Appellant commenced this action against the Oklahoma Industrial Development and Parks Department (Appellee) to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained while he was a guest at Fountainhead State Lodge. Appellant alleged that his injuries were caused by the negligence of Appellee’s agents and employees in that they permitted to exist a glass door which contained no markings or warnings of its existence. Appellant sustained injuries when he attempted to walk through the door.
Appellee filed a demurrer alleging that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because Appellee was an instrumentality of the State of Oklahoma engaged in governmental functions and immune from suit.
The trial court, relying on 74 O.S.1971 § 356.1, sustained Appellee’s demurrer. Appellant elected to stand on his petition and the trial court dismissed the action. Appellant appealed.
74 O.S.1971 § 356.1 [enacted in 1947] provides that the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board, and any successor board, is “hereby declared to be a governmental agency and instrumentality of the State of Oklahoma * * Operation of the State lodges was transferred to the Oklahoma Industrial Development and Park Commission in 1965. 74 O.S.1971 § 1102. The alleged injuries in the case at bar were sustained prior to the enactment of 74 O.S.Supp.1972 § 1802, which transferred the management of the State lodges to the Oklahoma Tourism and Recreation Department. No contention is made that the 1972 amendatory act is material to the issues presented.
Appellee has liability insurance coverage on the lodge. It appears the lodge was constructed by the Oklahoma Lake Development Authority and bonds were issued to finance the construction. The Economic Development Administration, now a part of the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, purchased the bonds. One of the requirements of the bond indenture and the lease rental contract was that liability insurance would be required for the operation of the lodge. Appellee entered into a lease-rental contract with the Oklahoma Lake Development Authority and was operating the lodge when.Appellant sustained his injuries. Appellant’s claim for damages is less than the insurance coverage. If Appellant should recover a judgment against Appellee, no general state funds will be used to satisfy the judgment.
In State v. Superior Court of Seminole County, Okl., 323 P.2d 979 (1958), we said the State of Oklahoma, as a sovereignty, is immune from suit for torts of any of its officers, agents, or employees, unless it has effectively consented to be sued for such torts. This case was cited with approval in State ex rel. Department of Highways v. McKnight, Okl., 496 P.2d 775 (1972), wherein we said that the right of the sovereign state to immunity from suit is a public right and must not be relinquished or conveyed away by inference or construction ; and the statutes must clearly permit the state to he sued or the right to do so will not exist. In Henry v. Oklahoma *906Turnpike Authority, Okl., 478 P.2d 898 (1970), we held that an action in tort against the Authority for damages is an action against the State and cannot be maintained in the absence of a permissive' statute or other consent of the State.
The case of State ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Bone, Okl., 344 P.2d 562 (1959), involved a tort action against the State Insurance Fund for negligence of one of the Fund’s employees. Recovery against the Fund was allowed on the basis that the statutes creating the Fund, and providing for its operation, made the Fund a business enterprise, as distinguished from a governmental activity. Independent control existed in the Fund to operate and maintain an insurance company in the same manner as a privately owned insurance company. We noted that under no circumstances could the general funds of the State be reached in order to satisfy an obligation of the Fund.
Appellee contends the operation of the lodge is a governmental function and the first three cases cited [323 P.2d 979 ; 496 P.2d 775; and 478 P.2d 898] are controlling. Appellee argues that the insurance was not purchased under any express or implied Legislative authority and has no bearing on the Oklahoma rule of sovereign immunity. On the other hand, Appellant contends the operation of the lodge is proprietary and the State Insurance Fund case [344 P.2d 562] is controlling. Appellant also contends that regardless of whether the operation of the lodge is governmental or proprietary, Appellee has waived its governmental immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage.
Whether the operation of the lodge constitutes a governmental or proprietary function is immaterial under the circumstances here presented.
In 1947 the Legislature granted additional powers to Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board (Appellee’s predecessor) for operating, maintaining, extending and improving State Parks. See 74 O.S.Supp. 1947, §§ 356.1 — 356.20. The Board was authorized to acquire property by purchase, lease, gift and condemnation, and to maintain use and operate any and all property [§ 356.2(2)]; to sue and be sued [§ 356.-2(5)]; and to make contracts and execute such instruments as in the judgment of the Board were necessary or convenient to the exercise of the powers conferred upon it [§ 356.2(9)]. See 74 O.S.1971 § 356.1 et seq. .
Appellee does not challenge the validity of the lease-rental contract,. but contends that the insurance was not purchased under any express or implied Legislative authority. In our opinion, if the Appellee had Legislative authority to enter into the lease-rental contract, the purchase of liability insurance to meet the requirements of that contract was consistent with such authorization. We hold Appellee had Legislative authority to purchase the liability insurance.
If a department of State purchases liability insurance pursuant to Legislative authority, must the Legislature expressly waive governmental immunity before a tort action may be maintained against the department, or should the Legislative authority be construed to include an implied consent to be sued and waiver of governmental immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage ?
The Legislature has authorized different departments of State, having governmental immunity to purchase liability insurance for certain purposes and expressly waived governmental immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage. See 47 O.S.1971 §§ 157.1 and 158.1. On the other hand, the Legislature has authorized the Board of Control of a county hospital to purchase public liability insurance without reference to the right to maintain a tort action against a county hospital. 19 O.S.1971, § 790. lb (8).
In our opinion, where the Legislature authorizes a department to purchase liability insurance, Legislative waiver of governmental immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage must be implied. Otherwise, the insurer would reap the ben*907efits of the premiums paid without being obligated to pay any damages for which the department was insured. A Legislative appropriation to a department presupposes the department will receive benefits for its expenditures.
Therefore, Legislative authority for a department to purchase liability insurance must be construed to include a consent to be sued and a waiver of governmental immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage only.
We hold that where a department of State purchases liability insurance pursuant to Legislative authority, the State has consented to be sued and waived its governmental immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage only. In reaching this conclusion we specifically modify, to the extent herein set forth, our holding in State ex rel. Department of Highways v. McKnight, Okl., 496 P.2d 775 (1972), and cases of similar import, wherein we, in effect, said that the right of the sovereign state to immunity from suit is a public right and must not be relinquished or conveyed away by reference or construction; and the statutes must clearly permit the State to be sued or the right to do so will not exist.
Appellee purchased liability insurance pursuant to Legislative authority and we hold the State has consented to be sued and waived its governmental immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage only.
Judgment of the trial court reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.
WILLIAMS, C. J., and DAVISON and BARNES, JJ., concur. SIMMS, Justice (specially concurring) : LAVENDER, J., concurs in results. HODGES, V. C. J., and BERRY and DOOLIN, JJ., dissent.