concurring in the result and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the Court which affirms the suspension of Pangburn’s driver’s license. I must, however, respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion which provides that a driver must be allowed to give a delayed assent to a blood-alcohol test after first refusing the test.
The statutory provisions in the area of driving under the influence and testing for alcohol are not models of clarity in all respects and have been the source of much judicial analysis since their substantial amendment in 1983. I cannot accept, however, that the provisions of Section 18-8002 leave doubt about the proper procedure to be followed at the time the driver is offered the test for alcohol concentration. That statute, in pertinent part, provides:
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol....
(2) Such person shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to such evidentiary testing.
(3) At the time evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol ... is requested, the person shall be informed that if he refuses to submit to ... evidentiary testing:
(a) His driver’s license will be seized by the peace officer and a temporary permit will be issued ...;
(b) He has the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days to show cause why he refused to submit to ... evidentiary testing;
(c) If he does not request a hearing or does not prevail at the hearing, his driver’s license will be suspended ...;
(d)After submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his own expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing.
(4)If the motorist refuses to submit to ... evidentiary testing after the information has been given in accordance with subsection (3) above:
(a) His driver’s license or permit shall be seized by the peace officer and forwarded to the court ...;
(b) A written request may be made within seven (7) calendar days for a hearing before the court.... The hearing shall be limited to the question of why the defendant did not submit to ... evidentiary testing, and the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant; the court shall suspend all his driving privileges ... unless it finds that the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop and request him to take the test or that the request violated his civil rights;
(c) If a hearing is not requested ... the court shall suspend his driving privileges....
The clear meaning of the statute is that: (1) a person who drives in Idaho is deemed to have consented to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration; (2) a driver does not have the right to consult with an attorney before testing; (3) at the time evidentiary testing is requested, a driver shall be informed of the consequences of refusing to submit to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration; and (4) if a driver refuses to submit to evidentiary testing after being informed of the consequences of such refusal, the driver’s driving license shall be seized and the driver’s driving privileges shall be suspended unless the arresting officer did not have legal cause to stop the driver and request evidentiary testing or unless the testing request violated the driver’s civil rights.
Despite that clear mandate, the Court of Appeals in In re Smith, 115 Idaho 808, 770 P.2d 817 (Ct.App.1989), engrafted a “flexible rule” to permit the driver to later change his mind and agree to the test. *144This rule has created the type of confusion we now see embodied in the case before us.1 The Court of Appeals’ judicial interpretation of I.C. § 18-8002 is contrary to our stated policy of giving statutes their plain meaning and avoiding subtle refinements when the language of the statute is clear and unequivocal. E.g., George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990).
For this Court to accept this refinement of the statute means that we now leave to law enforcement officers and magistrates the subjective task of determining when “testing equipment and personnel are reasonably available.” The obvious consequence of a police officer not remaining available for testing after a driver initially refuses evidentiary testing is that it invites drivers suspected of driving under the influence, such as Pangburn, to challenge whether an officer or testing equipment was “reasonably available.” Furthermore, even assuming a police officer who has left the police station after the suspected driver refused testing can be summoned back to the station, this still invites a challenge to the validity of a breath-alcohol test unless the driver was continuously observed. See State v. Bradley, 120 Idaho 566, 817 P.2d 1090 (Ct.App.1991). In the rural areas of Idaho where additional personnel are not readily available, I cannot help but think that the practical effect of this is that police officers, at a minimum, will be forced to observe continuously a driver suspected of intoxication for one hour after the driver refuses to submit to evidentiary testing.
Given the clear meaning of the statute and the appreciable burden this new rule places upon law enforcement, our adoption of this creative interpretation of I.C. § 18-8002 is totally inappropriate. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s decision affirming Pangburn’s license suspension but I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that a motorist suspected of intoxication who refuses to submit to evidentiary testing must be allowed to give delayed assent to testing.
. In this case a portion of the advisory form signed by Pangburn followed in substantial part the language from In re Smith, including:
7. If you refuse any of the tests I have asked you to take, you may change your mind and take the tests only if you are still in custody, if I have not left this location, and if the testing equipment is still available. You may not take the tests if more than one hour has elapsed between the time I asked you to take the tests and the time you changed your mind.
This language was apparently asserted in reaction to Smith because nowhere in Section 18-8002 is it suggested that the driver must be advised of this additional time within which to change his mind.