concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the majority decision which affirms the battery conviction.
I dissent, however, from the decision insofar as it affirms the trial court's order that the six-year sentence be served "consecutive to any violation of probation imposed ...". Record at 298.6
In this regard, the case before us is not unlike Arnold v. State (1989) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 539 N.E.2d 969, trans. denied. With respect to a guilty plea conviction, we stated there: "[Wlhen the court ... entered judgments of conviction, the court could not be aware of or be required to anticipate the ultimate disposition of any probation revocation issue." 589 N.E.2d at 978.
The majority decision here endorses such speculative anticipation. The resulting and unintended consequences might well frus*769trate, rather than aid, the statutory intendment. For example, if the probation court does not revoke probation and does not impose an executed sentence, it could be argued with some degree of merit that the six-year sentence imposed by the trial court would never commence to run. In any event, it is my view that the case law set forth in Ar-mold, supra, prohibits a trial court from ordering that its sentence run consecutively to an as-yet, non-existent sentence.
In this regard, our case is dissimilar to Menifee v. State (1992) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 601 N.E.2d 359. In Menifee, we approved the imposition of a sentence consecutive to a sentence already imposed as a result of a probation violation determination.
I fully join and subscribe to the majority's strong suggestion that trial courts advise guilty-plea defendants as to the requirements of IC 85-50-1-2(b) and, further, that all courts imposing consecutive sentences expressly state whether they are applying (a) or (b). Nevertheless, for the reasons earlier stated, I would affirm the conviction and the six-year sentence, but would require the trial court to vacate its order that the sentence be served consecutive to any future sentence imposed for a probation violation.
. The crime of Battery is defined by Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1;:
A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is:
a Class C felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any other person or if it is committed by means of a deadly weapon.
IC 35-42-2-1(a)(3).