(dissenting). I am of opinion that, under the present state of the record, the writ should be denied because this court is without lawful authority to grant it.
In the majority opinion the jurisdiction of the district court of Lincoln county to entertain the action there pending is not questioned. It is the exercise of jurisdiction therein that is enjoined by the writ. And the reason *334given for the issuance of the writ is that the exercise of jurisdiction therein will conflict with the jurisdiction of this court to determine the validity of the bonds of the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority. The source of this court’s jurisdiction thereon is Tit. 69 O. S. Supp. §668, of which the pertinent part is as follows:
“The Authority is authorized in its discretion to file an application with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for the approval of any bonds to be issued hereunder, and exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the Supreme Court to hear and determine each such application.”
Under the terms thereof this court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter could not obtain until such application for approval has been filed.
The exercise of jurisdiction by the district court could not conflict with the jurisdiction of this court until it obtains and in the absence of its existence there can be no authority for issuing such writ.
As stated in the majority opinion, this court, in the exercise of its superintending control, modified the restraining order, awarded by the district court, in order to enable the Authority to proceed with the matter of opening bids and the sale of the bonds. Under the same authority this court could, if deemed necessary, further modify such restraining order to enable the plaintiffs, at their election, to file in this court an application under authority of said section 668. But until such application has been filed, this court, for reasons stated, is without authority to disturb the exercise of jurisdiction by the said district court. Whether, with the filing of such application, this court is endowed with jurisdiction as declared in said Act, and, if so, whether the circumstances are such as to justify the issuance of the writ, are, in my opinion, moot until the application has been filed here and jurisdiction sought to be exercised thereon.
If and when the Turnpike Authority seeks approval of its bonds by this court, we can then determine whether we will stay further proceedings in the case pending in the district court or will permit that court to proceed with the trial of all of the questions of which it has jurisdiction, which are appropriately raised in the pending action. In my opinion, unless there be shown a greater emergency than now appears to exist, this court should not require the plaintiffs in the Lincoln county case to surrender their right to try their case in the district court of their county, constitutionally created for such purpose, and to assume the burden and expense of trying their case in a protest to the approval of the bonds filed in this court.
In cause No. 34579 in this court, the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Robert O. Cunningham v. Charles G. Morris, as the State Examiner and inspector of the State of Oklahoma, an order was entered on the 15th day of May, 1950, denying the application to assume original jurisdiction and try the application for mandamus, and the reasons for such denial were stated as follows:
“It appears that various issues of fact have arisen between the parties which are material, and that other material issues of fact will or may arise; that the trial court, to wit, the district court, is especially and specifically equipped to obtain the attendance of witnesses and to take and preserve evidence and determine fact questions; that this court has not been furnished with similar facilities; that in a case where the fact issues might be complicated or the evidence become voluminous this court should not assume the prerogative of the trial court; and that for the best interest of all parties this court should not assume original jurisdiction of the trial of this cause.”
Those reasons apply in this case equally well. Immediately following that part of the Turnpike Act heretofore quoted is the following:
*335“It shall be the duty of the court to give such applications precedence over the other business of the court and to consider and pass upon the applications and any protests which may be filed thereto as speedily as possible.”
The Legislature had no power to make such requirement and it is invalid (Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Long, 122 Okla. 86, 251 P. 486) and furnishes no reason why this court should “convert itself from an appellate court of last resort into a nisi prius court, . . . and for weeks have its nine Justices sit en banc in examination of witnesses, and during all of said time hold in abeyance a thousand litigants with cases now before us on appeal to try the issues in this single case.