(dissenting). I find I am unable to agree with the decision reached by my colleagues in this case. My reading of the opinion written by appeal board member Mumper leads me to conclude that the decision rendered below was again reached through the application of an erroneous legal standard.
*105Plaintiff was originally awarded workmen’s compensation benefits for a back injury she suffered in a work-related accident. At the expiration of 500 weeks, plaintiff sought to recover further benefits for total and permanent disability due to the alleged loss of industrial use of her legs.1 Testimony adduced at the hearing on plaintiff’s claim reveals that the disabling condition upon which plaintiff was relying to seek further benefits was due either to the effect protracted leg use had on her work-related back injury, certain psychological problems, or a combination of the two. In order for the appeal board to make a proper determination of the instant case it was required to ascertain whether:
"[t]he use of one or both legs, whether or not injured, triggers an employment-related injury or malady in any part of the body, including one or both legs, that causes pain or other condition that prevents use of both legs in industry.”2
If plaintiff satisfied the above test then the fact that plaintiff’s condition may also have been aggravated by psychological problems does not preclude her from receiving further compensation. See Crosby v Sterner Sheet Metal & Roofing Co, 51 Mich App 311; 214 NW2d 868 (1974); Lockwood v Continental Motors Corp, 27 Mich App 597; 183 NW2d 807 (1970).
In reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing on plaintiff’s claim, the appeal board, member *106Storie dissenting, found that plaintiff did not suffer the loss of industrial use of her legs. In reaching this decision the appeal board focused on whether there was direct medical evidence establishing physical injury to plaintiff’s legs. In so doing the appeal board employed an erroneous legal standard. Since it is not our function to sit as a factfinder in cases where the appeal board "has not made findings of fact with consideration for the proper legal standard”,31 would again remand this case for consideration in conformance with the proper legal standard.
Formerly MCLA 412.10(b)(7); MSA 17.160(b)(7), now MCLA 418.361(2)(g); MSA 17.237(361)(2)(g).
Burke v Ontonagon County Road Commission, 391 Mich 103, 114; 214 NW2d 797 (1974), reaffirming the decisional validity of Paulson v Muskegon Heights Tile Co, 371 Mich 312; 123 NW2d 715 (1963), and Lockwood v Continental Motors Corp, 27 Mich App 597; 183 NW2d 807 (1970). See also DeGeer v DeGeer Farm Equipment Co, 391 Mich 96; 214 NW2d 794 (1974).
Wright v Thumb Electric Cooperative, 49 Mich App 714, 718; 212 NW2d 607 (1973).