(concurring in the dissent) — I have signed Justice Robert Utter’s dissent. I agree with him the record contains ample evidence to support the necessary findings of the hearing panel accepted by the disciplinary board. I agree also the panel’s recommendation for suspension rather than disbarment is fully supported by those findings.
The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion very recently recognized the necessity for individualized justice in disciplinary proceedings of a member of the bar. In re Livesey, 85 Wn.2d 189, 193, 532 P.2d 274 (1975). In fulfilling the requirements of individualized justice in determining whether the discipline to be imposed should be censure, reprimand, suspension or disbarment, the court must look beyond the misconduct charged to the conduct of the whole man in order to ascertain the kind of man he is, all things considered. In re Caughlan, 61 Wn.2d 557, 379 P.2d 189 (1963). Since a lawyer may be disciplined for conduct outside as well as inside the profession, (DRA 1.1(a)), fairness requires that commendable conduct outside the respondent’s relationship as an attorney be given proper and substantial weight in determining the nature of the discipline to be imposed.
To protect the public and promote confidence in the legal profession and in the judicial system, this court has heretofore listed the factors to be considered in imposing discipline. In In re Little, 40 Wn.2d 421, 430-31, 244 P.2d 255 (1952), the court stated:
Among these are the motives and purposes which actuated his misconduct and the lack of gravity or serious consequences of it, his attitude toward the proceeding against him, his experience and training, his general characteristics and nature, his previous good record, and the likelihood and probability that he will not again transgress. These subjects of consideration do not excuse improper conduct. They only aid the court in arriving at a fair and moderate determination of the necessary discipline which duty requires it to impose.
The action to be taken rests within the sound discretion of the court. This discretion is wide, and, as is true *505in every instance where it has no well-defined boundary, it must be exercised with extreme care and caution to avoid its abuse. Its limits in each case are determined by the evidence then before the court. The final adjudication should provide neither more nor less than the facts fairly require to penalize the offender, deter others, and indicate to laymen and members of the bar that proper discipline will be enforced and the standards of the profession maintained.
Under the discipline rules for attorneys kept currently updated, procedures are provided for charges to be preferred, hearing to be had thereon before a hearing panel empowered to take sworn testimony, followed by the entry of the hearing panel’s findings, conclusions and recommendations. Provision is also made for review of the hearing panel’s findings, conclusions and recommendations. Such a review is conducted by the disciplinary board based on the record made before the hearing panel. The disciplinary board is empowered to change any finding, conclusion or recommendation of the hearing panel. DRA 3.2; 5.4; 5.6. Later when the Supreme Court functions in disciplinary proceedings, it gives great weight to the actions of the hearing panel and the disciplinary board, particularly the findings and conclusions entered. It is the hearing panel, not the Supreme Court, that hears and observes the witnesses testifying. Accordingly, “[i]n disciplinary actions this court will not ordinarily disturb the panel’s . . . findings of fact made upon conflicting evidence.” In re Kennedy, 80 Wn.2d 222, 230, 492 P.2d 1364 (1972). It is true the court need not accept the findings and conclusions. Unless, however, there is good and sufficient reason for doing so, the findings and factual conclusions supported by substantial evidence, even if that evidence is conflicting, will not be rejected.
Here the following significant findings and conclusions, factual in nature, were entered by the hearing panel and remained unchanged by the disciplinary board.
The Panel further finds that the respondent attorney has a spotless record except for the incident giving rise to *506the present proceedings; that he is outstanding in character and ability; that his reputation is beyond reproach; that he acted, although mistakenly, out of misguided loyalty to the President of the United States; that the event was an isolated one; and that in all probability there will be no repetition of any such error on his part.
Finding of fact No. 6.
The Panel further finds that respondent attorney has accepted responsibility and made amends to the best of his ability; that he has testified fully and candidly; and that his attitude in this proceeding has been excellent.
Finding of fact No. 7. The conclusions reached by the panel include the following:
It is the unanimous opinion of the Panel that the circumstances surrounding and leading to Mr. Krogh’s felony conviction are unique in character and factually distinguishable from other cases resulting in disbarment. In the present case Mr. Krogh apparently followed the unmistakable order of a somewhat distraught President of the United States under the guise of national security to stop, by all means, further security leaks. The evidence further shows, and so freely admitted by Mr. Krogh, that his conscience at that time and for some time thereafter was not alert enough to refuse participation in the unlawful activities involving Drs. Fielding and Ellsberg, and to recognize that national security was not a lawful justification for such operation.
Conclusion No. 11.
The hearing panel also concluded:
The unanimous conclusion of the Panel, in view of the foregoing and of all of the evidence, the circumstances, and the entire record of Mr. Krogh, is that respondent should be subjected to discipline but should be retained as a member of the Bar, and that the disciplinary sanction of suspension is sufficient.
Conclusion No. 10.
The hearing panel then recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 9 months in addition to the suspension automatically ordered on February 4, 1974, based upon his conviction of the *507offense involved in the present proceeding. In addition, the panel recommended that if on review the disciplinary-board should modify the panel recommendations and recommend disbarment, that the Supreme Court give favorable consideration to
reinstatement of Mr. Krogh at the earliest possible date since the Panel unanimously believes that the circumstances leading to Mr. Krogh’s conviction were collectively an isolated event in his life, most likely due to his inexperience and youth and somewhat unusual atmosphere that permeated some of the White House personnel at that time.
The Panel further believes that the public interest and the integrity of the profession will not be jeopardized in any way by such an early reinstatement. The Panel also believes that Mr. Krogh’s collective experience gained during his White House and other government career including his conviction, will tend to make him a more useful and productive member of society.
A reading of the record demonstrates the record contains ample support for the quoted findings and conclusions entered. Based on those findings and conclusions, the record provides ample support for the hearing panel’s recommendations reached on the basis of the principles of law that must govern such proceedings. The disciplinary board’s recommendation, based on the findings and conclusions it accepted without change, is unaccompanied by a statement of reasons from which to determine the adequacy of such reasons particularly with respect to unchanged findings, including finding of fact No. 6.
The majority opinion reaches its conclusions concerning the discipline to be imposed by dealing principally with respondent’s relationship to and participation in the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office. Concerning that matter, respondent testified fully, candidly, and honestly. That testimony dealt with a detailed history of his participation and of the circumstances leading up to it. There can be little question that his participation was motivated by an honest belief that what he was asked to do by those representing the *508President of the United States concerned the urgent necessity of preventing the leak of confidential information concerned with national security. After a rigorous cross-examination, counsel for the bar stated to the hearing panel:
By court rule bar counsel properly may not make a recommendation for this panel, but I would be remiss if I did not say that I have been impressed by Mr. Krogh’s candor and his explanation of his role in the incident that brings this matter before the panel.
The panel agreed. Finding of fact No. 7.
In the majority opinion dealing with the evidence certain statements are made which in my view do not fairly reflect the record. Furthermore the majority relies on matters not contained in the record. These matters have been dealt with in the dissenting opinion and I need make no further reference to them. There is one matter, however, to which specific reference should be made. The majority opinion rejects the finding entered by the panel, and with no change by the disciplinary board “that in all probability there will be no repetition of any such error on his part.” It is said there is no evidence to support that finding. My own reading of the record leads me to an opposite conclusion. In that same connection the opinion briefly refers to respondent’s “commendable qualities and achievements.” However, the opinion fails to give proper weight to them in determining the discipline to be imposed. I will simply state that after reading the evidence, and the hearing panel’s findings, conclusions and recommendations, amply supported by the evidence, I agree with the recommendations of the hearing panel.
Utter, J., concurs with Horowitz, J.Petition for modification denied August 12, 1975.