OPINION
HARTEN, JudgeAppellant Robert Baumann challenges his DWI conviction, asserting that the district court erred in holding constitutional the stop of his vehicle based on the presence of special series license plates and the warrantless entry into his garage. He also challenges the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 168.0422 (1998) (permitting stops of vehicles bearing special series license plates without reasonable, articulable suspicion). We affirm.
FACTS
On March 19, 1999, at 7:10 p.m., Coon Rapids Police Officer J. Urquhart overheard a radio transmission from a sheriffs deputy regarding the sighting of a white Chevrolet Corsica with plates bearing the letters “WX.” According to Urquhart, the deputy stated that the “registered owner had had warrants and was canceled IPS [mimical to public safety].” Urquhart stated that he did not recall hearing the *773car’s license plate number or the driver’s gender.
Later, that night, at 1:41 a.m., Urquhart was on patrol approximately one mile from the area described in the earlier radio transmission. He observed a white Chevrolet Corsica with special license plates beginning with “WX.” Urquhart knew that such plates were issued due to past alcohol-related driving offenses.
Urquhart followed the vehicle and entered its license plate information into the patrol car’s onboard computer. As he waited for the information to come up on the computer, the vehicle turned into a townhouse driveway, and a garage door opened. Urquhart then turned and followed the vehicle into the driveway with his red squad car lights activated. As the car pulled into the garage and the garage door began to close, Urquhart exited his squad car and ran under the door. The driver, later identified as Robert Bau-mann, exited his vehicle, and Urquhart asked him for his driver’s license. Bau-mann replied that he did not have one. Urquhart then asked Baumann for some form of identification, and Baumann produced his Minnesota photo identification card.
Baumann was charged with six gross misdemeanor DWI violations: three under Minn.Stat. § 169.121 (1998), and three under Minn.Stat. § 169.129 (1998). Bau-mann stipulated to certain facts and moved to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges based on his assertion that the police stop of his vehicle and the warrant-less entry into his garage were unconstitutional. The district court denied his motion.
Pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn.1980), Baumann pleaded not guilty, stipulated to the facts, and agreed to a bench trial. He was found guilty of aggravated DWI, having an alcohol concentration of .10 or more in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.129, subds. 1, 2(a), and the other counts against him were dismissed. He was sentenced to one year in prison, eight months of which were stayed. This appeal followed.
ISSUES
1. Was the stop of appellant’s vehicle constitutional?
2. Were appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights violated when the officer entered appellant’s garage without a warrant?
ANALYSIS
In reviewing pretrial suppression orders, the appellate court independently reviews the facts and determines, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in its decision. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn.1999).
1. Constitutionality of the Stop
Baumann asserts that Minn.Stat. § 168.0422 (1998), which permits stops of vehicles bearing special series license plates1 without reasonable suspicion of a crime, is unconstitutional. Baumann argues that the officer’s stop of his vehicle was also unconstitutional.
Constitutional questions need be decided by this court only as necessary to dispose of the case presented. State v. Hoyt, 304 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Minn.1981). Because we conclude that Baumann’s con*774viction can be sustained on other grounds, it is unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 168.0422.2
“[T]he factual basis required to support the stop for a routine traffic check is minimal.” State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Minn.1977) (quotation omitted). In order to conduct a Terry stop for limited investigatory purposes, an officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn.1999). The stop must be
not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity [but rather] based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.
Johnson, 257 N.W.2d at 309 (quotation omitted).
State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn.1996) upheld as constitutional the stop of a suspect’s vehicle based on a routine computer check of the suspect’s license plates, which indicated that the vehicle’s registered owner’s license had been revoked.
It is not unconstitutional for an officer to make a brief, investigatory, Terry-type stop of a vehicle if the officer knows that the owner of the vehicle has a revoked license so long as the officer remains unaware of any facts which would render unreasonable an assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle.
Id. Once an officer obtains information that tends to show the owner of the vehicle is not the individual driving the vehicle, however, reasonable suspicion ceases. Id.
Here, as in Pike, the officer’s stop of Baumann’s vehicle was based on more than “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” Johnson, 257 N.W.2d at 309. The officer had received information earlier in his shift that a white Chevrolet Corsica with WX plates had been seen in the immediate area, and he was aware that special series plates are issued to those with a history of DWI offenses. Additionally, the officer knew that the registered owner “had had warrants” out for his or her arrest and “was canceled IPS.” Although the officer may not have been certain that the vehicle he stopped was the same vehicle seen earlier in the evening, this was a reasonable inference. The vehicle descriptions were identical, and the stopped vehicle was first observed only a mile from the reported earlier sighting. On these facts, Urquhart’s stop was supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion.
2. Warrantless Entry in Appellant’s Garage
The Fourth Amendment of the United State Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of “persons, houses, papers and effects.” In order for an arrest to be made after a warrantless entry or search of a person’s home, the state must demonstrate the existence of either (a) consent or (b) probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Minn.1996). It is undisputed that Baumann did not consent to Urquhart’s entry.
But Urquhart had sufficient probable cause to justify entry into Bau-mann’s garage. Probable cause is found when police demonstrate that they “reasonably could have believed that a crime was being committed by the person arrested.” Id. (quotation omitted). Urquhart was aware that (a) a vehicle matching Bau-mann’s vehicle was seen in the area earlier in the evening; (b) the driver of the vehicle seen earlier in the evening had a li*775cense which was canceled as IPS; (c) the driver “had had warrants”; and (d) Bau-mann failed to stop and closed the garage door on Urquhart despite Urquhart’s activation of his squad car’s overhead lights. Taken together, the totality of the circumstances indicates that probable cause existed at least for obstruction of legal process, a misdemeanor, under Minn.Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1 (1998).3
Second, exigent circumstances in the form of “hot pursuit” were' also present in this situation. Police in hot pursuit may follow a fleeing suspect and enter into a dwelling in the absence of a warrant. State v. Koziol, 338 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Minn.1983) (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. at 2406, 2410, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976)). Further, “a person may not defeat a warrantless arrest which has been set in motion in public by entering into his dwelling.” Id. Although Urquhart followed for only a short distance with his squad car lights activated, the “hot pursuit” doctrine applies regardless of whether officers conduct “a high speed chase of the suspect* or merely approach a suspect who immediately retreats into a house.” Paul, 548. N.W.2d at 265.
DECISION
The district court did not err by denying Baumann’s motion to suppress. The police stop of Baumann’s vehicle was based on reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity given the totality of the circumstances. When Baumann entered his garage, the police officer was engaged in “hot pursuit” and had probable cause to believe that Baumann had committed a crime. The officer’s entry into the garage was not unconstitutional.
Affirmed.
. Special series license plates permit the continued operation of a vehicle that has its registration plates impounded because a driver and/or owner committed certain driving offenses. Minn.Stat. § 168.041, subd. 6(a), .042, subd. 12 (1998). Both statutory subdivisions authorize special series plates if (1) the violator or owner has a limited license, (2) the owner is not the violator and has a valid license, or (3) a member of the owner’s household has a valid license. Id. Special series plates may also be issued under Minn.Stat. § 168.041, subd. 6(a), if someone in the violator's household has a valid driver’s license and may be issued under Minn.Stat. § 168.042, subd. 12, if the violator has an identified qualified licensed driver.
. In State v. Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d 326 (Minn.App.1995), we held that officers could not lawfully stop vehicles based solely on the observation of special series license plates on the vehicle. The legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 168.0422 subsequent to this court's decision in Greyeagle. We need not resolve whether this statute has effectively overruled Greyeagle.
. Baumann argues that the police did not charge him with obstruction of legal process. But whether or not Baumann was charged with obstruction of legal process is not controlling. The fact that the charge was objectively available answers the inquiry for probable cause purposes. See State v. White, 489 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Minn.1992) ("Under the objective test of probable cause which we use, the issue is whether there was objective probable cause to arrest.”).