The state appeals from the post-trial order dismissing the criminal charges against Dion Smith for failure to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The state asserts the district court erred by not taking judicial notice that U.S. Highway 95 is maintained by the state — a jurisdictional fact which was not in evidence. For the reasons specified below, we reverse the order of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.
By an information dated November 5, 1987, the state charged Dion J. Smith with two offenses, leaving the scene of an injury accident (I.C. § 18-8007) and aggravated driving under the influence (I.C. § 18-8006). At the trial, the state presented evidence supporting the allegations of the information: that the alleged crimes arose from Smith’s operation of a motor vehicle on U.S. Highway 95, at Milepost 301.24, near Lapwai, in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The evidence also showed that U.S. Highway 95 at this location was within the boundaries of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation and that Smith is an enrolled member of the Nez Perce Indian Tribe.
At the close of the evidence, Smith moved under I.C.R. 12(b)(2) to dismiss the information for failing to show jurisdiction of the court and he moved for judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29(a). Because the proof showed that the crimes were alleged to have been committed by an “Indian in Indian Country,” the state court’s subject matter jurisdiction became an issue.
In order to establish jurisdiction of the State of Idaho concerning a crime arising in Indian country, the prosecution had the burden to show that the criminal laws which the state was seeking to enforce fell within those matters described in I.C. § 67-5101. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 418, 725 P.2d 115, 123 (1986). The applicable parts of the statute in this case are as follows:
The state of Idaho, in accordance with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page 589 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts jurisdiction for the civil and criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian country is defined by title 18, United States Code 1151, and obligates *673and binds this state to the assumption thereof:
G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads maintained by the county or state, or political subdivision thereof.
This statute, in conjunction with federal law, confers jurisdiction on the state to enforce state laws concerning the operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation which are maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof. State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 793 P.2d 682 (1990); State v. Michael, 111 Idaho 930, 729 P.2d 405 (1986); State v. Fanning, 114 Idaho 646, 759 P.2d 937 (Ct.App.1988). See also State v. Snyder, 119 Idaho 376, 807 P.2d 55 (1991).
The state asked the district court to take judicial notice that U.S. Highway 95 was a public highway and maintained by the state. The district judge refused to take judicial notice that U.S. Highway 95 is maintained by the state because he could “not say as a fact who maintains the highway at that point,” but nevertheless he submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges.
Following the trial, defense counsel renewed his motion to dismiss the felony convictions on jurisdictional grounds and his motion for acquittal under I.C.R. 29(c). The district judge found that “[njowhere is it pleaded or proven that this stretch of [U.S. Highway 95] is one maintained by the state of Idaho.” From this, he concluded that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to the offenses charged against Dion Smith. The district judge vacated the sentencing hearing, and after due consideration of the extensive briefing by the parties, granted the dismissal in an order dated August 15, 1991. The state appealed on the issue of jurisdiction only, which is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Matter of Hanson, 121 Idaho 507, 509, 826 P.2d 468, 470 (1992), citing Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Yon, 118 Idaho 367, 796 P.2d 1040 (Ct.App.1990).
The state argues on appeal that it was error for the district court not to take judicial notice that U.S. Highway 95 is maintained by the State of Idaho. The state asserts that the issue of the maintenance of U.S. Highway 95 is a jurisdictional fact and thus not governed by I.R.E. 201, which formed the basis of the district court’s refusal to take judicial notice. The state argued that I.R.E. 201 provides for judicial notice of adjudicative facts, which ultimately are to be resolved by a jury, and that the district court improperly relied upon the rule where the significance of jurisdictional facts is a legal issue.
We start our analysis of the jurisdictional issue with the applicable language of I.C. § 67-5101(G). It is clear, for the issue we must decide, that by the enactment' of this statute the State of Idaho assumed jurisdiction for the criminal enforcement of state laws within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation boundaries concerning the “[operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof.” To satisfy the jurisdictional requirements, the state need only show that Smith was, at the time and place of the alleged crime, operating a motor vehicle upon a highway or road “maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof.” We hold that the state met this burden.
Here, for the purpose of this appeal, it is conceded the evidence at trial showed that Dion Smith was operating a motor vehicle upon U.S. Highway 95, within Nez Perce County, Idaho, as alleged in the information. On its face, therefore, the information alleged facts showing that the Idaho trial court had jurisdiction. The evidence, however, also showed that U.S. Highway 95 where these acts occurred is within the boundaries of the Nez Perce Indian Reservation. No evidence was admitted at trial to show who “maintained” U.S. Highway 95 at this location. Nevertheless, the stat*674utes make it clear who had the duty to maintain the highway.
Idaho Code § 40-201 states:
There shall be a system of state highways in the state, a system of county highways in each county, a system of highways in each highway district, and a system of highways in each city, except as otherwise provided. The improvement of highways and highway systems is hereby declared to be the established and permanent policy of the state of Idaho, and the duty is hereby imposed upon the state, and all counties, cities, and highway districts in the state, to improve and maintain the highways within their respective jurisdiction as hereinafter defined, within the limits of the funds available.
Idaho Code §§ 40-202, 40-203, 40-203A and 40-203B describe how counties and highway districts may establish highway systems of their own within their “respective jurisdiction^].” These statutes provide also that, by agreement, maintenance duties may be shifted among the state, counties, cities and highway districts on certain highways, but those provisions do not concern us in the present case because here the state had “jurisdiction” to prosecute these criminal cases if the highway in question was maintained by either “the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof.” I.C. § 67-5101(G).
Idaho Code § 40-120(4) defines “State highway system” to mean “the principal highway arteries in the state, including connecting arteries and extensions through cities, and includes roads to every county seat in the state.” This definition alone coupled with common knowledge of the area’s highways would lead to the indisputable conclusion that U.S. Highway 95 is one of “the principal highway arteries in the state” and, therefore, is part of the “State highway system.”
If there was any question that, as a matter of law, the state had the duty to maintain U.S. Highway 95 within state boundaries, the trial court could have taken judicial notice of the “Official Highway Map” which the Idaho Transportation Department periodically issues and widely distributes for the convenience of motorists. This readily available map designates the entire length of U.S. Highway 95 within the state as a “principal” highway, thereby indicating that it is part of the state highway system within the meaning of I.C. § 40-120(4). While these maps may not be conclusive on the subject, they are- reliable authority that U.S. Highway 95 is one of the principal highways being maintained by the state as part of the state highway system. See I.C. § 40-310(2).1
It follows from these statutes we have discussed that the State of Idaho, through its Department of Transportation, has the duty to maintain U.S. Highway 95 within the boundaries of the State. Moreover, “[i]n Idaho, as in most states, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by public officers.” Homer v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985), citing Farm Bureau Finance Company, Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 750, 605 P.2d 509, 514 (1980). See also State v. Wendler, 83 Idaho 213, 218, 360 P.2d 697, 699 (1961) (“The law presumes that the board of highway directors discharged its duty lawfully and in the manner prescribed by statute.”). Based on the presumption that the state does maintain U.S. Highway 95 within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, we conclude that the state made a prima facie showing that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to try the charged offenses.
It is true that the state’s statutory duty to maintain all sections of U.S. Highway 95 may have exceptions. As noted, by agreement with other governmental agencies, *675the duty to maintain sections of highways within cities, counties or other governmental jurisdictions may be altered. However, the state does not shoulder the burden of proving the lack of any such exceptions. Rather, the state can rely upon the statutory duty it has to maintain the highway and upon the presumption which flows from that duty. The state should not be required to prove a negative under these circumstances.
Once the state has made a prima facie showing of facts establishing the court’s jurisdiction, the burden of coming forward with evidence to show that some exception exists is upon the defendant. The ultimate burden of persuasion never shifts from the state. Any substantial evidence showing that U.S. Highway 95 within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation boundaries was not “maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof,” would suffice to dispel the presumption. It would then be the state’s burden to produce evidence which would persuade the trier of the fact that jurisdiction had been proven. This case never reached that stage.
In this case, no evidence was produced from any source to show that some other entity or agency besides the state was involved in the maintenance of any part of U.S. Highway 95. A mere showing that U.S. Highway 95 passes through the Nez Perce Indian Reservation and that the accident occurred within the boundaries of the Reservation is not evidence that the state’s duty to maintain the highway at the location of the accident is being ignored or that any other governmental entity has assumed the duty by agreement with the state.
Because the state made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction and the defendant did nothing to rebut the showing, the court was in error in dismissing the case on the ground that “the State has failed to prove subject-matter jurisdiction.” Accordingly, we reverse the order of the court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SILAK, J., Acting Judge, concurs.. In an analogous situation involving the admission in evidence of an order of the state highway directors designating 35 miles per hour as the reasonable, safe, prima facie speed limit in an area upon U.S. Highway 30, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms that it was proper for the courts to take judicial notice not only of the order in question, but also “of the fact that the section of highway to which it relates is a part of the ‘state highway system.'" State v. Wendler, 83 Idaho 213, 218, 360 P.2d 697, 700 (1961).