Lloyd v. Runge

Parker, C. J.

(dissenting): Time will not permit detailed reference to the record or a prolonged discussion of the authorities and I recognize that a dissenting opinion is of little benefit to the bench and bar.

briefly stated, my views are that, when reviewed in the light of the rule stated in the opinion, the evidence of record discloses the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant’s automobile on the date of the involved collision and that to hold otherwise is contrary to the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting what is now G. S. 1949, 8-122b, as well as our former decisions construing its force and effect. Therefore I dissent from that portion of the opinion holding that the evidence is sufficient to withstand the part of the demurrer based on the premise plaintiff had failed to take himself outside of the guest statute.

Assuming as I must, since the majority opinion so holds, that plaintiff was a passenger and not a guest, I concur in the view expressed by the court, that defendant’s contention plaintiff’s evidence, as a matter of law, fails to show ordinary negligence on the part of defendant, which could have been the proximate cause of the involved collision, must be rejected.

Price, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.