(dissenting) — The events comprising “Watergate” have left a dismayed and shaken public, profession and judiciary as a part of their legacy. Dismay, anger and a wish to prevent a repetition of these events are natural but make it difficult to obtain the perspective so necessary to the dispensation of justice. In past times of crisis, courts have, unfortunately, not always shown the ability to remove themselves sufficiently from the emotions of the times to render what history has since understood to be *490considered justice.4 I am not concerned here with what history will say, however, but rather with what I believe to be a grave injustice to an individual achieved by our actions in this case. I believe the majority is, in effect, adding one wrong to another in an attempt to make a right.
I reach this conclusion for several reasons. The majority summarily rejects the uncontested finding of fact by the bar hearing panel that Mr. Krogh is unlikely to repeat his unlawful conduct. The record is replete with evidence that his misconduct is unlikely to recur and, lacking the benefit of face-to-face examination of the witnesses the hearing panel enjoyed, we should adhere to the reasons behind our established case law and accept this finding of fact. The majority also relies on matters outside the record and guilt by association to buttress its decision. This is a dangerous and intolerable way to justify a judicial conclusion. Lastly, the majority places too much emphasis on the fact that respondent’s action has been labeled as a felony involving moral turpitude as a justification for its judgment of disbarment. While we have disbarred in other cases where misconduct has been found to meet these technical requirements, we have not viewed them as a substitute for the principle of individualized justice to which we should always adhere, with protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal system as our guide.
Suspension of respondent for a period of time may be appropriate. Disbarment, however, under the facts of this case, will not preserve but will in the long run undermine the confidence of the public in the ability of the legal profession to give individualized justice.
There is no disagreement here that what respondent Krogh did was both wrong and criminal; he has admitted that it was and a court has determined it was in a judgment that is conclusive on us. He has served a prison sen*491tence imposed by that court for his crime. But Krogh’s culpability is not the end of our inquiry but the beginning. The question in a disbarment case is not so much what the respondent attorney did, or why or whether he should have done it, as what, if anything, his actions indicate about his fitness to continue in the practice of law. The facts of this case which concern Krogh’s illegal acts, his felony conviction, and the institution of these proceedings are not disputed by the parties or contradicted on the record. Yet, despite the majority’s lengthy recitation of them, it is not these facts that are determinative in our disposition of this case. Rather, the facts that should concern us here are those which go directly to the respondent’s qualities as a person and a lawyer. In the array of information in the record before us which is relevant to this question, the isolated incidents which led to his felony conviction are only a single, though highly significant, item.
The bulk of this information, and of the record in this case, consists of statements of opinion regarding Krogh’s professional and personal attributes and abilities, buttressed by descriptions of his behavior in several circumstances which demonstrate them. This testimony is uniformly, even remarkably, laudatory of him. It came from almost a score of witnesses, many of them lawyers of the highest standing in our bar and those of other states, who stated that their experience with him indicated to them that, in spite of his serious mistake, Krogh is manifestly fit and able to continue in the practice of law. The majority’s attempt to discount this evidence by baldly stating that “[f]ew of the witnesses seemed to consider the respondent’s crime a serious one or to contemplate that it might indicate the presence in his character of qualities inappropriate in a member of the bar” is an unsupportable affront to the integrity and character of these individuals. It cannot obscure the fact that the hearing panel, which had the opportunity to hear their testimony directly, found the facts they swore to be true and inferred, I think properly, that they were, fully *492aware of the gravity of the offense but were also aware of redeeming qualities in Mr. Krogh. It, unlike the majority opinion, adhered to the uncontradicted evidence on the record in finding that he
has a spotless record except for the incident giving rise to the present proceedings; that he is outstanding in character and ability; that his reputation is beyond reproach; that he acted, although mistakenly, out of misguided loyalty to the President of the United States; that the event was an isolated one; and that in all probability there will be no repetition of any such error on his part.
This finding, adopted by the disciplinary board, should be central to our decision, yet the majority chooses to ignore or reject it by denigrating the panel’s sources, or by simply disagreeing with its conclusions as it does with respect to the specific determination that Krogh is unlikely to repeat his unlawful conduct. Contrary to the majority’s contention, the record is replete with evidence in support of this latter finding. This includes not only statements of opinion but also descriptions of particular events which demonstrate his fitness to practice law despite his transgression: his violation of an illegal presidential order apparently designed to prevent him from revealing the facts of the break-in conspiracy to its victims, the courts and the Watergate special prosecutor; his abandonment and denunciation of the spurious “national security” defense in his unbargained-for guilty plea; and his intervention on behalf of a group of native American demonstrators who, like Dr. Ellsberg, had incurred the administration’s wrath and were in danger of both the deprivation of rights and physical injury in a planned attempt to put a stop to their protest.
The majority justifies its skepticism of this finding by stating that Krogh’s remorse came “ — only, it seems, after it became evident that in spite of all the efforts of the administration to conceal them, the investigative activities conducted in and by the White House were going to be exposed.” This completely ignores the fact that he refused to authorize a wiretap on one Yeoman Radford after the *493Fielding break-in at a time when there was no public revelation of his activities and that it was this refusal that probably terminated his work with the special investigations unit. That action was clearly not grounded on expediency but on an apparently growing awareness of the moral and legal issues involved. The fact is that the findings of the hearing panel are supported by the testimony and the attempt by the majority to alter them is a serious disservice to respondent, to history, and to the hearing panel which found the facts in this case.
In disciplinary proceedings as in any appeal, appellate courts are in a poor position to find facts for themselves. The bar disciplinary system includes hearings and findings by the hearing panel in order to apprise this court of the facts of the case without our having to hear testimony and sift unrefined evidence ourselves.
In disciplinary actions this court will not ordinarily disturb the panel’s . . . findings of fact made upon conflicting evidence. The panel, before which the witnesses appear, is in a much better position to evaluate the testimony than we can possibly be from reading the record, complete though it is. In re Little, supra, [40 Wn.2d 421, 244 P.2d 255 (1952)]; In re Foster, 40 Wn.2d 1, 239 P.2d 1060 (1952); In re Thacker, 35 Wn.2d 605, 618, 214 P.2d 507 (1950).
In re Kennedy, 80 Wn.2d 222, 230, 492 P.2d 1364 (1972). Although this court theoretically retains the power to overturn findings of fact by the board and panel below (see In re Caffrey, 63 Wn.2d 1, 4, 385 P.2d 383 (1963); In re Simmons, 59 Wn.2d 689, 701, 369 P.2d 947 (1962)), it is senseless to exercise that power where nothing is served thereby but the negation of the function of the established fact-finding procedures and the diminution of the credibility of the basis for our decision. In logic, if not technically in law, at least where they are not disputed by the parties or contradicted on the record, “the findings [of the panel and board] must be accepted by us as verities.” In re Ward, 54 Wn.2d 593, 597-98, 343 P.2d 872 (1959).
*494Even more disquieting is the obvious impact on the majority’s decision of facts and allegations not contained in this record at all. However “common” is the knowledge that the “reputation and honor of the bar have suffered” from the actions of attorneys acting as high executive officials in the late Nixon administration, that information is not contained in the record of this disciplinary action, and no opportunity has been afforded respondent to contest that fact or this court’s placing of responsibility on him for it. It is not clear to me from this record how much, if at all, respondent’s behavior has contributed to any recent decline in public regard for the legal profession. Whether the public is familiar or wants to be familiar with Mr. Krogh’s actions, whether it shares the majority’s opinion of them, whether public opinion is the result of an objective knowledge of the evidence or of the distortion and confusion as to precise details inevitable in a 2-year long political scandal and outrage — none of these questions are answered by the record before us.
The penalties provided for misconduct by the members of the bar are severe, and proceedings to determine guilt or innocence of disciplinary rules violations or the penalty therefor must comport with the requirements of due process. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, 88 S. Ct. 1222 (1968); In re Metzenbaum, 22 Wn.2d 75, 79-80, 154 P.2d 602 (1944). It is not consistent with due process to go beyond the record in a case and deprive a party of a valuable right on the basis of “judicially noticed” information that has not been proven and which he has had no opportunity to question or rebut. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 81 L. Ed. 1093, 57 S. Ct. 724 (1937); State ex rel. Huff v. Reeves, 5 Wn.2d 637, 642-43, 106 P.2d 729, 130 A.L.R. 1465 (1940). It is not consistent with due process to impose “gúilt by association” on an individual by penalizing him for events which have not been shown to be the result of his acts or acts of others which are ascribed to him. Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246, 1 L. Ed. 2d 796, 77 S. Ct. 752 (1957).
*495The disciplinary board’s recommendation that respondent should be disbarred should be reviewed only in light of the factual record before us, which has been compiled with the safeguards of the rules of evidence and which he has been given the opportunity to examine and contest. Going beyond that record for unproven facts of questionable relevance which have not even been shown to have anything to do with respondent’s conduct is improper and unfair and can hardly do much to restore public confidence in the honesty of the bar or the integrity of the judicial system.
Limiting our decision to the record before us, what the record shows, other than that many attorneys and other citizens hold the highest regard for Mr. Krogh as a person and a lawyer, is the fact of his illegal conduct and his ultimate guilty plea to criminal charges of conspiracy to violate civil rights. The majority opinion seems to treat the latter aspect of the case as nearly conclusive, edging close to the position of Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 27 L. Ed. 552, 2 S. Ct. 569 (1882), that conviction of a felony requires automatic disbarment. But under our decisions and rules, a criminal conviction, even one of a felony involving “moral turpitude,” does not absolve us of the responsibility to form and impose a sanction which is just and justifiable in each individual case.
Our disciplinary rules attach significance to a criminal conviction only by treating it as conclusive proof of the fact of the wrongful behavior. Indeed, DRA 1.1(a) specifically states that criminal conviction is neither a “condition precedent to disciplinary action” nor a fact which precludes further consideration of punishment in a DRA 3.2 hearing. Our prior decisions have been consistent with this principle, and we have not differentiated between cases in which criminal behavior resulted in a conviction and others in which similar misdeeds resulted only in disciplinary proceedings.5 Misconduct by attorneys resulting in criminal *496conviction has been held to warrant the same full range of sanctions available for noncriminal misconduct, dependent, in each case, on the particular facts and circumstances involved. See, e.g., In re Seijas, 52 Wn.2d 1, 318 P.2d 961 (1957) (tax fraud conviction-disbarment); In re English, 64 Wn.2d 129, 390 P.2d 999 (1964) (tax evasion conviction-suspension); In re Molthan, 52 Wn.2d 560, 327 P.2d 427 (1958) (tax evasion conviction-suspension).
Nor is the rule any different where the criminal conviction happens to be of a felony rather than a misdemeanor. DRA 1.1(a) clearly abjures any distinction between conduct which is felonious and that which is otherwise criminal or “illegal.” Although, as the majority notes, we have apparently found disbarment warranted in all cases which have involved felony convictions, our judgments in such cases have not always been summary or unanimous.6 Virtually all of them involved misbehavior in the course of employment as an attorney,7 or in a position of trust closely *497related to the respondent’s status as such,8 which would have called for disbarment regardless of the criminal conviction. The few cases we have heard which involved felonies which, like this one, were unrelated to the respondent’s professional status are dated and largely uninstructive;9 courts in other jurisdictions with broader experience under rules similar to ours, however, have frequently found disbarment unwarranted in such cases. See, e.g., In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 415 P.2d 800, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1966) (manslaughter); In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940) (assault with a deadly weapon); In re *498Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964) (involuntary manslaughter); In re Abramson, 37 App. Div. 2d 301, 324 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1971) (tax fraud); State v. Postorino, 53 Wis. 2d 412, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972) (gambling); Re a Solicitor; Ex Parte Incorporated Law Soc’y, 61 L.T.R. (n.s.) 842 (Q.B. 1889) (embezzlement outside duties as a solicitor). Thus, although we never have held that felonious misconduct did not require disbarment, neither have we adopted “as ironclad rule so that it followed, ‘as the night the day,’ that any member of the bar who [is] convicted of a felony would be disbarred . . .” In re Evers, 41 Wn.2d 942, 247 P.2d 890 (1952) (Hill, J., dissenting).
The irrelevance of any distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor is particularly evident in this case. Respondent Krogh was convicted of conspiracy to violate civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which is a felony. But conspiracy is only a misdemeanor at common law, which our statutes codify. See RCW 9.22.010; R. Perkins, Criminal Law 613 (2d ed. 1969). Conspiracies are generally chargeable as felonies or misdemeanors under federal law (Williams v. United States, 238 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1024 (1957)), and under the law of California, where the object of this conspiracy was carried out. Cal. Penal Code § 182 (West 1969). Had respondent been tried in California and convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary, the status of the offense would have depended on the sentence given him. People v. Hamilton, 33 Cal. 2d 45, 198 P.2d 873 (1948). It could not be more obvious than it is on this record that “[t]hat the act may or may not be a misdemeanor or a felony, is purely coincidental.” In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 683, 397 P.2d 475 (1964).
Nor even can the further determination that respondent’s crime involved “moral turpitude” serve as a substitute for a reasoned judgment in this case. The definition of “moral turpitude,” “ ‘[everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals . . .’ ” (In re Comyns, 132 Wash. 391, 394, 232 P. 269 (1925); In re Finch, 156 Wash. *499609, 611, 287 P. 677 (1930)), is exceedingly vague and broad, arguably encompassing almost everything that could conceivably result in bar discipline. Certainly where a crime is involved, especially a felony, the concept of “moral turpitude” adds nothing to the analysis of the case and the determination of the disciplinary action that is appropriate: it is difficult to imagine “what kind of a felony could be considered as not being ‘contrary to honesty, justice or good morals.’ ” In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 683, 397 P.2d 475 (1964). At least in a case like this, “moral turpitude” can serve only as a conclusory label for a judgment arrived at through consideration of some other factor or factors. And even as such, under our rules it can only purport to justify the imposition of some discipline; an attorney who commits an “act involving moral turpitude” can be “censured, reprimanded, suspended, or disbarred” for it. DRA 1.1.
Thus, neither the fact that the respondent has been criminally convicted, nor the fact that the crime he was convicted of was a felony, nor the conclusion that it involved “moral turpitude,” except this case from the often-repeated rule that “there is no fixed standard by which the result of a disciplinary proceeding can be determined.” In re Steinberg, 44 Wn.2d 707, 715, 269 P.2d 970 (1954); In re Ward, 54 Wn.2d 593, 600, 343 P.2d 872 (1959). For Mr. Krogh’s notorious misconduct, just as for misdeeds by lawyers less well known,
The challenge for this court is to fashion a suitable remedy in each case before us to accomplish these goals [of bar discipline] and insure that individualized justice is dispensed. The action appropriate in a given case can only be determined by its particular facts and circumstances.
In re Livesey, 85 Wn.2d 189, 193, 532 P.2d 274 (1975).
The accepted purposes of bar discipline are the preservation of confidence in the profession and the protection of the public. In deciding what disciplinary action is required in a given case, we must consider “the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, the need to avoid repetition, *500deter others from similar misdeeds, maintain respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession, and assure that those who seek legal services will be insulated from unprofessional conduct.” In re Livesey, supra at 193; In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 663, 521 P.2d 212 (1974).
There is no question that Krogh’s offense was serious and was not justified by the surrounding circumstances; he admits, as he must, that “it struck at the heart of what this Government was established to protect, which is the individual rights of each individual.”10 But, as noted above, consideration of the seriousness of the offense and the lack of justification or excuse for it is only the departure point for our determination and provides no guidance as to the proper sanction to be imposed. Other factors must finally control our decision of that ultimate question.
“Avoidance of repetition” is not at issue here at all, although the majority attempts to make it so. The hearing panel found, on substantial evidence, that repetition was unlikely even if respondent were again to hold similar public office; the majority rejects that finding, totally without justification. But in the final analysis, the whole question is irrelevant: the issue before us is Mr. Krogh’s fitness to practice law, not to act as a White House Aide. Although his prospects of again holding such office are dim, they are unaffected by our judgment in this case. His ability to use his expertise in governmental affairs remains undiminished by whatever action we take. The extensive evidence presented to the hearing panel assured them it was unlikely Mr. Krogh would repeat his past transgressions. The hearing panel evidenced no fear that these past mistakes would impair his ability to effectively discharge the duties and *501responsibilities of public office in the future. By keeping him from practicing law we cannot prevent him from taking official positions of authority for which no bar membership is required. The majority’s rejection of the hearing panel findings is thus not only improper but also pointless.
Deterrence is a valid and important concern, but I do not believe that even the harsh judgment of disbarment that the majority imposes adds much to the deterrent effect of the public disgrace, loss of prospects for further governmental office, and criminal sentence that Mr. Krogh has already received. Lawyers and others in official positions have been educated by what already has happened to him, and will have reason to refrain from similar conduct. They should learn from watching and reflecting on his experience that such illegal activities are unacceptable in a democratic society in which the rule of law, rather than men, applies to those in the highest positions of government as well as its other citizens. If they have not come to understand that, perhaps at least the losses respondent and his colleagues have already suffered will make them fear to repeat their mistakes. If what has already happened has not achieved this result, however, I doubt we can do so through any action we take.
These considerations leave the need to uphold the honor and dignity of the profession as the sole ground for imposing sanctions on Mr. Krogh. Certainly the honor of the profession can be enhanced by casting persons the public believes to be wrongdoers out of it. But I believe that, in the last analysis, it is the fair adjudication of all cases, including bar discipline cases, which is most crucial to the honor of the profession. “[B]oth the bench and bar are on trial before the public in all disciplinary actions.” In re Haglund, 81 Wn.2d 118, 123, 500 P.2d 84 (1972) (Stafford, J., dissenting). We do not best acquit ourselves by considering, in a decision to disbar an attorney, the fact that “the vast majority of the people” who admittedly “do not have . . . [an] intimate knowledge of the respondent *502and his character” disapprove of his conduct or that of his colleagues.11 We do not best acquit ourselves by imposing a sanction which is excessive in relation to the purposes of bar discipline and which imposes unnecessary punishment on the offending attorney.12 The restoration of public confidence requires that in this case, as in any other, we fashion our judgment in a reasoned resolution of the legitimate affected interests of the people, the bar, and the transgressing attorney.
Because his crime was serious, because it is necessary to discourage other members of the bar from similarly forgetting the priorities of the constitution in a fervor for law enforcement at all costs, because there is a difference between the violation of constitutional rights by a layman and similar acts by a lawyer, Mr. Krogh should not go without discipline. But, in view of the losses he has suffered and the probability that he can best make them up and compensate somewhat for his misdeeds in the private practice of law, the ultimate sanction of disbarment is inappropriate. The hearing panel’s recommendation that Krogh be suspended from practice for 9 months, “would answer every purpose, to the public, the profession, and the court.” In re Liliopoulos, 175 Wash. 338, 343, 27 P.2d 691 (1933) (Holcomb, J., dissenting). We have recently accepted the recommendation of the hearing panel and rejected a more severe recommendation of the disciplinary board after weighing all the factors in the case. In re Greenlee, 82 Wn.2d 390, 510 P.2d 1120 (1973). I believe, for the reasons stated, we should do the same here.
*503In order that the dissent may be understood in its intended sense, it is appropriate to make certain additional observations. It should first be made clear that the dissent was not written as a personal rebuke but rather a statement of reasons for disagreeing with arguments advanced in the majority opinion.
The concurring opinions were prepared subsequent to the writing of the majority and dissent. I appreciate and agree with Justice Wright’s concern that all members of the bar, both prominent and obscure, be accorded the same treatment. We did, in In re Caughlan, 61 Wn.2d 557, 379 P.2d 189 (1963), a nonfelony case, consider in arriving at the proper discipline to be imposed for failure to file income tax returns, the numerous commendable things he had done as well as his admittedly serious offense. It was my hope that we could apply that same principle here. The lack of emphasis on the separate judgment of the disciplinary board in my dissent stems from the fact that, except in its recommendations as to punishment, the board adopted the panel’s findings and conclusions in full. No reason was given for the changed result, no additional evidence was taken which could explain it. It was, therefore, impossible to give special deference to, or even knowledgeably discuss, the disciplinary board’s recommendation.
The issue is not whether courts should be permissive or firm. No hint of permissiveness in the handling of Mr. Krogh’s case can be found at any level. This is true whether we consider his sentence to prison by the federal court or his immediate suspension from the practice of law by this court. What is at stake is whether we remain true to our basic principle of individualized justice with the protection of the public and preservation of confidence in our legal system as a guide. Because I believe the majority fails to accomplish this, I dissent.
Horowitz, J., concurs with Utter, J.See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 89 L. Ed. 194, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 63 L. Ed. 566, 39 S. Ct. 252 (1919).
Compare In re Garvin, 78 Wn.2d 832, 479 P.2d 930 (1971) (conduct “amounting to ‘embezzlement . . from estate, no criminal conviction), with In re Johnson, 74 Wn.2d 21, 442 P.2d 948 (1968) (embezzle*496ment from estate, criminal conviction); In re Hall, 73 Wn.2d 401, 438 P.2d 874 (1968) (misappropriation of trust funds, no criminal conviction), with In re Dillard, 48 Wn.2d 376, 293 P.2d 761 (1956) (misappropriation of trust funds, criminal conviction); In re Caffrey, 71 Wn.2d 554, 429 P.2d 880 (1967) (subornation of perjury, no criminal conviction), with In re Bixby, 31 Wn.2d 620, 198 P.2d 672 (1948) (subornation of perjury, criminal conviction).
For example, in In re Simmons, 65 Wn.2d 88, 395 P.2d 1013 (1964), the respondent attorney had been convicted of assault with intent to rape, but his conviction was reversed on appeal. See State v. Simmons, 59 Wn.2d 381, 368 P.2d 378 (1962). Although there is nothing in the disciplinary rules which differentiates between felony convictions which are reversed on appeal and those which are not, the court did not rest its judgment of disbarment on the fact of the conviction or the alleged conduct underlying it. Instead, the respondent was disbarred for statements he made about various state and county officials. In re Simmons, supra at 99. In In re Liliopoulos, 175 Wash. 338, 343, 27 P.2d 691 (1933), although the respondent attorney had been convicted of grand larceny of a client’s funds, Holcomb, J. dissented from the judgment of disbarment arguing that suspension “would answer every purpose, to the public, the profession, and the court.”
See, e.g., In re Anderson, 73 Wn.2d 587, 439 P.2d 981 (1968) (grand larceny of client’s funds); In re Hett, 70 Wn.2d 435, 423 P.2d 629 (1967) (aiding client’s unlawful flight); In re Wallis, 63 Wn.2d 833, 389 *497P.2d 421 (1964) (embezzlement of client’s funds); In re Dalton, 60 Wn.2d 726, 375 P.2d 258 (1962) (grand larceny of client’s funds); In re Bixby, 31 Wn.2d 620, 198 P.2d 672 (1948) (subornation of perjury); In re Liliopoulos, 175 Wash. 338, 27 P.2d 691 (1933) (grand larceny of client’s funds); In re Comyns, 132 Wash. 391, 232 P. 269 (1925) (mail fraud conspiracy with clients). In a few cases our records do not show whether or not the criminal conduct was in the course of business as an attorney. In re Burns, 13 Wn.2d 199, 124 P.2d 550 (1942); In re Wrabek, 113 P.2d 526 (Wash. 1941).
See, e.g., In re Johnson, 74 Wn.2d 21, 442 P.2d 948 (1968) (embezzlement from incompetent’s estate by attorney-guardian); In re Timothy, 58 Wn.2d 153, 361 P.2d 642 (1961) (grand larceny of estate funds by attorney-administrator); In re Dillard, 48 Wn.2d 376, 293 P.2d 761 (1956) (misappropriating funds of ward by attorney-guardian); In re McCoy, 20 Wn.2d 884, 146 P.2d 818 (1944) (embezzlement of fines and falsifying of public records by attorney serving as Justice of the Peace).
In In re Seijas, 52 Wn.2d 1, 318 P.2d 961 (1957), where the respondent was convicted of tax fraud, we relied exclusively on the determination of other courts in other contexts that such a crime involved “moral turpitude.” In re Finch, 156 Wash. 609, 287 P. 677 (1930) involved a conviction for conspiracy to sell illegal liquor; there, too, we simply, rather mechanically, applied a formula for “moral turpitude.” The respondent in In re Barnett, 35 Wn.2d 191, 211 P.2d 714 (1949), who was convicted of sale of narcotics, apparently did not contest the disbarment recommendation. And In re Wells, 121 Wash. 68, 208 P. 25 (1922), in which the respondent was disbarred for his involvement in a “conspiracy to hinder the war effort” by distributing literature opposing the draft, is an historical anomaly of obviously doubtful constitutional validity (see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 17 L. Ed. 2d 235, 87 S. Ct. 339 (1966)) and consequently entitled to little weight as authority.
It is ironic that, in this aspect of its decision, the majority relies on In re Brooks, 57 Wn.2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), a case in which this court held that an individual’s refusal to comply with official governmental orders which he believed to be immoral and unconstitutional made him morally unfit for admission to the bar. Here we have a lawyer accused of the opposite sin, of failing to refuse to take actions which we find objectionable on those same grounds.
By far the most serious source of public dissatisfaction with the legal profession is the impression that lawyers are greedy and overcharge. Thomason, What the Public Thinks of Lawyers, 46 N.Y.S. B.J. 151, 152-54 (1974). Yet in “excessive fees” cases we have imposed only the lightest sanctions. See, e.g., In re Greer, 61 Wn.2d 741, 380 P.2d 482 (1963).
Cf. In re Greiner, 61 Wn.2d 306, 318, 378 P.2d 456 (1963) (Bosellini, J., dissenting):
“There appears to be no relation between the act of discipline and the evil which is attempted to be prevented. It seems to be a blind desire to obtain a pound of flesh for a wrong committed.”