I concur in the judgment.
When this cause was originally before us in People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559] (hereafter.- sometimes Bacigalupo I), having found no reason to reverse, I was of the view that the judgment, including the sentence of death, should be affirmed. (Id. at pp. 152-154 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In Bacigalupo v. California (1992)_ U.S._[121 L.Ed.2d 5, 113 S.Ct. 32], the United States Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the cause to us for further consideration in light of Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S. _ [117 L.Ed.2d 367, 112 S.Ct. 1130] (hereafter sometimes Stringer). After such consideration, and having still found no reason to reverse, I remain of the view that the judgment should be affirmed.
Except as to disposition, however, I dissent. Both the majority and the concurring justice declare, more or less openly, that Stringer does not apply to the California death penalty law. Both are in error. For reasons I cannot fathom, they flout the authority of the United States Supreme Court and thereby guarantee the granting of defendant’s inevitable petition for writ of certiorari, risking unforeseeable consequences. The high court has been quick to intervene when lower courts have been recalcitrant. (See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391 [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 111 S.Ct. 1884].) It will surely do the same in this case. Indeed, it must. Otherwise, it will expose all its decisions to the same ill treatment here inflicted on Stringer.
I
In Stringer, the United States Supreme Court held that “if a State uses aggravating factors in deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty or who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth *485Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].)
The Stringer court declared: “Although our precedents do not require the use of aggravating factors, they have not permitted a State in which aggravating factors are decisive to use factors of vague or imprecise content.” (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p__[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 382, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].)
The Stringer court explained: “A vague aggravating factor employed for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty fails to channel the sentencer’s discretion.” (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. _ [117 L.Ed.2d at p. 382, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].)
The Stringer court explained further: “A vague aggravating factor used in the weighing process is in a sense worse, for it creates the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty than he might otherwise be by relying upon the existence of an illusory circumstance. . . . [T]he use of a vague aggravating factor in the weighing process creates the possibility not only of randomness but also of bias in favor of the death penalty . . . .” (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 382, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].) In this regard, an aggravating factor is vague if it does not “adequately . . . inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty . . . .” (Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356, 361-362 [100 L.Ed.2d 372, 380, 108 S.Ct. 1853] [hereafter sometimes Maynard].)
To cast the Stringer court’s explanation in somewhat different words: A “vague aggravating factor employed for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty” blurs the line that defines the class of the death-eligible. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 382, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].) For its part, a “vague aggravating factor used in the weighing process” to determine whether a defendant will actually receive the death penalty undermines individualized sentencing among the members of the death-eligible class. (Ibid.)
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against vague aggravating factors, as set out in Stringer, evidently arose in Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 100 S.Ct. 1759] (hereafter sometimes Godfrey), which reviewed an aggravating factor used to determine whether a defendant was eligible for the death penalty. Godfrey was followed by Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. 356. The proscription was extended in decisions that considered aggravating factors used to determine whether a defendant would actually receive the death penalty. In Stringer, the proscription is often *486indicated by reference to Godfrey and/or Maynard, whether the aggravating factor in question is employed for either or both purposes. (See Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at pp._-_[117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 376-383, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1135-1140] [holding in substance that Godfrey and Maynard govern both definition of the death-eligible class and individualized sentencing among its members].) Indeed, by 1990 the court had “[taken] for granted ... the proposition that if a State uses aggravating factors in deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty or who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p--[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139], italics added.)
In Richmond v. Lewis (1992) _ U.S. _, _ [121 L.Ed.2d 411, 420, 113 S.Ct. 528, 534], which was decided the term following Stringer and effectively explicated that decision, the court declared that the “relevant Eighth Amendment law is well defined. First, a statutory aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to furnish principled guidance for the choice between death and a lesser penalty. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-364 [100 L.Ed.2d 372, 380-382] (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-433 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 405-409] (1980). Second, in a ‘weighing’ State, where the aggravating and mitigating factors are balanced against each other, it is constitutional error for the sentencer to give weight to an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor, even if other, valid aggravating factors obtain.”
It should be noted that Stringer was not a unanimous decision. The question presented therein was, in substance, “whether in a federal habeas corpus proceeding a petitioner [was] foreclosed from relying on” the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against vague aggravating factors on the ground that it amounted to a “new rule as defined in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 [103 L.Ed.2d 334, 109 S.Ct. 1060] (1989)” if applied to a judgment that became final in 1985. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. [117 L.Ed.2d at p. 375, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1133].) There was a majority opinion, which gave a negative answer; it was authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor. (Id. at pp. [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 375-383, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1133-1140] (opn. for the court by Kennedy, J.).) There was- also a dissenting opinion, which would have given an affirmative answer; it was authored by Justice Souter and joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. (Id. at pp. - [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 383-390, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1140-1146] (dis. opn. of Souter, J.).)
But more important for present purposes, it should also be noted that in Stringer the members of the court were in fact unanimous as to the existence *487of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against vague aggravating factors and its general applicability to all such factors—at least since 1990— whether used to determine death eligibility or penalty or both. (See Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at pp__-_[117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 375-383, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1133-1140] (opn. for the court by Kennedy, J.); id. at pp._-_[117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 383-390, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1140-1146] (dis. opn. of Souter, J.).)
II
California uses “aggravating factors”—labeled “special circumstances” in Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)—to decide who shall be eligible for the death penalty. “The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of’ certain specified “special circumstances has been found . . . to be true . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a).)
California also uses “aggravating factors”—bearing that very label in Penal Code section 190.3—to decide who shall receive the death penalty. “In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of’ certain specified “aggravating and mitigating” “factors if relevant . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 190.3.) “[T]he trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances [as specified] . . . , and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.” (Ibid.)
It follows from the foregoing that, inasmuch as California “uses aggravating factors”—labeled “special circumstances”—“in deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty . . . , it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].) Consequently, our special circumstances must be clearly defined.
Similarly, and of particular importance here, inasmuch as California “uses aggravating factors”—bearing that very label—“in deciding . . . who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth *488Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].) Consequently, our aggravating factors too must be clearly defined. That means that they must “adequately . . . inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty . . . .” (Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 361-362 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 380].)
IH
The majority and the concurring justice generally disagree with the reasoning and conclusions set forth above. In this, they err.
To the extent that the majority and the concurring justice state or imply that aggravating factors under California law need not perform the function of deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty, they are plainly correct. Our special circumstances accomplish that task. The Eighth Amendment does not demand redundancy. The majority misunderstand defendant to claim that our aggravating factors must perform the death-eligibility function. In this regard, they apparently mistake his references to Godfrey and Maynard. As noted above, in the view of the Stringer court, Godfrey and Maynard govern not only definition of the death-eligible class but also individualized sentencing among its members. (See Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at pp. [117 L.Ed.2d at pp. 376-383, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1135-1140].) For purposes here, I need only note the majority’s misunderstanding. Defendant will surely explicate the matter further before the United States Supreme Court on certiorari.
To the extent that the majority and the concurring justice state or imply that aggravating factors under California law need not be clearly defined, they are plainly incorrect. They founder on Stringer.
To repeat Stringer’s plain words: “[I]f a State”—like California—“uses aggravating factors in deciding . . . who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].)
To rehearse Stringer’s express rationale: “[T]he use of a vague aggravating factor in the weighing process creates the possibility not only of randomness but also of bias in favor of the death penalty . . . .” (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. _ [117 L.Ed.2d at p. 382, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].) Let us assume that our aggravating factor comprising “the circumstances of the crime” is vague. Let us further assume that it may invite consideration of, say, a defendant’s physical repulsiveness and/or his membership in a *489disfavored religious group. Could we dismiss the threat of “randomness” and/or “bias” in the actual imposition of the death penalty on the defendant by simply asserting that he was nevertheless eligible for that sentence? Manifestly, we could not do so—at least not without offense to the Eighth Amendment.
In the course of their opinion, the majority say too little about points that matter. Indeed, they barely acknowledge Stringer’s crucial holding: “[I]f a State”—like California—“uses aggravating factors in deciding . . . who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].) Only by effectively denying the very existence of these plain words can they assert that “Stringer is silent... on the Eighth Amendment requirements for aggravating factors such as” ours. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 476.)
At the same time, the majority say too much about points that do not matter—presenting, as they do, a general disquisition on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the California death penalty law.
In Bacigalupo I, defendant contended that the aggravating factors under California law are subject to the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against vagueness. The majority therein rejected the claim: “Under decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eighth Amendment’s ‘vagueness’ evaluation . . . has been applied only to statutes that govern ‘those circumstances that make a criminal defendant “eligible” for the death penalty.’ [Citation.] The statute at issue here, [Penal Code] section 190.3, does not govern those circumstances. Under the California death penalty scheme, the determination that a defendant is eligible for the death penalty is made when the jury finds the special circumstance allegation to be true. [Citations.] [Penal Code] [sjection 190.3 does not govern the circumstances making a defendant eligible for the death penalty but instead pertains to the sentencing stage at which the jury decides ‘from among that class [of persons eligible for the death penalty], those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death.’ ” CPeople v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 148.)
In Stringer, as noted, the United States Supreme Court held: “[I]f a State uses aggravating factors in deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty or who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. _[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139], italics added.)
*490In Bacigalupo v. California, supra,_U.S._[121 L.Ed.2d 5, 113 S.Ct. 32], as also noted, the United States Supreme Court remanded the cause to us, after vacating our judgment, for further consideration in light of Stringer. What it desired us to do is plain: to correct the error that appears in the passage quoted from Bacigalupo I. The majority refuse to do so. Rather, as stated above, they present a general disquisition on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the California death penalty law. In their discussion, moreover, they go astray. For example, it is not the case that a “death-eligibility criterion” that does not “include some narrowing principle” “is deemed impermissibly vague under the Eighth Amendment.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 462, italics added.) Rather, it is overbroad.
For his part, the concurring justice initially attempts to construe Stringer as applicable only if a state uses aggravating factors in determining both death eligibility and penalty. That decision, however, simply cannot be limited to such “dual use” aggravating factors without intolerable violence to its plain words. It expressly governs “if a State uses aggravating factors in deciding who shall be eligible for the death penalty or who shall receive the death penalty . . . .” (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. _ [117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139], italics added.)
The concurring justice next attempts to avoid Stringer by distinguishing Mississippi’s death penalty law from California’s.
He first tries to distinguish California and Mississippi law by construing Mississippi to use aggravating factors in deciding both who shall be eligible for the death penalty and who shall actually receive the death penalty. He fails.
Mississippi law determines death eligibility through conviction of capital murder, without consideration of any aggravating or mitigating factors. (See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2) (1993); accord, ibid. (Supp. 1991).) It then determines penalty at a sentencing phase at which, for the first time, such factors come into play. (See id., § 99-19-101 (1993); accord, ibid. (Supp. 1991).) In Ladner v. State (Miss. 1991) 584 So.2d 743, 763, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained: The “constitutionally required narrowing of the class of persons eligible for the death penalty is accomplished by the legislative definition of capital offenses in the guilt phase .... [T]he jury’s further narrowing in the sentencing phase is not constitutionally required.”
The Stringer court got it right: “Under Mississippi law the death sentence may be imposed for murders designated by statute as ‘capital murder.’ . . . Following a capital murder conviction, the jury in the Mississippi system *491proceeds to the sentencing phase of the case. For a defendant who has been convicted of capital murder to receive the death sentence, the jury must find at least one of eight statutory aggravating factors, and then it must determine that the aggravating factor or factors are not outweighed by the mitigating circumstances, if any.” (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p. _ [117 L.Ed.2d at p. 375, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1134].1
The concurring justice then tries to distinguish California and Mississippi law by construing California to use aggravating factors that are not aggravating factors at all but, as it were, mere transparent panes through which the evidence may be viewed. He again fails.
It is simply too late in the day for the concurring justice to deny the substantial nature and crucial function of the aggravating factors under California law. Along with the mitigating factors—to quote words he himself used—they provide the “framework for the exercise of [the jury’s] discretion” and “assist the jury in placing the particular defendant’s conduct in perspective.” (People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127] (per Panelli, J.); accord, People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 674 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351] [quoting Miranda];, see, e.g., People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1074 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277] [following Miranda]; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 230, fn. 5 [276 Cal.Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323] (per Panelli, J.) [stating that our aggravating and mitigating factors “statutorily define [the jury’s] sentencing function”].)
In sum, the majority and the concurring justice cannot “deconstruct” Stringer by denying either the existence of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against vague aggravating factors or its applicability to the California death penalty law. The proscription was common ground for both the majority and the dissenters in Stringer. As noted above, all the members of the Stringer court recognized both the existence of the proscription and its general applicability to all aggravating factors, whether used for death eligibility or penalty or both. What the majority and the dissenters in *492Stringer disputed was simply whether the proscription amounted to a “new rule” that could not be relied on in a federal habeas corpus proceeding by the petitioner therein, whose judgment became final in 1985. True, the proscription evidently arose with regard to aggravating factors used to determine whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty. But it has been extended to reach aggravating factors used to determine whether a defendant will actually receive the death penalty.
Neither can the majority or the concurring justice delete Stringer's plain words: “[I]f a State”—like California—“uses aggravating factors in deciding . . . who shall receive the death penalty, it cannot use factors which as a practical matter fail to guide the sentencer’s discretion” in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p._[117 L.Ed.2d at p. 381, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].)
Finally, the majority and the concurring justice cannot avoid Stringer's express rationale: “[T]he use of a vague aggravating factor in the weighing process creates the possibility not only of randomness but also of bias in favor of the death penalty . . . .” (Stringer v. Black, supra, 503 U.S. at p__ [117 L.Ed.2d at p. 382, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1139].)2
*493IV
For all the reasons stated above, although I concur in the judgment, I dissent from my colleagues’ erroneous, and insubordinate, declaration that Stringer does not apply to the California death penalty law.
I note in passing that the concurring justice’s own analysis would make California and Mississippi law substantially indistinguishable in relevant aspect. Under his reasoning, both states would have to be deemed to use aggravating factors in deciding both who shall be eligible for the death penalty and who shall actually receive the death penalty. He discerns “dual use” in Mississippi because the sentencer there must find at least one aggravating factor before it may actually fix the punishment at death. By parity of reasoning, he must discern “dual use” in California because the sentencer here must effectively find at least one such factor before it may actually fix the punishment at death. (See People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541-542, fn. 13 [220 Cal.Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], revd. on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].)
In an evident attempt to save the aggravating factor comprising “the circumstances of the crime” from invalidity under the Eighth Amendment on the ground of vagueness—an aggravating factor that, strictly speaking, is not before the court—the majority sub silentio overrule People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436] 7 (hereafter sometimes Edwards), and adopt in its place People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142] (hereafter sometimes Tuilaepa), certiorari granted December 6, 1993, sub nomine Tuilaepa v. California, United States Supreme Court Docket No. 93-5131 [126 L.Ed.2d 563, 114 S.Ct. 598].
In Edwards, a majority of this court construed the aggravating factor in question. The Edwards majority stated that it “does not mean merely the immediate and spatial circumstances of the crime,” but rather “extends to ‘[t]hat which surrounds materially, morally, or logically’ the crime.” (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 833.) It did not clarify or delimit its construction. Indeed, it expressly declined to “explore [its] outer reaches . . . .” (Id. at p. 835.)
It is manifest that this aggravating factor as construed in Edwards is vague under the Eighth Amendment. Could a jury—or anyone, for that matter—divine therefrom just what it was required to find in order to impose the death penalty? True, it might believe it must ascertain whether something “surrounded” the crime “materially, morally, or logically.” But whether something “surrounds” a crime “materially, morally, or logically” is theoretically indeterminate and practically meaningless. Indeed, it might reach matters such as whether the capital defendant—like defendant here—had been bom in the Southern Hemisphere under the astrological sign of Libra.
The Eighth Amendment has invalidated an aggravating factor that the crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” (Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 360-366 [100 L.Ed.2d at pp. 379-383].)
The Eighth Amendment has also invalidated an aggravating factor that the crime was “ ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.’ ” (Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. *493at pp. 427-433 [64 L.Ed.2d at pp. 405-409] (plur. opn. by Stewart, J.); id. at pp. 433-442 [64 L.Ed.2d at pp. 409-415] (conc. opn. of Marshall, J.).)
A fortiori, the Eighth Amendment must invalidate the aggravating factor comprising “the circumstances of the crime” as construed in Edwards. If juries are not adequately informed as to what they must find in order to impose the death penalty when they are told to determine whether the crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” or “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman,” they are not informed at all when they are directed merely to “ ‘[t]hat which surrounds materially, morally, or logically’ the crime.” (People v. Edwards, supra, at p. 833.)
Little better than Edwards is Tuilaepa, the decision that the majority rush to embrace as they contemplate the void. In Tuilaepa, a majority of this court construed the aggravating factor in question to “direct the sentencer’s attention to specific, provable, and commonly understandable facts about the defendant and the capital crime that might bear on his moral culpability.” (People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal,4th at p. 595.) What “specific, provable, and commonly understandable facts”? One cannot say. How to determine whether such “facts” “bear on [the defendant’s] moral culpability”? Here too, one cannot say.
I do not reach the question whether the majority’s overruling of Edwards, and their adoption of Tuilaepa in its place, are enough to save this aggravating factor from invalidity under the Eighth Amendment on the ground of vagueness. Defendant will no doubt press the issue before the United States Supreme Court on certiorari. In Arave v. Creech (1993)_U.S. ___[123 L.Ed.2d 188, 200, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542], the high court recently held: “If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.” (Italics in original.) Apparently, a sentencer could so conclude as to the aggravating factor in question.