delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald, Kilbride, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.
OPINION
After being charged with driving without proof of insurance (625 ILCS 5/3 — 707(a) (West 2002)), improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11 — 709(a) (West 2002)), and two counts of driving while under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002)), defendant Brian R Bywater was notified that statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license would take effect pursuant to the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.1 (West 2002)). Defendant contested this summary suspension pursuant to section 2 — 118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2 — 118.1(b) (West 2002)). On appeal, he argued that the 30-day time limit for holding a rescission hearing set forth in section 2 — 118.1(b) was not met where, despite timely serving the State with his petition to rescind by mail, the circuit court of Kane County held the hearing on the thirty-fourth day. The appellate court disagreed, holding that section 2 — 118.1(b)’s 30-day deadline does not begin to run until the State’s actual receipt of a petition to rescind. 358 Ill. App. 3d 191, 198. The court further held that in cases where service is effected by mail, section 2 — 118.1(b)’s deadline is extended by four days by application of Supreme Court Rule 12(c) (145 Ill. 2d R. 12(c)). 358 Ill. App. 3d 191.
We granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) to consider whether the 30-day time limit for conducting a petition to rescind hearing established by section 2 — 118.1(b) commences on the date of the filing of the petition in the circuit court of venue or is extended by Supreme Court Rule 12(c) to commence running on the date the State receives service. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the decision of the appellate court and remand this cause to the circuit court for entry of an order granting Bywater’s petition to rescind.
BACKGROUND
On June 29, 2002, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. On that same day, he was notified that statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license would take effect on August 14, 2002, under section 11 — 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. On July 11, 2002, defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension with the clerk of the circuit court of Kane County pursuant to section 2 — 118.1(b) of the Vehicle Code, and sent a copy of that filing to the State by first-class mail.
On July 18, 2002, both defendant and the State appeared before the circuit court on the State’s motion to set a hearing date on the petition to rescind. At the July 18 appearance, the State argued that because defendant served the State with his petition to rescind by mail, Supreme Court Rule 12(c) applied and the 30-day time limit for conducting a rescission hearing pursuant to section 2 — 118.1(b) did not actually start until July 15, 2002. The circuit court agreed, entering an order continuing the hearing on the petition to rescind to August 14, 2002.
On August 14, defendant presented a motion to dismiss the statutory summary suspension arguing that dismissal was appropriate because a hearing was not held within 30 days, as required by section 2 — 118.1(b). The circuit court denied this motion, raising Sixteenth Judicial Circuit Court Rule 34.05(b) (16th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 34.05(b)) sua sponte. The circuit court found rule 34.05(b), which required a defendant to request a hearing on a petition to rescind in open court, controlling and thus the hearing was timely.
On appeal, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the circuit court still retained jurisdiction over the issues raised in the petition to rescind. See People v. Bywater, No. 2—03—0514 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court remanded, and on July 7, 2004, the circuit court denied defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss as well as his petition to rescind. The circuit court also denied defendant’s motion to reconsider. Defendant appealed the case a second time.
In defendant’s second appeal, the appellate court held Sixteenth Judicial Circuit Rule 34.05(b) invalid. 358 Ill. App. 3d 191. The appellate court went on to find, however, that section 2 — 118.1(b)’s 30-day deadline begins to run when service is effective on the State, which, under Supreme Court Rule 12(c), is four days after mailing. 358 Ill. App. 3d at 198. Pursuant to that finding, the appellate court affirmed defendant’s suspension. 358 Ill. App. 3d at 198.
Because the State does not challenge the appellate court’s finding that the local court rule raised by the circuit court was invalid and acknowledges that it conflicted with section 2 — 118.1(b) and established precedent, this court will limit its analysis to the issue of whether the 30-day time limit for conducting a petition-to-rescind hearing established by section 2 — 118.1(b) commences on the date of the filing of the petition in the circuit court of venue or on the date when mailed service is actually effective.
ANALYSIS
While this court has previously addressed section 2 — 118.1(b) in People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250 (1993), we have not addressed the precise issue of construction described above. The construction of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. In re D.S., 217 Ill. 2d 306, 313 (2005). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Devine v. Sharkey, 221 Ill. 2d 613, 617 (2006). The best indication of that intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. McClure, 218 Ill. 2d 375, 382 (2006). When the language is unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written without resorting to other aids of construction. People v. Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill. 2d 360, 364-65 (1994). A statute must be considered in its entirety, though, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 170 (2006). With these principles in mind, we turn to the statute at issue here.
Section 11 — 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code requires the Secretary of State to summarily suspend the driver’s license of any motorist who: (1) is arrested for driving under the influence and refuses to submit to testing of his or her blood-alcohol level, (2) tests above the legal limit for alcohol content, or (3) tests positive for an intoxicating substance. 625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.1 (West 2002). The Vehicle Code allows a motorist to challenge the statutory summary suspension, however, through section 2 — 118.1(b). That section provides:
“Within 90 days after the notice of statutory summary suspension served under Section 11 — 501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds upon which the person seeks to have the statutory summary suspension rescinded. Within 30 days after receipt of the written request or the first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket issued pursuant to a violation of Section 11 — 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, the hearing shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction. This judicial hearing, request, or process shall not stay or delay the statutory summary suspension. The hearings shall proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil proceedings.” (Emphases added.) 625 ILCS 5/2 — 118.1(b) (West 2002).
Though neither party contests that the rules of service must be complied with under section 2 — 118.1(b), the parties do contest when the 30-day time limit set forth above commences.
The State argues that the statutory language is ambiguous. Specifically, the State focuses on the language emphasized above in section 2 — 118.1(b) and presents the question of whose receipt of the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension triggers the 30-day deadline: receipt by the circuit court or receipt by the State. The State urges this court, in light of the structure of the summary suspension statute and the policy behind it, to resolve this purported ambiguity by affirming the appellate court’s conclusion that receipt by the State activates section 2 — 118.1(b)’s 30-day deadline. By that reasoning, the State also contends, as the appellate court found below, that Supreme Court Rule 12(c) applies. Rule 12(c) provides that “[slervice by mail is complete four days after mailing.” 145 Ill. 2d R. 12(c).
The State argues that because summary suspension becomes effective on the forty-sixth day after a defendant is notified of it (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501.1(g) (West 2002)), any defendant concerned about obtaining a rescission before the summary suspension takes effect has adequate time to do so, even if the hearing is conducted within 34 rather than 30 days of the petition’s filing. As such, the State contends that the difference between its interpretation of section 2 — 118.1(b) and defendant’s interpretation is not material for due process purposes.
Additionally, the State argues that while its review of the Illinois Compiled Statutes uncovered no other provision with language analogous to that disputed here, there are numerous examples of provisions in which a party must take some action within a specified number of days of receipt of some legal notice or document to avoid losing the right to take that action. See, e.g., 205 ILCS 5/48 (West 2002) (the Commissioner of Banks and Real Estate may issue an order of removal of a director, officer, or other agent of a state bank or subsidiary due to circumstances such as violation of the law; the person affected may request a hearing before the state banking board within 10 days of receipt of the Commissioner’s order); 705 ILCS 405/2 — 25(8) (West 2002) (if the person affected is not in court when an order of protection regarding a minor is issued, the sheriff or other server must serve the order upon the person, and the person, within seven days of receipt, can file a written motion to modify the order); 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2002) (an arbitrator’s decision in a workers’ compensation case is filed with the Commission, which sends each party a copy, and unless a petition for review is filed by either party within 30 days of receipt, the decision is conclusive). The State points out that in each of these provisions the time deadline is not triggered until the burdened party actually receives some particular notice or document. By analogy, the State contends that because it is the State that has the burden to set a rescission hearing here, so too should the State’s time period within which to complete that duty be triggered only after the State becomes aware of it, namely, the day that service is complete. This cited authority makes evident, though, that when the legislature so desires, it is more than capable of writing into a statute unambiguous language establishing time period provisions expressly beginning upon a burdened party’s receipt. See, e.g., 205 ILCS 5/48(7) (West 2002) (“The person affected by the action may request a hearing before the State Banking Board within 10 days after receipt of the order” (emphases added)); 705 ILCS 405/2 — 25(8) (West 2002) (“The person against whom the protective order was obtained may seek a modification of the order by filing a written motion to modify the order within 7 days after actual receipt by the person of a copy of the order” (emphasis added)); 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2002) (“Unless a petition for review is filed by either party within 30 days after the receipt by such party of the copy of the decision *** then the decision shall become the decision of the Commission and in the absence of fraud shall be conclusive” (emphasis added)).
Considering this, and notwithstanding the State’s other arguments, we agree with defendant’s position. Guided by principles of statutory construction, we find no ambiguity in the language of section 2 — 118.1(b). That language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, does not support the position that the 30-day time period of section 2 — 118.1(b) is triggered by the State’s receipt of service of a defendant’s petition to rescind. Section 2 — 118.1(b) does not mention the State at all, let alone in context of the State’s receipt of a defendant’s petition to rescind. On the contrary, the section repeatedly and consistently refers to the circuit court of venue.
Section 2 — 118.1(b)’s first sentence describes how a person may make a “written request” with “the circuit court of venue.” The second sentence describes the content of “[t]he request to the circuit court.” The third sentence establishes the time period within which the hearing shall be held by “the circuit court having jurisdiction” and conditions that time period upon “receipt of the written request.” To read into this statute a requirement that the 30-day time period does not begin to run until the State’s receipt of service would contravene the statute’s plain language and run afoul of the oft-repeated principle of statutory construction that when statutory language is unambiguous it must be applied as written. See People v. Brooks, 221 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2006) (“When a term used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to other aids of construction”); Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill. 2d at 364-65; People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (1988).
Further, we note that statutory interpretation is not a tool to be utilized by courts attempting to remedy apparent oversights by rewriting statutes in ways that contravene their clear and unambiguous language. See People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 162-63 (2006). As already described, the legislature could just as easily have provided, as it has in other situations, that the time period within which to take a particular action would not begin to run until the State’s actual receipt of service. The legislature did not take that path here. Instead, the receipt of a petition to rescind contemplated by the language of section 2 — 118.1(b), as written, is the receipt by the circuit court of venue. It is this receipt that commences the running of the 30-day time period delineated in the statute.
This finding comports with People v. Schaefer, where this court found that the legislature enacted the summary suspension laws as an appropriate means to deter and remove from the highway drivers who pose a threat to public safety because of their use of alcohol and drugs. People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250, 255 (1993), citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 6 — 206.1. We went on to note that this goal must be met while guaranteeing defendants notice and an opportunity to be heard so as to satisfy “the concern for protection of the substantive and procedural due process rights of motorists as guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions.” Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 261. With that background in mind, we held that section 2 — 118.1(b)’s “30-day statutory period commences on the date of the filing of a proper petition to rescind in the circuit court of venue, with service on the State, in accordance with the rules of this court.” Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 261. In this case, we reaffirm that the plain language of section 2 — 118.1(b) establishes a 30-day period within which a hearing on a petition to rescind summary suspension must be held and again hold that this period commences on the date that petition is received by the circuit court of venue.
It should be emphasized that a defendant has a duty to properly serve the State with any request to rescind the statutory summary suspension of that defendant’s driver’s license under section 2 — 118.1(b). See 735 ILCS 5/2 — 201(a) (West 2002); 145 Ill. 2d R. 11. As this court stated in People v. Schaefer, a “defendant’s challenge to the summary suspension of driving privileges must be heard within the statutory 30-day period, unless the delay is occasioned by the defendant ” (Emphasis added.) Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 253. In this case, though, defendant did not occasion any delay. In fact, defendant properly served the State by expeditiously sending his petition to rescind to the State by first-class mail on the very same day he filed it with the circuit court. This is not a case where a defendant was remiss in effecting service nor does the State contend it as such.
In its brief, the State cited this court’s previous decision in People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill. 2d 308 (2005), highlighting a particular provision of that decision where we stated:
“Construing section 2 — 118.1(b) in this way champions the interests of both defendants and the State. Defendants retain the right to enforce a timely hearing as contemplated in the statute, and the State is guaranteed at least 30 days to prepare for the hearing once that right is asserted.” Cosenza, 215 Ill. 2d at 315-16.
This statement was made in the context of a different question of interpretation. The issue presented in Cosenza was whether a hearing under section 2 — 118.1(b) had to be concluded within 30 days of the filing of a petition to rescind or whether it merely had to be commenced within 30 days. The issue in this case, what triggers the commencement of the 30-day hearing deadline, was not before this court in Cosenza, nor was it contested by the parties in that case. As such, we do not conclude that Cosenza should dictate our decision in the present case.
CONCLUSION
Because Brian Bywater properly filed a written request to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license in the circuit court of venue pursuant to section 2 — 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/2 — 118.1(b) (West 2002)), and because he properly and timely served the State with that request, the language of the statute required that his hearing be held in the circuit court of venue within 30 days. Because By-water did not get that hearing within 30 days, this court must reverse the judgment of the appellate court as well as the judgment of the circuit court. Accordingly, this cause is remanded to the circuit court with direction that an order be entered granting By water’s petition to rescind.
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded with direction.