Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks No. 85 v. Tax Commission

CROCKETT, Justice

(concurring):

I concur, and in doing so express these thoughts in supplementation:

The term charity, in usage and in dictionary definition, is broad in compass, *1220having a number of related meanings. While it includes giving to the poor and needy, it is not restricted to that narrow concept. In its larger sense it includes love and concern for the welfare of one’s fellowmen. Safeguarding and promoting the general welfare of citizens is one of the responsibilities of government. This includes their educational, cultural and recreational needs. Insofar as private philanthropy and charity are willing to help bear those burdens, it is and should be the policy of the law to assist and encourage them in doing so. One of the ways of accomplishing this is by relieving them of taxation on the property committed to such purposes.

Supportive of the foregoing is the realization that a very substantial part of the progress of mankind in all areas of learning and culture, whether in science, art, literature, music or whatever, is attributable to patronage and support by sources properly characterized as charitable in this broader sense.

Comparison with property exempted as being used “exclusively for religious worship” is helpful. In order for property to come within that language it need not be so sancrosanct that no money whatsoever changes hands therein. Even with church buildings, nearly all have some social and recreational auxiliary activities and some fund raising activities to support them which involve a certain amount of such commerce. But where the main purpose is to provide the public a place for religious worship, and not to make a profit in the ordinary commercial sense, either for individuals or for the church, the property is held to be exempt under the quoted provision of our constitution (Art. XIII, Sec. 2). Similar reasoning should apply to exempt property as being used “exclusively for charitable purposes.”

The doctrine of stare decisis, which dictates that there should be some solidarity in and respect for established law is also a persuasive consideration here. I realize that the fundamental issue is a constitutional one. Nevertheless there has been a judicial determination on essentially the same facts in the Groesbeck case (Footnote 1, main opinion), which has stood as the law for 64 years. In the absence of clear and persuasive realization of error, any change would better come through the regularly prescribed processes for changing the law, through legislative and/or constitutional amendment, rather than any change by whim or caprice, or difference of opinion in an administrative interpretation. Accordingly, I concur with the decision based on established law and reversing the order of the Tax Commission.