(concurring). Traditional tort and contract jurisprudence is designed to determine and vest parties’ interests for past and future damages completely and finally as of one particular time. It is in this context that the concept of res judicata has been developed. As a component of the theoretical framework of that jurisprudence, res judicata "seeks to lend fairness and finality to the law.” Post, p 612 (Boyle, J.).
It is evident, however, that the traditional concept of res judicata cannot be severed from its tort and contract law moorings and transplanted without refinement into the law governing workers’ compensation cases. Our statutorily based workers’ compensation system contains its own quasi-judicial and administrative structure and is designed to provide injured workers with income maintenance on a continuing basis.1 "[W]e have . . . consistently emphasized that workers’ compensation is a matter of statutory grace.” Selk *606v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 11; 345 NW2d 184 (1984).
As Justice Levin emphasized in his concurring opinion in Franks v White Pine Copper Co, 422 Mich 636, 683; 375 NW2d 715 (1985), reh den 424 Mich 1202 (1985):
The nature of workers’ compensation is that events after an award of benefits may change the extent of an entitlement to benefits. A disabled worker may cease to be disabled or obtain gainful employment. The number of the worker’s dependents may change. The right to receive workers’ compensation benefits thus generally depends on one’s status, week by week, and is subject to change during any week.[2]
On the other hand, res judicata is designed to prevent the unraveling and relitigation of what was intended to be a final determination of interests without regard to future events.3 Finality is the goal of res judicata. Finality is not in the design or the interest of the workers’ compensation scheme.4
In the tort system, a single, vested award is *607made on the basis of a prediction of future damages and needs, so that review of the judgment in light of subsequent events is foreclosed. All parties to a tort judgment thus bear the risk that future events will vary from the prediction embodied therein. By contrast, workers’ compensation awards are intended to remain open and subject to modification in the interest of the stability and remedial nature of the system. See Franks, supra, 653-654; Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368, 391; 224 NW2d 856 (1975) (Levin, J., concurring).
In this light, I see the principle of res judicata as set forth in the opinion of Justice Boyle playing a useful but limited purpose in the workers’ compensation context. Where appropriate, I would apply res judicata in accordance with the principles articulated by Justice Boyle to all payments and benefits awarded or denied pursuant to an earlier determination, but only until such time as a subsequent petition based on changed circumstances that would not have been present at the previous litigation is filed and the issues presented are resolved. Prior to such a second determination, the prior determination controls and the award or denial of benefits pursuant to the prior determination is not subject to the subsequent determination.
Because of the nature and design of the workers’ compensation system, future determinations based on events that have occurred subsequent to the previous litigation should control the award and amount of future benefits.5
On the other hand, this Court has continually sought to prevent benefit recipients from being *608twice visited by misfortune and has not required the repayment of benefits already received.6 The concept of res judicata that I would apply, when a judicial decision changes the law, incorporates such considerations of fairness and protects recipients who have reasonably relied on circumstances prevailing when payments pursuant to the prior determination were made. Accordingly, this concept does not permit the undoing of a determination or adjudication as to benefits already received and therefore "vested.” By the same token, the employer is not required to pay benefits which were denied pursuant to the prior determination. This approach comports with the policy underlying the traditional res judicata doctrine, while at the same time taking into account the unique characteristics of income-maintenance schemes.
I agree with Justice Boyle that the defendants had ample opportunity to raise the constitutional claim at the prior proceedings. Thus, my disagreement does not involve the question whether an exception to res judicata should apply, but rather whether the application of the res judicata concept in cases arising out of income-maintenance systems such as workers’ compensation permits redetermination in light of an intervening change in the case law. Because I agree with Justice Griffin’s holding regarding the gender-based presumption at issue here, I agree that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar a redetermination of the issue of Ms. Pike’s dependency in light of this finding of unconstitutionality. I would therefore remand the case to the wcab for it to determine whether or not Ms. Pike was in fact a dependent at the time of Mr. Pike’s injury. If it is found that she was not in fact a dependent at that time, the *609dependency benefits should be reduced accordingly as of the date of that determination.7
The attempted application of res judicata has generated inconsistency and confusion at all levels of adjudication and review of workers’ compensation cases. See, e.g., Riley v Northland Geriatric Center, 431 Mich 632; 433 NW2d 768 (1988) (resolving split in Court of Appeals regarding proper application of res judicata to cases decided prior to Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 [1981]).
See, e.g., the following sections of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq., specifically §§ 301(5), 351(1), 361(1) and 401(3). Similar considerations would apply in the unemployment compensation context. See MCL 421.32(d); MSA 17.534(d) (providing that the issuance of each benefit check constitutes a determination of qualification and eligibility for unemployment benefits).
See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc v Moitie, 452 US 394, 401; 101 S Ct 2424; 69 L Ed 2d 103 (1981).
I recognize that under the wdca, it is provided for at the time of the initial determination that the future occurrence of certain, specific events will bring about specific consequences for a claimant’s eligibility or benefits. In contrast, the present situation involves an unanticipated change in what the law was thought to be. Nevertheless, the provisions of the act which authorize reevaluation and corresponding benefit changes make clear that workers’ compensation is a unique system which is designed to keep benefits current and responsive to changing events and circumstances.
As noted in n 2, the Legislature has provided for redetermination when certain factual changes occur. A change in the law may be effected either through statutory amendment or judicial decision. In case of the former, our primary task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature regarding the effect of the change. Franks, supra.
Ante, pp 604-605 (Griffin, J.). See also Gusler, n 1, supra, 298.
As explained above, p 607, a redetermination after a judicial change in the law must be preceded by a petition "based on changed circumstances that would not have been present at the previous litigation . . . The "changed circumstances” for present purposes are the opinions issued today, which hold the conclusive presumption in § 353(l)(a)(i) to be unconstitutional. In the interest of administrative economy, I would allow the remand to the wcab in this case to satisfy the above petition requirement.