(concurring).
I strongly concur in the result reached by the majority and agree that the appropriate test is whether the deviation on the ballot constituted malconduct “sufficient to change the result of the election.” Because of the difficulty the trial judge faces in making this determination, however, some comment should be made on the propriety of admitting expert testimony based on a poll taken of selected voters for assistance. I have concluded that such evidence is properly admitted and, in the case at bar, clearly supportive of the trial judge’s decision.
Turning first to the question of the relevancy of survey evidence, it must be conceded that the utilization of mathematical and statistical techniques as an aid to the fact-finding process at trial has generated considerable controversy among legal scholars.1 For example, Professor Tribe, writing in reaction to what he describes as a “growing and bewildering literature of praise for mathematical precision in the trial process”2 argues that the utility of mathematical techniques at trial has been greatly exaggerated, that they inherently conflict with other important values in our system, and concludes that the “union would be more dangerous than fruitful”.3 These dangers are typified by People v. Collins, 66 Cal.Rptr. 497, 438 P.2d 33 (1968). There a couple was convicted by *84a jury after an expert mathematician testified that if the robbery were indeed committed by a Caucasian woman with a blond pony tail accompanied by a Negro with a beard and moustache driving a yellow car as several witnesses testified, there was only one chance in twelve million that the defendants, who possessed those same characteristics, were innocent. The California Supreme Court reversed their convictions, and noted that “[m]athematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society, while assisting the trier of fact in a search for truth, must not [be allowed to] cast a spell over him.” 66 Cal.Rptr. 497, 438 P.2d 33.
To be contrasted to the Collins situation, where probability theory was used to prove a fact not susceptible to quantitative analysis, is the case where the governing substantive law turns on a question that is in some sense mathematical. In such a case there is general agreement that the use of mathematical and statistical techniques is proper.4 Thus, quantitative methods have been utilized in cases hinging on percentage of market control,5 expected lifetime earnings,6 the randomness of the jury selection process,7 and widespread public confusion over similar trademarks.8 In the case at bar, not only was the poll highly relevant, but, as the state concedes, an expert-conducted poll is really the only satisfactory objective evidence available to assist the trial judge in deciding whether the error on the ballot was sufficient to 'change the result of the election. Applying the ’test we announced in Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 70 (Alaska 1968), that we would permit expert testimony if the trier of fact “can receive appreciable help from the expert witness on the subject on which he testifies,” I think that the trial court correctly decided that the poll was relevant.
Appellant also argues that admission of the poll violated the rule against admission of hearsay evidence.9 The more persuasive authority and the concensus of legal writers, however, is that the hearsay rule should not bar introduction of survey evidence.10 Several grounds have been suggested for this conclusion. First, the out-of-court statement often is not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, and in such a case does not fall within the clas*85sic definition of hearsay.11 Second, even if it is regarded as hearsay, it is admissible under the recognized exception to the hearsay rule for declarations of present attitude, belief or state of mind.12 Third, it has been suggested that since surveys satisfy the rationale for the other exceptions to the hearsay rule, namely, necessity and trustworthiness,13 a special exception for survey evidence should be recognized.14
Finally, appellant argues that because of a number of defects in Dr. DeVries’ poll it should be accorded no probative weight. Briefly, Dr. DeVries, a professor of political science at the University of Michigan and an acknowledged expert in election and political polling, proceeded as follows: Two Anchorage area precincts were selected as “weather vane” precincts because the percentage vote on the referendum there approximated the percentage vote in the state as a whole, and because the precincts had tended to reflect the outcome of the last several statewide elections.15 One hundred and fifty voters who had participated in the last election were selected at random from each precinct and each voter was asked four questions. The questions asked were: (1) Should the people of Alaska vote on the question of land claims ? (2) Should there be a reform of the Alaska Court System? (3) Should the people of Alaska vote on the question of reapportionment of the legislature? (4) Should there be a constitutional convention? In one precinct each question was prefaced by the phrase “as required by the Constitution of the State of Alaska”; in the other precincts they were not. As Dr. DeVries explained, the result was that an affirmative bias, ranging from eight percent to thirty-four percent, was found to have been introduced by the prefatory phrase “as required by the Constitution of the State of Alaska.” On the constitutional convention question, the affirmative bias was 14.7 percent. Dr. DeVries testified that in his opinion the prefatory language introduced a significant bias towards an affirmative vote and changed the result of the November referendum.
Clearly no reversible error occurred in admitting this poll. Even if I were persuaded by appellant’s criticisms of the poll,16 it would be difficult to conclude that the trial judge could not competently weigh the evidence without being prejudiced. This is to say that within fairly broad limits, and especially in a judge-tried case, any defects in the poll should go to its weight and not its admissibility.17 We *86have adopted liberal rules in Alaska regarding the admission of expert testimony 18 and I see no reason to cut back in cases where the expert’s testimony is based on a poll. Appellant cross-examined Dr. DeVries in considerable detail at trial and presented its own expert witness who gave his opinion about certain defects in Dr. DeVries’ poll. Cross-examination and the opportunity to present rebutting expert testimony provide adequate protection against any errors in the poll or in the expert’s testimony.19 These considerations are particularly persuasive under the facts of this case where, as indicated above, survey evidence is the only objective evidence available.20
.In praise of mathematical techniques, see, e. g., Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-finding: A Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1969 U.Tol.L.Rev. 538 (1969) ; Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1970). Substantial reservations are expressed in Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1329 (1971). See also, Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.Pol.Bcon., 169 (1968) ; Birmingham, A Model of Criminal Process: Game Theory and Law, 56 Cornell L.Rev. 57 (1970) ; Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan.L.Rev. 1065 (1968).
. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L.Rev. 1329, 1332 (1971).
. Id. at 1393.
. See id. at 1338. Regarding the use of survey evidence in particular, see H. Barksdale, The Use of Survey Research Finding's as Legal Evidence (1957) ; Sorenson & Sorenson, The Admissibility and Use of Opinion Research Evidence, 28 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1213 (1953) ; Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 Cornell L.Q. 322 (1960).
. E. g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 304-305 (D.Mass. 1953) (Wyzanski, J.), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 910 (1954).
. See, e. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Steel, 257 Ala. 474, 59 So.2d 664 (1952) ; Yon Tersch v. Ahrendsen, 251 Iowa 115, 99 N.W.2d 287 (1959) ; Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 70 (Alaska 1968).
. See, e. g., Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 88 S.Ct. 4, 19 L.Ed.2d 25 (1967). See generally Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 338 (1966) ; Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37 U. Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1969).
. E. g., United States v. 88 Oases, More or Less, Containing Bierley’s Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967, 974 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 342 U.S. 861, 72 S.Ct. 88, 96 L.Ed. 648 (1951) ; Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670, 680-686 (S.D.N.Y.1963) (Feinberg, X).
. Under a stipulation between the parties, all objections to the hearsay nature of the poll, “with the exception of possible hearsay objections over the absence of the individuals whose opinions were solicited” were waived. Thus, we can limit our attention to the out-of-court statements of interviewees; no “double hearsay” problems remain.
. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1704 at 15 (Supp.1970) ; Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 Cornell L.Q. 322, 333-337 (1960) ; H. Barksdale, The Use of Survey Research Findings as Legal Evidence, 39-41 (1957).
. See United States v. 88 Oases, More or Less, Containing Bierley’s Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967, 974 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 342 U.S. 861, 72 S.Ot. 88, 96 L.Ed. 648 (1951).
. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) and cases cited therein.
. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1420-1422 at 202-205 (1940).
. Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 Cornell L.Q. 322, 345-346 (1960). See also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports. Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670, 683-684 (S.D.N.Y.1963).
. Dr. DeVries developed the statistical weather vane concept in 1962. It is based on the premise that certain precincts tend to vote consistently like the electorate in an entire state through time. He testified that he had had a near 100% success record using this technique in the recent past.
. Appellant asserts that there were nine major defects in Dr. DeVries’ poll. (1) Dr. DeVries’ “survey” was in fact an “experiment”. (2) Conditions had substantially changed between the time of the election and the time of the survey. (3) Several of these differences could have been avoided. (4) Only the final tabulations of the survey were put into evidence. (5) The survey was offered for a purpose different from that for which it was designed. (6) The interviewers were poorly supervised. (7) The sampling technique used by Dr. DeVries was inadequate. (8) The sample was drawn from a population which was not representative of the universe. (9) The study was prepared for the purpose of litigation.
. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
. See Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 70 (Alaska 1968). Cf. Dash v. State, 491 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1971).
. See Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 Cornell L.Q. 322, 340-344 (1960) for a discussion of how a survey can be impeached by showing either that the survey was directed at a. universe which was irrelevant to the litigated issue, that the sample taken was inadequate, or that there were circumstances existing in the interviews which diminished the reliability of the survey. In order to give opposing counsel a reasonable opportunity to effectively cross-examine the expert witness, he should, of course, be notified prior to trial that a survey will be used.
.The presumption of validity given to elections and the diffidence with which the court attacks the results thereof places a heavy burden on a trial judge. Any aid which he can obtain in reviewing largely subjective matters is greatly to be preferred over other methods which ax-e closer to personal preference than legal authorities readily care to admit.