dissenting:
I believe the majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the applicable use and sales taxes. It is clear that printing presses are machinery and equipment primarily used in the process of manufacturing or assembling, and they therefore meet the first definitional requirement for the manufacturing-machinery exemption. In fact, as the majority points out, the revenue department has abandoned its original position that printing presses are not manufacturing machinery. It has also abandoned its reliance on its emergency rule adopted on December 21, 1979, which later became a permanent regulation, that manufacturing does not include the process of printing.
This would end the case, and the manufacturing-machinery exemption would relieve the taxpayer of the contested use tax, had the revenue department not shifted its position during the course of this litigation to argue that the exemption does not apply because a newspaper is not “tangible personal property for wholesale or retail sale” within the meaning of this provision. There is no doubt, however, that newspapers fall within the category of. tangible personal property as that term is commonly understood, just as books and paintings do. For example, a person who owns a copy of the famous Tribune headline declaring Thomas E. Dewey the victor in the 1948 presidential election would certainly regard it as a valuable piece of tangible personal property.
The fact that the legislature has decided in another provision that the sale of newspapers should not be subject to a tax does not change a newspaper from “tangible personal property” as that term is used in the manufacturing-machinery exemption into something else. The language used in the two provisions is different; hence, there is no valid basis for concluding that because newspapers are specifically exempted from the sales tax, they are also excluded from the term “tangible personal property” as used in the manufacturing-machinery exemption. The latter exemption by its terms applies to the “manufacturing or assembling of tangible personal property for wholesale or retail sale or lease.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 439.3.) The provision exempting the sale of newspapers, on the other hand, first refers to newsprint and ink as “tangible personal property” and then exempts the purchase of “newsprint and ink for the primary purpose of conveying news” by directing that such a transfer “is not a purchase, use or sale of tangible personal property.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 440.
The purpose of the latter provision was only to exclude newspapers from taxation as retail sales by the device of declaring that such a transfer is not a sale of personal property. Nothing in the wording of this exemption either commands or justifies its application as a definition of “tangible personal property” which excludes newspapers wherever that term is used in the tax statutes. Moreover, the use of different language surrounding that term suggests it has different meanings in the two contexts. Reading into the manufacturing-machinery exemption the dissimilar language of the newspaper-sales exemption leads to a construction of the former provision which is contrary to its plain meaning. The newspaper-sales exemption confers upon newspapers a status that is, of course, contrary to reality. It is illogical and unwarranted to carry that status over to another provision adopted 18 years later, designed for a different purpose, dealing with different subject matter and using the term “tangible personal property” in a completely different context, absent a clear directive from the legislature.
I find nothing irregular or unacceptable in a taxing scheme that exempts newspapers from a sales tax while at the same time exempting the printing presses that produce them from a use tax. That is the legislature’s prerogative and, as I read the statutory provisions, it has expressed that choice in clear and unambiguous language.
Because the statutory provisions applicable here are clear and unambiguous, they should be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. (People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 469, 475-76.) It is therefore improper to consider the statements of two members of the General Assembly referring to a defeated amendment to House Bill 1596 to determine whether the legislature intended that printing presses qualify for the manufacturing-machinery exemption. The statutory language itself is the best indication of the intent of the drafters. (89 Ill. 2d 469, 475.) In any event, the statements on which the majority relies do not indicate any legislative intent, and thus neither require the interpretation of the manufacturing-machinery exemption which the majority applies nor even lend support to that interpretation.
As the majority points out, the defeated amendment would have added a provision to the manufacturing-machinery exemption covering “press equipment designed and used for producing newspapers or other periodicals that have the primary purpose of disseminating news to the public.” (106 Ill. 2d at 70.) There is no certainty, however, that the observations of Senator Regner and Representative Flinn express what motivated the majority of the senators who voted against the amendment. Those who voted “against” may have done so believing the amendment unnecessary because the manufacturing-machinery exemption clearly included news-printing presses. Representative Bowman’s statement in opposition to the graphic-arts bill is also inconclusive, for if printing presses were already included in the manufacturing-machinery exemption, they could hardly contribute to the expansion of the exemption to which Representative Bowman was referring.
Moreover, the enactment of the graphic-arts bill does not support the conclusion that it provided an exemption for printing presses which did not previously exist. The graphic-arts amendment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 120, par. 439.3) was enacted in the next session of the legislature after the revenue department adopted its emergency rule on December 21, 1979, which later became a permanent regulation, declaring that printing machinery did not qualify for the manufacturing-machinery exemption. Under these circumstances, the graphic-arts bill should be regarded as interpretive and a reaffirmation of existing legislation, designed to correct an erroneous administrative interpretation placed on the statute by the revenue department. (Bruni v. Department of Registration & Education (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 6, 11-12; People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 18.) Thus, such directive as we have from the legislature can be regarded as contrary to the conclusion the majority reaches.
The legislative comments on which the majority appears to place sole reliance for its holding are, in my judgment, neither helpful nor appropriate in reaching the proper result in this case. Rather, applying the statutory provisions in accordance with their clear and plain meaning leads to a resolution of this appeal in favor of the taxpayer without the need to consider either the inconclusive comments of three members of the General Assembly or the constitutional arguments the taxpayer has advanced.