(dissenting and commenting).
I am not persuaded that I should disagree with the determination made by the trial court, arrived at after six days of trial and extensive exploration and consideration of the issues involved.
In support of that ruling these points should be noted: (1) Salt Lake County adopted a uniform zoning ordinance in 1966 containing various regulations which apply to the unincorporated areas of the county and thus to the area here in question. Its position is that this proposed change in zoning is an amendment to that general ordinance. (2) Pursuant to the notice which was given, four to five-hundred people, including these plaintiffs, attended the hearing and that “nowhere during that hearing, or in the trial below,1 did appellants claim any prejudice or lack *135of opportunity to be heard . . . because of lack of notice.2 (3) The trial court found that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing this suit, in that they failed to take the appeal permitted to the Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment.3
Inasmuch as the main opinion does not treat the issue as to whether the zoning was capricious and arbitrary no useful purpose would be served by any extended discussion thereof in this dissent. I comment only briefly: (1) The zoning was for a valid and salutary purpose of conserving and protecting this wilderness area and watersheds. (2) It is within the discretionary prerogatives of (a) the planning commission; then (b) the county commission; then (c) the district court, to pass on any abuse of discretion by the former; and thus this court would be three times removed from the prerogatives of discretion. Wherefore, there is no basis upon which the zoning could be declared invalid on that ground by this court.
In view of the ruling of my colleagues, contrary to the judgment of the trial court, and my own, I think the following observation concerning the main opinion is warranted :
The statement to the effect that an amendment cannot apply to unzoned land impresses me as too broad. Whether under some circumstances an amendment could properly create new zoning might well depend on those circumstances, including how substantial the change was in relation to the zoning problem at hand. Suppose, e. g., the proposal was to rectify an irregularity or uncertainty, or to straighten or reconcile a boundary, of a zoned area, or between them, and included minor amounts of either unzoned or other zoned land. I think the amending procedure (Sec. 17-27-14) would be all right.
. That anyone who had actual notice and suffered no disadvantage cannot complain of defects in notice is uniformly affirmed by the authorities, see Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966); Dolomite Products Company v. Kipers, 39 Misc. 2d 627, 241 N.Y.S.2d 748, 752 (1963).
. See Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305, 392 P.2d 40; 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, Section 595.