not know that its general statements are contractual terms to which it may be held accountable. Here, the majority does not directly address this issue, yet implicitly sets a higher standard, but when doing so, establishes a standard for specificity in the complaint that virtually eliminates a valid cause of action. A more appropriate result would be to hold, as I would, that under the rule articulated in Pine River respondents have sufficiently stated a claim for unilateral contract so that their action survives 3M’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss their breach of contract claim.
Promissory estoppel “focuses on the reasonableness of the employee’s reliance to create a contractual obligation * * Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 750 (Minn.1983). It provides a different analytic approach than does the analysis used for a unilateral contract. Id. at 748. The analytic focus for promissory estoppel should not rest only on whether the alleged promise is clear and definite, but must focus on whether there was a promise made that was, or reasonably should have been, expected to induce reliance on the part of the promisee. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). Therefore, I disagree with the holding of the majority on promissory estoppel and join in the dissent’s conclusion that under a Rule 12 motion, dismissal of respondents’ cause of action for promissory estoppel is inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings.