I dissent.
Proper warning of the consequences of refusal to comply with Vehicle Code section 13353 is one of the elements essential to suspension of a license under the code. (Giomi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 905, 906 [93 Cal.Rptr. 613].) While one might prefer such admonition to be letter-perfect in the statutory terms, warnings have been held to be adequate if they state that refusal “would probably” cause suspension (Janusch v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 193, 196 [80 Cal.Rptr. 726]) or that “chances are that you will lose your license” (Smith v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 499, 503 [81 Cal.Rptr. 800]).
Furthermore, in Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 1 Cal.3d 74 [81 Cal.Rptr. 348, 459 P.2d 900], the police officer was not required to advise an allegedly drunk driver that additional tests may be taken at his own expense, even though the statute so provides. And in Westmoreland v. Chapman (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 1 [74 Cal.Rptr. 363], the officer was not obliged to inform the arrestee that a licensed technician was authorized to take a blood specimen from him, even though the statute so provides.
The majority rationalize the foregoing cases expressing approval of substantial rather than literal compliance with the statute by quoting from Giomi, supra, that in those instances “the language used adequately con*908veyed to the driver the strong likelihood that the adverse result would follow upon refusal.” (Ante, p. 906.) I agree: strong likelihood of adverse result should be reflected, but not absolute certainty.
Nearly four decades ago, our courts found substantial compliance with a statute when “there is no evident intention to mislead, but a bona fide attempt to comply with the law . . . [and] the absence of any evidence that it did in fact mislead.” (Uttley v. City of Santa Ana (1933) 136 Cal. App. 23, 25 [28 P.2d 377] (hg. den.); also see Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 215, 223 [82 P.2d 216] (hg. den.).)
It seems clear to me that the officer here made a bona fide attempt to comply with the law. He prefaced the warning that “Your driving privileges could be suspended for a period of six months” with a statement that “You are required by law to take one of three chemical tests of your choice” (italics added). If the use of “could” is deemed to be equivocal, certainly the expression “required by law” adds the element of statutory mandate inevitably followed by sanctions for recalcitrance.
The record is devoid of evidence that Decker was misled. He said he understood the officer; but with the not uncommon bravado of a suspected inebriate, he blustered that “They won’t take my driver’s license.” He then added, “I’m not going to take any of those tests,” even though he had been advised the tests were “required by law.”
In short, I am convinced that the officer adequately complied with the Vehicle Code section as a matter of law. To return this driver to the highways solely on the majority’s distinction between “could” and “would” rewards obstinacy, exalts form over substance, and frustrates the salutary purposes of the license suspension statute. This is, as described by Justice Fleming in his opinion in the instant case in the Court of Appeal ((Cal. App.) 97 Cal.Rptr. 361, 364), a “Pedantic play with words.”
I would reverse the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.