dissenting.
I agree with the majority's disposition of the jurisdictional issue concerning the robbery charge. In addition, I must agree that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crocker v. State (1985), Ind., 475 N.E.2d 686 (1985) appears to constrain us to the majority's conclusion. There the court indicated it was following Williams v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1036 concerning the review of guilty pleas and determined that it was necessary to vacate a guilty plea entered in 1977 because the court failed to advise Crocker that it was not bound by the terms of any plea bargain entered into.1
I feel it incumbent upon me to express the opposing view which, rather than searching for nuances between Williams and German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234, seeks recognition of a different principle.
Although debate continues,2 the so-called orthodox rule of harmless error was stated as carly as 1830. Doe v. Tyler (C.P.1830), 6 Bing. 561, 130 Eng.Rep. 1397. Concern has focused not upon whether an error may be harmless, but when; and, thus, upon by what standard want of harm may be judged.
In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, the Supreme Court determined that federal constitutional error might be harmless, rejected the earlier "reasonable possibility" test of Fahy v. Connecticut (1963), 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, and ruled that to be held harmless the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828.
In Greer v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 20, 245 N.E.2d 158 Indiana applied the Chopman test to federal constitutional errors. It acknowledged Chapman in Dickerson v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 562, 276 N.E.2d 845 stating that when a constitutional error has been committed a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises and the burden is on the state to demonstrate that the accused was in no way prejudiced thereby. 276 N.E.2d at 851. (Greer also cited as authority Harris v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 681, 231 N.E.2d 800, wherein the court had stated,
"It is clear, therefore, that the Indiana cases, and the cases from other states and from the Supreme Court of the United States, encourage and support our holding that constitutional error is not reversible error where the state bears the burden of demonstrating that the accused was in no way prejudiced by such error."
281 N.E.2d at 806.
Assuming that Chapman still accurately represents the federal rule (compare, eg. Brown v. United States (1973), 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208); assuming that Indiana would elect the strictness *337of the Chapman standard in viewing questions of state constitutional error; and assuming that advisement of the court's status in a plea agreement is of constitutional dimension, it seems clear that under the circumstances of the given case such error may nevertheless be harmless.
In DeVillez v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 263, 416 N.E.2d 846, 848 our Supreme Court considered IC 85-4.1-1-8(e) [repealed] under which Pharms appeals and concluded,
"The objective of subsection (e) is fairness to the accused. This objective is sought by portraying the role of the court as being independent of the plea agreement and by insuring that the acceptance of the plea and the sentence received are within the expectations of the accused."
The record before us discloses that after the jury had been impaneled to try Pharms, and as a result of a plea agreement, he pled guilty to the robbery count and the state nolle prossed the murder count. The parties are agreed that the court in fact accepted the plea bargain and sentenced Pharms accordingly. He received exactly what he had bargained for.
Under these circumstances, and regardless of the problems that may exist when an appellate court attempts to gauge the impact of an error upon a jury, it may be stated with conviction that the trial court's error in failing to advise Pharms that the judge was not bound by the plea agreement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
For that reason the denial of post-conviction relief should be affirmed.
. Arguably, the court determined that whether or not the trial court actually accepted the plea agreement was immaterial since it found it unnecessary to discuss that circumstance in the opinion. On the other hand, it may be urged that the court neither considered nor passed upon the question now raised.
. See, eg., Traynor: The Riddle of Harmless Error. Law Forum Series of the College of Law of Ohio State University, No. 7 (1970).